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INTRODUCTION

The causes of decline for cities such as Buffalo, New York in the northeastern United
States, or rust belt, have been attributed to many factors over the last half-century. Many
lay the blame for economic decline on labor unions and the high cost associated with
their members’ compensation and inefficient work practices. Some experts cite the high
tax burden in New York State, which may stifle economic growth. Many of these experts
also denounce the government efforts to provide aid to this region as not only misguided
and ineffective, but also an impediment to true entrepreneurial potential.
Population decline in Buffalo is another problem that bears closer scrutiny. Many
researchers have concluded that the loss of employment opportunities in the cities led to
the population shifting to suburban areas or to other states, but others have countered
with the view that poor race relations also contributed to the exodus. This, combined with
the predominance of the automobile and the construction of numerous highways, has
made living outside of the city a more viable alternative. Inept, shortsighted politicians
and business leaders who contributed to the decline of population and prosperity made
many of the decisions. Buffalo has increasingly become an area of concentrated poverty,
as the more affluent residents depart for the outer suburbs. Without a sizable taxpayer and
industrial base, the city cannot afford to provide adequate services to its remaining
residents. Dependence on state and federal funding has increased as Buffalo struggles to
maintain a working infrastructure. By isolating the historic sources of the out migration,
Buffalo can begin to craft workable solutions to slow the decline and make the city more
appealing to taxpayers.
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This study will focus on these various causes in an attempt to pinpoint the historical
reasons for decline, not for the purpose of laying blame, but to set the groundwork for
possible solutions that will stem the economic decline. Only with a proper, objective,
historical perspective can these problems be identified and solved.
The methodology for this study includes an examination into the roots of the decline
of Buffalo and the past attempts to reverse it. Once the causes are identified, along with
the reason for the failure of previous solutions, then present and future solutions for
stemming decline may be evaluated.
Using census data, state and city transportation reports, federal grant reports,
interviews, city budget data, news articles and other primary sources, the study will move
from the more broad picture presented by the experts, to a more narrow focus gleaned
from the material listed in the primary sources. This thesis suggests that the emphasis
placed on the negative effects of federal government block grant funds and organized
labor have been over exaggerated, while the affects of poor race relations, inept
leadership from local government and business leaders, destruction and elimination of
neighborhoods and parkland for highway construction, lack of waterfront development,
outdated zoning ordinances, and limitations on immigration have been understated.
Exposing these discrepancies may lead to more effective solutions.
This study builds on the work initiated by Dr. Neil Kraus, an associate professor at the
University of Wisconsin, who explored the politics of race in the city of Buffalo in his
book, Race, Neighborhoods, and Community Power. Dr. Kraus highlights for example,
the disproportionate number of African Americans who were displaced during the urban
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renewal of the 1950s.1 His work supports the view that white animosity toward African
Americans led to unfair treatment, inadequate political representation, and eventually
“white flight,” or the mass migration of whites from the city of Buffalo to the suburbs.
This study will test the validity of Dr. Kraus’s assertions and attempt to show how race
relations aided Buffalo’s economic and population decline through examinations of the
Federal Housing Administration’s policies, school desegregation in the city of Buffalo,
Buffalo Municipal Housing Authority reports, and census data.
Another source on the subject of urban renewal is Jon C. Teaford, Professor Emeritus,
Department of History at Perdue University. In his book, The Rough Road to
Renaissance: Urban Revitalization in America, 1940-1985, Teaford explored the failures
of urban revitalization efforts in the northeastern United States during the 1950s and
1960s. This study will show how these efforts destroyed a viable, racially-mixed
neighborhood in Buffalo and forced a large number of African Americans into other
areas at an unnatural pace, which led to more out migration of whites.
In addition to these authors is the work of investigative reporter James Heaney, of the
Buffalo News, whose 2004 work exposed how Buffalo politicians squandered millions of
dollars in federal aid from block grants with little investment in brick-and-mortar projects
and without a comprehensive plan. This study will provide more examples of this pattern
of ineptitude, while contrasting that with examples from other cities that have used
federal funds to improve their physical structures through the use of comprehensive
planning.
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Neil Kraus, Race, Neighborhoods, and Community Power: Buffalo Politics, 1934-1997 (Albany:
State University of New York Press, 2000), 98.
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Michael R. Fein, assistant professor of history at Johnson & Wales University in
Providence, Rhode Island, supplied the previous work on the politics of highway
construction in New York State. His book, Paving the Way: New York Road Building and
the American State, 1880–1956, reveals how the New York State Department of Public
Works joined with state engineers to make decisions that favored people who commuted
to work in automobiles.2 He pinpoints the period when automobile supremacy begins at
the expense of public transportation and pedestrian-friendly areas. This study will
continue exploring this trend as it permeates into the local level and affects the distinct,
defined borders of Buffalo’s traditional neighborhoods.
Paul A. Tiffany, Assistant Professor of Management, University of Pennsylvania and
former consultant to the United States Steel Corporation, the American Iron and Steel
Institute, and the Steel Service Center Institute, focuses on management and labor. This
study will examine Professor Tiffany’s assertion that the failure of government, steel
management, and labor led to the decline of the steel industry.3 In addition, Thomas
Leary and Elizabeth Sholes, partners in an independent public history firm, add their
study on the trends in the steel industry (especially poor corporate practices) that led to
the decline of Bethlehem Steel. The demise of Buffalo’s steel industry provides a case
study to test these theories and expand on the previous findings.
Proposals to revitalize the city of Buffalo include the radical concept of “smart
decline,” in which former industrial cities of the northeastern United States would shrink
in population, while consolidating their residents in a smaller land area. Rutgers
2

Michael R. Fein. Paving the Way: New York Road Building and the American State, 1880-1956.
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2008), 188.
3
Paul A. Tiffany, The Decline of American Steel: How Management, Labor, and Government Went
Wrong. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988.): 291.
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University and Princeton University professor Frank J. Popper backs this approach, and
adds that outdated zoning ordinances in the city of Buffalo, created in anticipation of
population growth, now serve as a restriction to the mixed-use areas that make city life
more vibrant.4 This study will explore how Buffalo’s zoning ordinances, which combine
industry or residential parcels in distinct areas, create suburban-style islands of shopping
and industry that are more suited to automobile travel and inhibit “walkable” areas.
Harvard economics professor Edward Glaeser agrees with the idea of Buffalo accepting
its smaller population and attempting to improve existing properties, rather than
continuing to build more office space and residences.5 This study will examine declining
property values due to an overabundance of structures in an attempt to show that
funneling resources toward gentrification can make neighborhoods more attractive and
create a stronger taxpayer base.
The reasons for the economic and population decline in the city of Buffalo are still a
point of debate today. The value of federal government funding in the form of block
grants and highway construction, the predominance of the automobile in city planning,
the effects of poor race relations, the actions of labor and management in Buffalo’s
industrial base, and the ineptitude of local politicians are fodder for historical debate
concerning Buffalo’s past, but remain as unsolved questions in the present. If Buffalo’s
leaders can come to a consensus on what its failures were, then city planners can properly
evaluate proposed solutions and form a comprehensive plan to stabilize economic and
population decline.
4

Deborah and Frank Popper. “Smart Decline in Post-Carbon Cities: The Buffalo Commons Meets
Buffalo, New York.” The Post Carbon Institute. Available from:
http://www.postcarbon.org/Reader/PCReader-Popper-Decline.pdf. Internet; accessed 21 July 2010; 3.
5
Edward L. Glaeser. “Can Buffalo Ever Come Back?” City Journal, October 2007. Available from:
http://www.city-journal.org/html/17_4_buffalo_ny.html. Internet; accessed 24 July 2010.
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The first four chapters of this study will examine the most significant reasons for
economic and population decline in Buffalo, while the last chapter provides an
examination of several proposed methods of urban revitalization and how they have fared
in other struggling cities. Chapter one outlines the federal government’s attempts to
rebuild cities like Buffalo by initiating massive renewal programs aimed at replacing
structural blight and how that funding was managed by the city government. In addition,
chapter one examines how federal funding was used to provide tax breaks in distressed
areas in order to spur investment and create jobs. Chapter two outlines the role that race
relations played in Buffalo’s decline, including forced school integration and its role in
the out migration of whites to the suburbs. Chapter three outlines the role of the
predominance of the automobile in Western New York and how this led to highway
construction that dissected and disrupted several Buffalo neighborhoods, while an
opportunity to create effective public transportation for the Western New York region
was squandered by local officials. Chapter four outlines the role that management, labor,
and government played in the massive decline of manufacturing jobs in Western New
York, especially the demise of Bethlehem Steel. Finally, chapter five outlines several
proposals to stem economic and population decline, including some initiatives that have
had success in cities similar to Buffalo.

7

CHAPTER 1
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION AND THE REVITALIZATION OF THE
AMERICAN CITY: BUFFALO, NY IN THE POSTWAR ERA
“Societies and civilizations in which the cities stagnate don’t develop and flourish
further. They deteriorate.”6 This quote from sociologist Jane Jacobs is a sober reminder
that our nation has an obligation to invest in the maintenance and development of its
cities. Our cities have traditionally been places of innovation, discovery, and creativity. If
we abandon our efforts to restore the American city to its former status as the center of
knowledge and culture, our nation will continue to decline.
Federal, state, and local governments have made several attempts to slow or reverse
this decline through large-scale urban renewal programs. These efforts have taken various
forms throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, with mixed results. Former
industrial giants such as Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh have attempted to regain their
status as thriving urban centers and prevent the outward migration of residents with the
help of federal and state urban renewal programs, such as urban renewal, the Model
Cities Program, block grants, and Enterprise Zones. These cities have lost the majority of
their manufacturing jobs and tax revenue from the companies that moved. Each of the
aforementioned programs will be assessed in regard to their success in Buffalo with a
comparison to their success in other selected cities.
These programs have sparked a debate over the usefulness of massive aid to cities
and over the means of allocating the funds. Some historians, such as Jon C. Teaford,
argue that government renewal programs have largely failed and that the few successes
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Jane Jacobs, Cities and the Wealth of Nations: Principles of Economic Life (New York: Random
House, 1984), 232.
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were not substantial improvements, but merely “hype” fostered by charismatic mayors. 7
He views the loss of the manufacturing base as insurmountable as far as revitalization is
concerned. Those jobs helped to create a solid middle class in the Northeast. Some other
historians concur with Teaford on the overall failure of government to return cities to
their previous lofty status as the center of industry and population, but offer reasons why
the failure occurred. Associate professor at the University of Wisconsin Neil Kraus, for
example, contends that race relations thwarted Buffalo’s efforts at urban renewal, or
“Negro Removal”, as some have called it. He backs this contention with statistics that
show the majority of those displaced were African-American.8 Historian and specialist in
housing, community development, and urban affairs Alexander Von Hoffman counters
by illustrating both the failure of governmental intervention and the success stories. His
account of how the South Bronx community’s faith in the possibility of revitalization,
combined with their cooperation with and prodding of government officials, led to a
“resurrection.”9 In this sense, the government aid was a tool that could be utilized by
innovative, aggressive people to improve their neighborhoods and boost the quality of
life in the city, while not necessarily turning the local economy around.
The debate leads to the question of whether or not the governmental attempts at
revitalization were worth the enormous cost. This chapter will examine the legacy left
behind and weigh the successes against the failures in order to reach a conclusion. The
evidence validates the belief that governmental assistance to cities can make a positive
impact, but assistance alone will not return a poor city to its former economic standing.
7

Jon C. Teaford, The Rough Road to Renaissance: Urban Revitalization in America, 1940-1985
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), 307.
8
Kraus, 98.
9
Alexander Von Hoffman, House by House, Block by Block: The Rebirth of America’s Urban
Neighborhoods (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 76.
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Positive impact is possible when competent, innovative leaders, private interests, and
citizen organizations cooperate and use the resources to benefit the entire community.
While this is indeed a complex proposition, it is nevertheless achievable. Buffalo’s failure
to emulate the successes of other northeast cities was a result of inept, fractional
leadership that was not challenged by the racially polarized populace.

Urban Renewal in Buffalo’s Ellicott District

After World War II, the U.S. cities were ready for change. Areas of blight were a
cause for consternation among city residents and officials. The elimination of slums
became a top priority and the booming national economy provided the hope to make it
happen. The Housing Act of 1949 paved the way for older, industrial cities like Buffalo
to eradicate this blight and replace it with new construction using federal funds.10 Change
had arrived, but the process of renewal was not as simplistic as planners had anticipated.
The purpose of the unprecedented demolition and redevelopment was to eradicate the
slums of the inner city.11 New housing for the poor city residents was also a priority.
During the 1920’s, an exodus of middle class whites to the first-ring suburbs began to
drain the cities of population. This process sped up between 1950 and 1960, as population
in Buffalo’s suburbs grew by 52 percent and Cleveland’s suburbs saw a 115 percent
increase.12 This was made possible through Federal Housing Authority, Fannie Mae and
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Alfred D. Price, “Urban Renewal: The Case of Buffalo, N.Y.” Review of Black Political Economy
19, no.3 (1991): 125-160. EBSCOhostResearch [database on-line], Buffalo State College, E.H.Butler
Library Research: accessed October 1, 2006.
11
Ibid.
12
Teaford, 124.
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Veterans Administration low interest home loans for the middle class.13 Urban renewal
was intended to clear slums and make the city more attractive to those who remained, but
clearing out the slums also meant clearing out the people who lived in them.14 Critics
charged that poor residents, their neighborhoods, and their businesses were uprooted
unfairly. Business owners only received compensation for the value of their property
along with a $1,500 allowance.15
Prejudice played a role in this decision, especially in Buffalo, where 80 percent of the
relocated residents were African American.16 This view was substantiated in the 1974
school desegregation case of Arthur v. Nyquist. During the trial, it was revealed that the
Federal Housing Administration Underwriting Manual contained a passage that
commented on preventing the “infiltration of inharmonious racial or national groups” into
white neighborhoods.17 The Home Owners' Loan Corporation (HOLC), a New Deal
program that refinanced home mortgages, rated white, middle class neighborhoods as
“A,” (the top rating) while denying their services to black customers.18 Federal policy,
along with local policy, was surely influenced by racism.
This attitude, along with animosity toward the poor, led to the isolation of housing
projects from Buffalo’s other residential areas. The Ellicott and Talbert Malls in
Buffalo’s Ellicott district were public housing islands in a shrinking city (see Figure 1).
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Paul S. Grogan and Tony Procio, Comeback Cities: A Blueprint for Urban Neighborhood Revival
(Boulder: Westview Press, 2000), 194.
14
Price.
15
Bernard J. Frieden and Lynne B. Sagalyn, Downtown, Inc.: How America Rebuilds Cities
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989), 35.
16
Kraus, 98.
17
Mark Goldman, City on the Lake: The Challenge of Change in Buffalo, N.Y. (Amherst: Prometheus
Books, 1990), 137.
18
Kenneth T. Jackson. Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States. (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1985): 197.
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Figure 1. Buffalo’s Ellicott District 1961Ellicott Mall at top, Talbert Mall at bottom (from
Western New York Heritage Press, 2005)
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Many African Americans in Buffalo’s Ellicott district whose homes were demolished
declined to relocate to these public housing projects. They began to migrate to areas that
immediately adjoined the Ellicott district, which were predominantly German-American,
such as the Fruit Belt and Cold Springs neighborhoods.19 Many real estate agents took
advantage of this situation by first advising existing white homeowners to move out, then
inflating the price of the homes and selling them to unwitting African American buyers, a
practice known as “blockbusting.”20 White homeowners began to flee to the suburbs, and
as a result the East Side became predominately black. Meanwhile, the Municipal Housing
Authority of Buffalo continued to steer African Americans into housing projects well into
the 1970’s.21
Another stumbling block to progress in urban renewal was the glacial pace of
construction after demolition. In Cleveland, 126,000 homes and apartment buildings were
cleared in 1961 and replaced with only 28,000 new residential structures, which included
a mix of housing projects and homes.22 In New Haven, Connecticut thirty thousand
residents were displaced from 1956 to 1966.23 In Buffalo, 2,200 African-American
families were displaced for the 1954 Ellicott project and ten years later there were only
six single family homes constructed for middle-income families in that district. Part of
the delay was the fact that in the late-1950s, the federal government began to skimp on
funding while at the same time project costs rose due to issues with developers and
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Kraus, 187.
Ibid, 286.
21
Goldman, 44.
22
Kenneth Kolson, Big Plans: The Allure and Folly of Urban Design (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2001), 82.
23
Douglas W. Rae, City: Urbanism and its End (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 339.
20
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unions.24 Many cities were left with empty scars that were once neighborhoods filled with
people.25
While the idea behind urban renewal was a noble one, the results were less than
expected.26 Too much effort was put into demolition of blighted areas without enough
consideration of what would replace them and how residents would be affected. In some
cases, such as Cleveland’s 1959 Erieview project, everything that got in the way of new
development was classified as “blight.”27 Developers’ needs were placed over those of
the residents. This was the case in Buffalo as well. Cities are complex organisms that
require careful study and planning, along with citizen participation, before change is
enacted. Planners must anticipate how the developed area will interact with the rest of the
metropolitan area. The size of these projects was overly ambitious as well. Even with
ample federal funds at the city’s disposal, reconstruction cannot be completed overnight.
A careful, inclusive approach combined with a sufficient amount of time and funding
would have provided better results.

The Model Cities Program

The next federal attempt at city revitalization, the Model Cities Program, employed a
“bottom-up” implementation strategy in contrast to the “top down” implementation of

24

Teaford, 156.
Grogan and Proscio,195.
26
Urban renewal originated with the Housing Act of 1949. The federal government paid for twothirds of the cost, while local governments covered the remainder.
27
Kolson, 81
25
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Urban Renewal.28 Model Cities began in 1966 as a facet of President Lyndon Johnson’s
Great Society, which was created to combat poverty and racial injustice. Its creators
envisioned it as a more comprehensive program that involved revitalizing the cities
through a combination of rebuilding, rehabilitation, and delivery of social services.
Education, heath, employment, and housing would all be addressed in improving the
quality of life in cities. The major difference between Model Cities and Urban Renewal,
however, was the participation of citizens in both the planning and implementation, thus
the “bottom-up” label. This was an attempt to avoid the heavy-handed, “bulldozer”
approach of Urban Renewal, which destroyed whole neighborhoods without any input
from residents. Citizens’ groups would formulate a comprehensive plan to combat
poverty and blight in a particular neighborhood, and the federal government would
allocate the funds.
In 1967, Buffalo was chosen to participate as one of the demonstration cities in the
Model Cities Program. Local government leaders and the Model Cities director, who was
a local sociology professor, immediately had conflicting ideas on how the program would
be administered.29 The city’s community development officials attempted to undermine
the director and submit their own plan to the Department of Housing and Urban
Development, but the director’s close connection to the mayor led to the implementation
of his original action plan. The conflict stemmed from different ideologies. The director
viewed the program as more than a physical makeover, contrary to the previous federal

28

Nicholas Lemann “The Myth of Community Development.” New York Times. 9 January 1994, in
ProQuest Historical Newspapers [database on-line], Buffalo State College, E.H.Butler Library Research:
accessed October 1,2006.
29
Model Cities directors were chosen by each city’s mayor.
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Urban Renewal program.30 Rather than merely demolishing dilapidated neighborhoods
and building housing projects and homes, the Model Cities Program was designed to also
fund social service delivery and community participation. Local community development
officials disagreed with the social direction of the program, and together with the local
business leadership branded the Model Cities Program as another form of social welfare
handouts.31 They argued that social service delivery was the responsibility of the welfare
agencies alone. However, the record of weekly meetings of the citizen participants
reveals a different story. The citizens asked for improved transportation, education,
employment opportunities, and access to capital in order to better themselves and their
neighborhoods. This was no handout.32
Despite the lack of cooperation from Buffalo’s government and business leaders, the
Model Cities Program had some impact on the community. The Langston Hughes Center
for the Visual and Performing Arts, the Employment Information Center, the jitney
service, the ECCO Supermarket, along with numerous other community programs, were
some of those positive initiatives.33 Perhaps the most important component of the legacy
though, was the proliferation of grassroots organizations, such as community
development corporations, that the program helped to spawn. Until the late 1960’s,
Buffalo’s African-American population had virtually no voice in policy decisions. The
Model Cities Program changed that within a few years, involving citizens in physical
development as well as social service delivery.34
30

Diana Dillaway, Power Failure: Politics, Patronage and the Economic Future of Buffalo, New
York. (Amherst: Prometheus Books, 2006), 95-96.
31
These community development officials worked for the mayor’s office and had the backing of some
Common Council members as well.
32
Ibid, 94.
33
Model City, Buffalo, N.Y., produced by Doug Ruffin Enterprises, 2005, DVD.
34
Goldman, 67.
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While the Model Cities Program had its share of successes, it could not fulfill the
lofty goals set by its creators. Originally designed as a small-scale program that would
target specific areas in a handful of cities, the program eventually expanded to over 150
cities. The funding was therefore diluted, and in addition, city institutions did not always
comply with the program directors.35 The cities that were the most successful were the
ones that had a “parity” system in which neither government nor residents dominated the
planning and implementation stages.36 Another hindrance was the lack of coordination at
the federal level, which led to a delay in the allocation of funds until 1969.37 The
incoming Richard Nixon administration further weakened the program by slashing the
funding level from $38 million annually to 17.5 million in 1972. President Nixon seemed
content to let the program die in order to roll the funds into a new program that in 1974
provided local leaders less federal regulation and more choice in where to target the aid. 38

The Community Development Block Grant Program

That new program emerged from the Housing and Community Development Act of
1974. The law combined the existing categorical grants, including Model Cities, into
block form. The Community Development Block Grant Program (CDBG) was promoted
35

Von Hoffman, 12.
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Community Development,
Evaluation Division, The Model Cities Program: A Comparative Analysis of City Response Patterns and
Their Relation to Future Urban Policy. (Washington, D.C.: Housing and Urban Development, 1973), 7.
37
Monroe W. Karmin, “What’s the Status of Urban Uplift?” Wall Street Journal, 30 January 1969, in
ProQuest Historical Newspapers [database on-line], Buffalo State College, E.H.Butler Library Research:
accessed October 1,2006.
38
Emmett George, “Model Cities Time is Up-But Funds Keep Rolling In.” Chicago Tribune, 30
January 1975, W4, in ProQuest Historical Newspapers [database on-line], Buffalo State College,
E.H.Butler Library Research: accessed October 1,2006.
36
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as a more democratic approach to governmental aid in that localities would decide for
themselves where to target the funding. The only provisions were that the expenditures
had to be used for low-to-moderate income people, urgent community needs, or
elimination of blight.39
Buffalo seemed to exemplify the democratic spirit of the CDBG Program. A 1974
Buffalo Common Council hearing set the stage for citizens to make their concerns and
demands known. Some of the major issues discussed were: the desire for new houses
rather than projects, neighborhood as opposed to downtown development, quality of
social services, absentee landlord laws, blight, and programs that were city-wide rather
than local.40 In 1977, Mayor Makowski appointed community directors to head twelve
separate city districts and created several community development corporations with
ample staff and funding. This move was unprecedented, as it excluded Buffalo’s
Democratic “machine.” Power in the city was moving away from the party and back to
the citizens through grassroots organizations.41
In 1977, the populist tide swept in James Griffin as Buffalo’s new mayor. He
promptly replaced the old patronage system with one of his own. His populism, however,
did not extend to Buffalo’s African-American community. One of his first actions as
mayor was to terminate Makowski’s community coordinators.42 This set the stage for a
power struggle between Griffin, Buffalo’s grassroots organizations, and the Common
39

“CDBG: A 25-Year History.” Journal of Housing and Community Development, 56, no.4 (1999):
20-26. EBSCOhostResearch [database on-line], Buffalo State College, E.H.Butler Library Research:
accessed October 1,2006.
40
City of Buffalo. Common Council. Special Committee on Community Development: Public
Hearings. (Buffalo, N.Y.: Common Council, 1974), 8. From the George Arthur Papers at Buffalo State
College Special Archives.
41
Dillaway, 137.
42
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Community Planning and
Development, Citizen Participation in Community Development: A Catalog of Local Approaches.
(Washington, D.C.: Housing and Urban Development, 1978), 31.
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Council. Griffin and the developers favored downtown projects, grassroots organizations
preferred neighborhood development and services, while the Common Council members
fought for individual projects to satisfy voters.
Griffin won the power struggle by creating his own community development
corporations in order to control the flow of CDBG funds.43 Except for the occasional
concession to the African-American community or a small victory by a Common Council
member, Griffin was free to use the federal funds as he pleased. This occurred while the
amount of federal funding was still rising during the Jimmy Carter Presidency. In 1981
CDBG funds reached their peak at $54.5 million, while total federal assistance for the
city reached $83.5 million. During the Makowski tenure, critics claimed that the city
allocated too much money to neighborhood services, but this soon changed.44
Mayor Griffin and Buffalo’s dominant economic institutions; such as M&T Bank,
National Fuel, and Blue Cross, who controlled the boards of the regional development
agencies, viewed neighborhood investment as wasted funds that would not generate
further growth. The city began to funnel more and more money into downtown projects
like office buildings, parking ramps, and bank buildings in a spending spree that lasted
until the 1990’s. During the period from 1985 to 1987, only 2.7 percent of CDBG funds
were allocated to neighborhood revitalization.45
In addition to the neglect of city neighborhoods, incompetence and inaction was
rampant. There was no comprehensive strategy for revitalization as the Common Council
members fought for one small project at a time. Without federal oversight, money was

43

Dillaway, 179.
City of Buffalo. Comptroller’s Office. 151st Annual Report of the Comptroller/City of Buffalo, N.Y.
Fiscal Year ended June 30, 1983. (Buffalo, N.Y.: Comptroller’s Office, 1983).
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spread all over the city through agencies that were not monitored or evaluated properly.
Several of the downtown projects folded and the loans went into default. The city was
now using CDBG funds to pay off bad loans.46 In addition, the city squandered over $100
million over the life of the program (1974-2004) to pay salaries and benefits of city hall
employees.47 This recently prompted one city activist to label city officials as “poverty
pimps,” implying that government was diverting funds meant for improving the
distressed areas into their own payroll.48 What had started off with promise had
degenerated into frustration and despair as population was migrating to the suburbs and
business was following.

Block Grant Success Stories

This was not the case for all of the Northeastern cities, however. Several cities took
different approaches and achieved tangible results. Philadelphia, for example, employed a
more comprehensive approach to urban revitalization, which included a housing
counseling program to aid first time homebuyers in both purchasing and inspection. In
1997, the city used $18 million in CDBG funds to construct 296 houses in a dilapidated
area of North Philadelphia, which resulted in a complete turnaround.49 Historically
certified row houses were rehabilitated and sold as subsidized units. While some have
criticized the cost of subsidized housing in the U.S., it pales in comparison to the annual
46

Dillaway, 171.
James Heaney, “The Half -Billion-Dollar Bust,” Buffalo News, November 14, 2004,A1.
48
Stephen Watson, “Group Critical of Budget for Block Grants,” Buffalo News, March 16, 2004, B3.
49
John Kromer, Neighborhood Recovery: Reinvestment Policy for the New Hometown (New
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2000), 103.
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cost of the mortgage interest deduction (it lowered tax revenue by $86 billion in 2009),
which costs more than three times the amount spent on public housing.50 In addition, the
city required developers to hire within the zip code of the neighborhood in which it
developed.51 Rental developments were also part of the strategy, as all units supported
with CDBG funds were required to reserve twenty percent of the space for disabled or
special needs residents.52 This comprehensive, consumer-oriented strategy served to
increase sales, raise property values, and kept the neighborhood fairly integrated.53 This
is an example of competent leaders who used an inclusive, well-planned approach to
maximize the benefits of federal assistance.54
Another success story occurred in Baltimore, where emphasis on neighborhoods and
quality of life led to substantial improvements. In the 1970’s, the First Annual Baltimore
City Fair, which showcased neighborhoods and their rehabilitation, was a success,
drawing 1.3 million people by the second year.55 By the end of the decade, community
development corporations and citizens’ organizations were experienced and productive.
In fact, many American cities boasted grassroots organizations that no longer focused on
confrontation with government officials, but instead strived to develop their communities
in cooperation with those officials.56
An example of fruitful cooperation occurred in the midwestern city of Indianapolis,
where city government and community organizations joined forces to improve previously
slighted neighborhoods in the 1990’s. Prior to the 1990’s, city government in
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Indianapolis, in alliance with downtown business elites, focused primarily on downtown
development in order to stimulate business investment. Mayor Stephen Goldsmith
changed this approach by allocating CDBG funds to seven depressed neighborhoods
through one comprehensive neighborhood organization that assumed responsibility for
the funds. The group had a board of directors, a set of by-laws, and received full-time
organizational assistance and training from the city government. Instead of competing
with citizens’ groups or abandoning them, the Indianapolis city government harnessed
their energy and knowledge in order to implement CDBG funds wisely and productively.
In 1994 alone, the $525, 000 annual allocation of funds to the neighborhoods was
supplemented by an additional $712,000 of private money from local and national
foundations who favored community involvement. Accomplishments included newly
built affordable housing, the expansion of a Kroger supermarket, clean up of an
environmentally contaminated site, and rehabilitation of existing homes.57

Urban Development Action Grants

Although there were some success stories regarding the CDBG Program, some
critics voiced concerns that the funds were not reaching the target areas of low and
moderate-income people as originally intended. This prompted the Carter administration
to introduce Urban Development Action Grants (UDAG) in 1977. As part of an
amendment to the 1974 Housing and Community Development Act, the UDAG Program
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was created with more stringent guidelines. Funds had to be combined with other federal
grants, eligibility had to be met before applying, and contracts with private interests were
enforced.58
Buffalo took advantage of this program by using a four million dollar grant for a
downtown Hilton hotel and subsequently cobbling together a partnership between
business leaders, developers, local banks that issued bonds for the project, and the local
Iron Workers’ Union, which contributed pension funds in exchange for a promise of
union jobs. Loan payments were then recycled and used to build new East Side homes.59
Finally, Buffalo was able to use ingenuity and cooperation among different interests to
create something worthwhile using federal assistance. This progress was offset, however,
by the use of UDAG funds for construction of the $500 million rapid transit line that
proved to be a failure, due to its limited span, ridership that has not increased, and lack of
expansion. 60 In fact, all of the millions of dollars in UDAG funds sent to Buffalo were
used exclusively for downtown projects. The Griffin administration again neglected the
poor neighborhoods while the white majority remained silent.61
In 1980, the election of Ronald Reagan ushered in a conservative ideology that led to
change and ultimately termination of the UDAG Program. Conservatives objected to the
focus of UDAG on neighborhood rehabilitation and public housing projects. Job creation
and economic stimulus became the new focus of the program. By 1988, the appropriation
budget had dwindled to zero. The UDAG Program by its very nature as a government
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assistance venture did not stand a chance in the free-market atmosphere of the Reagan
administration. Nevertheless, the program promoted cooperation, coordination, and
commitment from both public and private interests. The fact that this occurred in a
fractionalized city like Buffalo proved that the program could indeed produce positive
results.62

Enterprise Zones

After the demise of the UDAG Program, the Reagan administration turned to a
different idea that coincided with their free-market ideological stance. That idea was to
create enterprise zones, which were originally used in Great Britain in the 1970’s under
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. The basic premise behind the enterprise zone concept
was the reduction of taxes and land-use regulation in a depressed area in order to attract
new businesses and retain the existing ones. Although U.S. Representatives Jack Kemp
and Robert Garcia vigorously championed this concept in the 1980’s, the Democraticcontrolled Congress refused to endorse the idea.63
This concept gained new life, however, when several states adopted their own
versions of the enterprise zone plan. By 1995, thirty-four states had a total of 2,840
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zones.64 Programs differed among the states, but the basic idea was the same  a
designated area would be made more conducive to business than its surrounding areas
through lower taxes. In exchange for the tax breaks, the businesses would have to hire a
minimum number of employees from the immediate area. Proponents envisioned clusters
of businesses developing and forming a critical mass of economic activity in the zones.
Employment figures would then rise as the oppressive tax burden was lightened.65 The
implementation of the zones produced a series of mixed results.
Louisville, Kentucky experimented with an enterprise zone in the mid-1980s and
provided some interesting insights. Of the four firms that set up in the zone, not one listed
tax incentives as a primary reason for relocating. The firms cited transportation access,
labor pool, and appropriate buildings as reasons why they moved. Later, Louisville
expanded the zone area and the number of firms increased to fifty-four. This was
combined with $21 million in private investment. The net result was 1,042 jobs created or
retained.66 Business owners who participated in the Louisville program commented that
available venture capital and inexpensive land were more important to starting and
expanding than tax cuts. Improvements in the immediate area, such as police protection
and infrastructure development were also concerns. Some recommended that other
programs, such as community development block grants, be combined with enterprise
zones to provide money in the start-up phase. U.S. Representative John LaFalce of
Buffalo seconded this opinion and called enterprise zones “a small piece of an effective
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overall urban policy”, but not “a substitute for other forms of aid.” Once again, a
comprehensive approach with the commitment of city officials in a specific area is the
key to producing positive results.67
Some areas did not fare as well with enterprise zones for various reasons. States that
increased the maximum number of zones allowed defeated the purpose by lessening the
advantage of a low-tax area. If there is a surplus of enterprise zones in an area, it does not
pay to relocate or start up in an undesirable neighborhood.68 Furthermore, some states
tied incentives to the number of jobs created, which did not encourage businesses to
create high-paying jobs. Instead, businesses created more low-paying jobs in order to
secure the maximum assistance from the state governments.69
The City of Buffalo, with its history of mismanaging assistance programs, made no
exception regarding enterprise zones. Mayor James Griffin went along with the state
program, but opposed local tax relief preferring instead the elimination of capital gains
taxes and issuance of investment tax credits. The top priority of the Griffin administration
was maintaining power in the executive branch of city government.70
Leaders at the city and state level share the blame for the botched implementation of
the enterprise zone program in Buffalo. The state government committed the cardinal sin
of designating too many zones across its territory in order to please every municipality,
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thereby negating any significant benefit that would compel a business to start or relocate
in a distressed area such as the inner city of Buffalo.71
Another mistake was city government’s use of the program as a tax credit giveaway
to existing businesses as a means of repaying friends and supporters. Among the
recipients were large companies who trimmed overhead and maximized profit with a
combination of zone tax break and layoffs.72 Buffalo in effect was bringing the zones,
and the benefits that accompany them, to the businesses. This is contrary to the original
purpose of bringing business, and the economic opportunity that accompanies it, to the
distressed areas. In addition to these gaffes was the tendency of city officials, this time
the Common Council, to push for zones in their territories that benefited small retail
operations. While this seems practical on the surface, it also runs contrary to the original
intention of the program. Cities need businesses that export goods and services in order to
draw more money from outside the area, not ones that simply shift existing money
around. Manufacturing operations are the key to this growth, not the law firms, banks,
restaurants, and commercial landlords that currently benefit from the program. The battle
for power in Buffalo, and statewide, turned what was a promising economic development
program into a patronage trough.73
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Local Enterprise Zone Success Stories

There are some success stories to be found in Buffalo however. Sonic Blinds, Inc.,
located in Amherst (a northeast suburb of Buffalo), took advantage of an enterprise zone
opportunity in 1995 to start a manufacturing operation in downtown Buffalo. The 80,000
square foot plant employed neighborhood residents and planned to expand its
workforce.74 As of 2011, the company continued to thrive. While this is a small
company, it is the ideal example of what the enterprise zone idea was meant to
promotelocal businesses that start up in the city because of tax breaks, hire zone
residents, export products in order to draw money from outside the area, and continue to
expand. This type of economic development requires time, patience, and the realization
that a proliferation of small businesses can have the same economic impact as one
mammoth industry.
In addition to Sonic Blinds, Cobey Inc., a supplier to the petrochemical and
compressor industries, moved into the Buffalo Lakeside Commerce Park (at the
southeastern edge of the city) in 2007, joining Sonwil Distribution Center and
CertainTeed Corp. in the park. The company employed seventy-one people and would
have moved out of state without the tax breaks afforded by the enterprise zone and the
help of the Erie County Industrial Development Agency.75 By 2010, the company
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increased to 110 employees and was still thriving.76 The former brownfield has become a
thriving industrial park, as local officials use the enterprise zone program in the manner
that its creators intended it.77

Conclusions on Government Intervention

The aforementioned examples are just some of several encouraging developments for
Buffalo in recent years. The mistakes made during the Urban Renewal Program have
been addressed through the construction of over three hundred new subsidized homes in
the Ellicott District (see Figure 1), the refurbishing of the Frederick Douglass Towers
(formerly Talbert Mall) and Ellicott Mall (renamed Ellicott Town Center) housing
projects, and the conversion of the Lakeview housing projects into single-family
subsidized homes. In addition, allocation of CDBG funds will now be allocated to human
services agencies based on performance instead of political connections. After a halfcentury of failure in the use of government aid to revitalize Buffalo, city officials are
beginning to show measurable progress in improving distressed areas, promoting city
strengths, and responding to residents’ concerns.78
This approach is one that other, more successful cities have used over the same
period. From Baltimore with its promotion of diverse neighborhoods, to Boston with its
rehabilitation of historic Quincy Market and Fanueil Hall, to Seattle with its restoration of
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Pike Place Market, cities have used government aid to both improve the physical
appearance and the quality of life in their respective areas. Cities such as Louisville
stimulated business startup and relocation through comprehensive planning and
cooperation among local officials. In all of these examples, leaders took advantage of the
opportunities offered by government programs to revitalize their cities rather than retain
their power base.79
The process of revitalizing the American city is an ongoing one. Different
government programs are initiated and terminated, but the goal remains the sameto
preserve the city as a center of knowledge and culture while maintaining an adequate
quality of life for its residents. The success stories illustrate the view that cities can
prosper despite the allure of the “clean” suburban alternative. Cities have unique assets
and architecture, rich history, and a sense of vitality and energy that the suburbs lack.
City officials and activists who realize this and work together have benefited from the
assistance of state and federal government. Those who have not cooperated, but rather
concentrated on retaining power through patronage, have contributed to the decline of
their cities.
Buffalo has traveled the latter course for most of the modern era, but progress is
beginning to occur. Government funds are being used to preserve and promote its unique
assets such as the Darwin Martin House, which was designed by world-renowned
architect Frank Lloyd Wright. Historical sites such as the Erie Canal Commercial Slip,
the J. Edward Nash House, and the Michigan Street Baptist Church have also employed

79

Frieden and Sagalyn, 157; U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of
Community Planning and Development, State-Designated Enterprise Zones-Ten Case Studies.
(Washington, D.C.: Housing and Urban Development, 1987).

30
public funding.80 Development of housing and homes in and adjacent to the downtown
area has sparked hope for a revitalized city center.81 New businesses have started, while
some existing businesses have expanded. While progress has been slow, the cooperation
between citizen activists, private developers, and city officials is encouraging. If these
individual interests are able to put aside their personal agendas in order to work together
and contribute to the city as a whole, everyone benefits. A look back at the last fifty years
proves that anything less would be futile.
These mistakes in the name of urban renewal often came at the expense of Buffalo’s
African-American community. They did not have the political clout to prevent local
government from bulldozing their neighborhoods and displacing them. The racial
tensions that resulted and the problems that it caused are examined in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 2
RACE RELATIONS IN BUFFALO, NEW YORK
In the year 1950, Buffalo was a bustling city with thriving neighborhoods and a vibrant
downtown business district. The population had peaked at 580,132 and the area was
dense with residents.82 Manufacturing jobs were in abundance, especially in the steel
industry. What was unforeseen, however, were signs that the path that Buffalo was on
would eventually begin to reverse. The growth in population had begun to slow since
1900, and by the 1960’s it began to decline. Manufacturing jobs were lost as dozens of
companies closed, leaving Buffalo with high unemployment and a bleak outlook.83
While some of the factors that contributed to Buffalo’s decline could not be avoided,
such as the building of the St. Lawrence Seaway, which ended Buffalo’s tenure as a
transportation hub, there were other factors that could have been prevented. The
purposeful residential segregation of the urban area initiated a concentration of poverty
that has grown worse and left Buffalo with a reputation as a poor, high crime city with an
undereducated workforce. This pattern of segregation was a result of changing racial
geography in America that influenced government decisions such as the Federal Housing
Administration loans and the GI Bill, which employed discriminatory practices to
exclude African Americans from obtaining mortgages.84 Certain areas became
“redlined,” or deemed high-risk areas for mortgage lending. African Americans were
unable to build equity and wealth, while whites moved upward. Today, whites and
African Americans have a huge gap in income and accumulated wealth. Since homes are
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one of the main sources of wealth, African Americans are at a disadvantage due to the
discriminatory actions of whites that sought to keep them residentially segregated. David
M.P. Freund, Associate Professor in the Department of History at the University of
Maryland, adds that at the time, public officials touted the merits of the program aimed at
whites only as part of the “free market” forces that would revitalize America.85 They
would not be held responsible for the segregation fostered by the actual lending
institutions.
The issue of the discrimination by the banks supported by the GI Bill and its affect on
mortgages is powerfully presented by Columbia University Professor of Political Science
and History, Ira Katznelson. He mentions the disparity in net worth between whites and
African Americans, while also pointing out that the opportunities provided by the civil
rights movement could not be taken advantage of.86 African Americans became left out
of the growing middle class due to discrimination. Yale Rabin concurs with this view, as
he notes that the Federal Housing Administration’s mortgage practices, combined with
the disparity of federal highway funds as opposed to public transit, served to situate
African Americans in what he terms a “web of isolating influences.”87 Buffalo is a case
study for this type of exclusion, and the inner city has suffered as a result. Katznelson
sees public policy in general as divisive and a contributor to residential and economic
segregation.
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Figure 2. Buffalo Neighborhoods Map (from University at Buffalo Map
Collection, 2008)
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Douglass S. Massey, Professor of Sociology at Princeton, and Nancy A. Denton,
Demography Professor at the State University of New York at Albany, add to the
discussion with their coining of the term “hypersegregation” to describe how Buffalo’s
African American population became centralized around the central city core, clustered
together with minimal or no contact with whites, and isolated.88 Even when public
housing was introduced to offer affordable options for low-income families, African
Americans found themselves excluded from white housing developments and herded into
segregated projects.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, urban renewal was another avoidable factor in
the decline of the city. During the 1950’s, African Americans saw their perfectly viable
neighborhoods leveled. These neighborhoods were labeled as blighted areas that had to
be eliminated and replaced. One area in particular, the Ellicott District (south of William
Street and labeled ES in Figure 2), was a diverse and vibrant neighborhood that saw its
residents displaced while public housing developments appeared after a long delay. The
poor were warehoused in projects built in the renewal district, while the other displaced
African Americans were concentrated in areas such as the Masten District (labeled M in
Figure 2). Segregation was in full swing. Jon Teaford points out that the white middle
class residents refused to return to the renewal area, furthering segregation in terms of
race and economics.89 The city received millions in federal aid to destroy, rather than
rehabilitate neighborhoods.
In addition to the factor of residential segregation, school segregation has also
contributed to the plight of African Americans and of Buffalo in general. After an initial
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and successful attempt to desegregate the schools and impart a certain level of equitable
distribution of educational resources, Western New York has begun to resegregate due to
the phenomenon labeled “white flight.” The cycle of poverty is perpetuated when African
Americans attend low-performing, segregated schools and leave unprepared for higher
education or for employment.
The process of desegregating Buffalo schools was a relatively smooth one, as Steven
J.L. Taylor asserts. In what seems like an uncharacteristically wise move by local leaders,
Buffalo incorporated the views of its citizens in the slow, deliberate process, thereby
diffusing any serious, organized objection. This transition followed a divisive and racially
charged mayoral campaign in 1969 by Buffalo Common Council member Alfreda
Slominski, who tapped into white fear of forced busing into black neighborhoods. Taylor
uses dramatically improved standardized test scores to support his contention that
desegregation was a positive for Buffalo.90 Taylor demonstrates continuing racial
tension, however, by mentioning the opposition to new busing in 1994. Many white,
middle class parents did not approve of their children being bused to predominantly
African-American neighborhoods.91 He adds that federal government aid to fund the
special magnet programs has dried up, adding to white flight. The funding alternative is
to raise middle class taxes, which also encourages white flight. Taylor’s view is
countered by Professor Emerita at The University at Buffalo Law School Judy TrentScales, who contends that although test scores and school pride improved, the dropout,
suspension, and special education placement rates increased disproportionately for
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African-American students.92 Not everything was as perfect as local officials claimed.
Buffalo city schools are currently centers of poverty. 93 Research Associates at The Civil
Rights Project at Harvard University, Erica Frankenberg, and Chungmei Lee, pick up on
the study years later, showing that white students in Buffalo are now concentrated in a
few schools. They claim the result is lower test scores for the Buffalo district, as schools
have resegregated due to white flight.94
White flight in turn, is perpetuated by the decision to use federal funds to construct
major highways that make it easier for whites to travel from their federally subsidized
suburban homes to their place of employment in the city (see Chapter 3). The interests of
the African Americans were ignored and neighborhoods were damaged in the frenzy to
reduce the commuting time of those who travel from suburb to city. At the same time,
government failed to provide urban residents access to the suburban areas with public
transportation. Those without automobile access found it difficult to travel to
employment opportunity in the outlying areas.
Neil Kraus, an associate professor at the University of Wisconsin, published a study
in 2000 about race relations in Buffalo and the effect on African Americans. His
conclusion was that local political decisions affected the development of low-income,
segregated neighborhoods in the city of Buffalo. Dr. Kraus argues that the Kensington
Expressway, which took eight years to complete, isolated the African-American
neighborhoods further by allowing commuters to bypass them completely. The below92
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grade construction obstructs the view of the neighborhood and contributes to the “out-ofsight, out-of-mind” attitude of many suburban commuters. Dr. Kraus adds that African
Americans did not enjoy the same mobility as whites and could not just move out of the
neighborhood as easily as whites could. Their options were limited in terms of renting or
owning homes in other neighborhoods compared to those of whites.95
The option of where to live was not the only limitation for African Americans
however. The new neoliberal policies of economic competitiveness superceding the old
Keynesian model has forced many off of government assistance while poverty rates have
increased. Meghan Cope, Department of Geography Chair at the University of Vermont,
and Frank Latcham, Research Associate at Berkeley, pursue this angle, asserting that the
new policies stress “personal responsibility” over social change.96 They dig further into
the reasons for the overall loss in population, blaming the corrupt leadership and racist
housing policies along with the traditional scapegoats of industrial loss and globalization.
Other authors have alluded to this, but Cope and Latcham dig deeper and find that there
are people migrating into Buffalo, but they are not the coveted middle class whites and
therefore are not welcomed as a positive trend.97 They also run contrary to the prevailing
opinion that Buffalo is losing its young population by noting that white youth is
dropping, while African-American and Latino youth is rising.98 This view is beginning to
gain prominence among those who study Rust Belt population trends. It may help in
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reversing the old ideas in city revitalization that begin with “silver bullet” projects rather
than improving schools, public transportation, and housing opportunities.
This argument of the causes of decline regarding Buffalo is one that will continue, not
to assign blame on any specific group, but rather to learn from the mistakes of the past in
order to reshape the future. There is no ignoring the changing makeup of the population
of Buffalo. Rather than bemoan the change, we must embrace it and be prepare to invest
in human capital. The focus on more funding to large downtown projects and law
enforcement, while cutting education, social services, tourism promotion, cultural sites,
and amenities such as libraries and community centers, serves to drain human capital and
keep Buffalo on the path of decline.

Early Segregation in Buffalo

This study of Buffalo’s racial relations begins with an examination of the growing
African-American population of Buffalo in the 1920s. There were only 4,511 African
Americans of the 508,776 total population. Of the 4,511, 3,401 lived in wards 6 and 7.99
Shawn Lay of the University of Georgia notes that racism played a role in restricting
physical and socioeconomic movement of these new arrivals, as was the case with many
newcomers. He cites a study conducted by University of Buffalo sociologist Niles
Carpenter in 1927, which stated that many employers referred to African-American
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workers as “slow thinkers” who required supervision from whites.100 As a result, African
Americans remained as “last hired-first fired” in a slew of lower-level jobs, while many
whites were able to gradually improve their economic, and later political status. Despite
these limitations, African Americans initiated many businesses and self-help groups,
including the Negro Businessmen's League, the Colored Musicians' Union of Buffalo, and
a chapter of Marcus Garvey's United Negro Improvement Association.101 If no one else
would fight for them, they would have to defend and support each other.
The 1940s ushered in a significant demographic change for the United States.
Many African Americans moved to the North during the First and Second Great
Migrations and by 1940, Buffalo had 17, 694 out of 575,901 total.102 The inequity and
segregation continued however, in the form of housing in particular. The 1940 Census
shows that of 151, 937 occupied dwellings, non-whites occupied only 4,844.
Most of these inhabitants were clustered in tract #14, bordered by Main Street, Eagle
Street, Jefferson Avenue, and Broadway (see Figure 3). This area had the dubious
distinction of possessing the lowest rate of owner-occupied dwellings and the highest
amount needing major repairs. Most were constructed before 1899, making this the area
with the oldest houses as well.103 Not only were African Americans clustered in one area,
but that area was substandard and ruled by absentee landlords as well, a trend that
continues through the 21st century.
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Figure 3. Buffalo Census Tracts (from the 16 th U.S. Census, 1940)
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To make matters worse, rents were higher than in other wards, meaning African
Americans were paying more money for less quality.

Barriers To Home Ownership

The only escape from this cycle of isolation and poverty seemed to be encompassed
in the new wave of home ownership ushered in by New Deal legislation. The Federal
Housing Act of 1934 created the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), which revived
the home construction and financing industries that had been devastated by the Great
Depression. After World War II, the FHA boosted the exodus to the suburbs through the
reduction of minimum down payments and absorption of mortgage risk for banks.104
They did not lend money directly, but rather insured the lenders against loss. In 1935, the
FHA landed a blow to the hopes of prospective African American homeowners by
defining what determined residential quality in its Underwriting Handbook. The
publication stressed “protection from adverse influences” which included “the infiltration
of inharmonious racial or nationality groups.”105 Neighborhoods were desirable only if
they could be homogeneous. The FHA was influenced, as Kevin Fox Gotham, Professor
of Sociology at Tulane University contends, by real estate interests during the
congressional hearings on the Federal Housing Act of 1934. These special interests shape
public policy, which in turn helps to shape public perception and eventually affect

104

Kevin Fox Gotham104, “Racialization and the State: The Housing Act of 1934 and the Creation of
the Federal Housing Administration,” Socialogical Perspectives, 43, no.2 (2000): 292. EBSCOhost
Research. Database on-line. Buffalo State College, E.H.Butler Library Research; accessed March 6, 2010.
105
Federal Housing Administration, 1935 Underwriting Manual. Washington, D.C., 1935.

42
reality.106 Raymond A. Mohl, Professor of History at the University of Alabama at
Birmingham, confirms this “infiltration theory” by noting that the National Association of
Real Estate Boards compiled a code of ethics in the 1920s that discouraged the placement
of African Americans in white neighborhoods. He continues by stating that the National
Association of Home Builders also contributed to this stance by refusing to build homes
for African Americans in white neighborhoods.107 These interests viewed AfricanAmerican as “adverse influences” that would eventually cause “blight” if allowed to enter
white neighborhoods and were also seen as poor candidates for mortgages.
African-American banker Robert R. Taylor dispelled this myth by loaning millions to
African Americans during the period from 1934 to 1948 without recording a single
foreclosure.108 Taylor proved that with proper qualifications, African Americans could be
responsible homeowners. The myth of African Americans neglecting property could be
attributed to absentee landlords who did little more than collect rent. The 1950 census
however shows African Americans still concentrated in tract #14 (see Figure 3), but
beginning to spread to adjacent tracts in the Fruit Belt (tract #31 in Figure 3) and toward
the Central Terminal (tract #16 in Figure 3) as their population increased to 36,645 of a
total 580,132. These tracts again showed the highest amounts of dilapidated homes, some
with no running water.109 Nonwhite owner-occupied homes totaled only 1,901 (2.6%) of
72,721 total homes.110 African Americans were for the most part left out of the housing
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market and neatly contained. This was an unfortunate occurrence, because a year earlier,
the journal The Mortgage Banker reported on the African American community as “a
large, untapped market.”111 It’s entirely possible that Buffalo could have avoided much of
the physical decay to its housing stock if more African Americans had been allowed to
purchase properties rather than relying on absentee landlords to manage the upkeep. In
addition, the emerging African American middle class in Buffalo would have had more
options and an opportunity to expand geographically.
Similar to the FHA, the Veterans Administration (VA) merely guaranteed loans that
were administered to veterans through lending institutions. Katznelson notes that many
African American veterans faced stiff requirements for loans, including a good credit
rating, adequate capital, and residence in a “desirable” neighborhood.112 Unabashed
racism prohibited these people who served their country from receiving the same
privileges as whites. Of the 67,000 mortgages supported by the VA in New York State,
less than 100 went to African Americans.113 During this time, Buffalo had reached the
pinnacle of the population roller coaster and began its rapid decline. The inequities of the
loan process presided over by the FHA and the VA contributed to the suburban increase
in population and geographical expansion.
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Segregation and Discrimination in Public Housing

In addition to the barriers faced by prospective African-American homeowners, many
low-income residents faced the dilemma of having to pay high rent prices. The Buffalo
Municipal Housing Authority (BMHA), established in 1934, aimed to alleviate the
housing problem for the poor. The first public housing project built in Buffalo was the
Kenfield Apartments. The Public Works Administration (PWA), a New Deal agency,
built the project along with many others around the nation. Another Housing Act in 1937
gave the PWA’s power to the U.S. Housing Administration, which in turn transferred the
power to build and manage future housing projects to the BMHA.114 The local authorities
used this increased power to begin a string of public housing projects in the Buffalo area,
which led to opposition in some neighborhoods that did not want low-income African
Americans relocated in their territory. Saul Pleeter, Adjunct Professor in the Department
of Economics at American University, disputes the perception of a relation between a
decrease in property values in proximity to low-income housing (which real estate boards
have historically promoted) in his study that found public housing to have no significant
effect on surrounding property values. While projects do not recoup the initial taxpayer
investment through tax revenue, they do not lower adjacent values either.115 Fear of
housing projects was unfounded and perpetuated by those who would benefit from that
fear. Kenfield was constructed on the northeastern edge of the city in a sparsely
populated area (tract #44 in Figure 3), which meant that this would become a new
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neighborhood, and African Americans would not be allowed to settle there.116 To address
the problem of housing the excluded low-income African Americans, the BMHA
constructed the Willert Park Courts in 1939. Not surprisingly, the BMHA selected the
predominately African-American neighborhood that was part of census tract #14 (see
Figure 3) in the Willert Park area south of Broadway after caving in to opposition from
residents, who resisted public housing in North Buffalo, South Buffalo, and
Cheektowaga.117 The National Urban League found that in the Cheektowaga area (the
BMHA’s jurisdiction extended to Cheektowaga and Tonawanda briefly) had a Polish
priest as the head of the local housing authority.118 These were former immigrants who
left the East Side of Buffalo as African Americans moved in and competed with them for
jobs. Race issues dominated the decisions on public housing and African Americans who
were paying high rents for substandard housing were not welcome in white housing
projects. A 1944 publication touting the new project from the BMHA made no attempt to
hide its intent as it stated: “Here is the center of life and activity for Buffalo’s Negro
population.”119 Residents and leaders alike were determined to keep Buffalo’s AfricanAmerican population contained. Willert Park Courts (later A.D. Price Courts) remained
an all-black project throughout its existence.
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Expansion of the Ghetto
While the attempt at segregation succeeded, Buffalo’s African-American population
began to expand in the 1950s and the ghetto expanded geographically as well. The
population began to spill into the areas north of Broadway, eventually overtaking the
Ellicott and Masten districts (see census tracts 25, 31, and 32 in Figure 3).120 While
African Americans eventually spread to other neighborhoods, the East Side (labeled as
ES in Figure 2) became predominately black as many whites left for suburban homes that
were unavailable to African Americans. The expanding ghetto was a cause for concern,
as many in Buffalo saw this area as what would come to be termed “blighted.” A 1952
BMHA report entitled Redevelopment in Buffalo identified blighted areas as those with
deteriorated housing, low-economic status, and a high incidence of poor social and health
conditions.121 No mention was made of the fact that these areas had a high level of
absentee landlords who neglected properties, many of which had incomplete plumbing
facilities. The report went on to recommend the complete demolition of these blighted
areas. In 1957, Chester Kowal campaigned for mayor on the promise to “…place the full
weight of the entire city government behind the redevelopment program…”122 What
followed was a process that ignored the views of the residents and left an entire
neighborhood obliterated (see urban renewal in Chapter 1).
By 1950, the Ellicott District held more than 75% of the city’s African-American
population (the rest was comprised of Jews and Italians) and became home to “blighted”
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areas as defined by local and federal officials. These areas were subject to demolition
under the National Housing Act of 1949, which provided federal assistance to clear
blighted areas and then sell them back to developers. This was the fate of a huge swath of
land in the district, as 2,200 African American families were removed for the demolition
project beginning in 1954.123 These families faced the dilemma of not being able to rent
or purchase homes in other areas of Buffalo or the suburbs, while they waited almost ten
years for the Ellicott project to reach completion. Many had to relocate to the Dante Place
(southwest of downtown) housing project or to the nearby Fruit Belt neighborhood
(labeled FB in Figure 2), which led to more “white flight” of existing residents with
German ancestry. By 1964, there were few homes for middle-income families in the area
and two high-rise housing projects that sat as bookends on a desolate parcel of land (see
Figure 1) that had once been a mixed, vibrant neighborhood of African Americans, Jews,
and Italians. Rather than use spot demolition or rehabilitation, local officials (backed with
federal funds) opted for what Neil Kraus characterized as “Negro removal.”124 Clearly,
the aim was to isolate poor African Americans in order to clear more land for the type of
developments preferred in the suburban setting. Exacerbating this process was the lack of
African Americans on the Urban Renewal Board until the mid-1960s.
Ironically, a pilot project in Buffalo’s Fruit Belt neighborhood conducted in 1960
actually led to an increase in property values through a program of inspection and repair
of building code violations. The owners of the 1,461 total structures were given a
reasonable amount of time to make the repairs; some were done voluntarily (exterior
painting, landscaping). The Buffalo Board of Redevelopment did advocate spot
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demolition in extreme cases, but stressed rehabilitation and stringent inspections.125 Here
is an example of reuse and rehabilitation rather than the turmoil and displacement that
tends to accompany wholesale demolition of neighborhoods.
Reaction to this force-fed demolition and relocation, combined with discrimination in
housing surfaced in Buffalo’s African-American community. The Buffalo Criterion
newspaper reported in 1958 that a committee of property owners in the Ellicott District
was dissatisfied with the reimbursements being offered for their relocation cost.126 They
had previously lost the battle to use rehabilitation over demolition and would later face
difficulties in finding housing in areas that did not want to accept them. The Criterion
also reported on the failure of the African-American community as a whole to mobilize
against the demolition. They quoted Dr. Lawrence Murphy of the Ellicott District who
stated: “Had the leaders in the Masten community given us a real hand, they would not be
facing this serious problem today.”127 The white leadership, opportunistic developers,
apathetic and/or racist residents and the federal government combined to isolate and
marginalize African-American communities whose power base was too fragmented to
mount a serious counterattack. The Masten District Council member Cora P. Mahoney
complained after the fact by observing that housing restrictions led to de facto school
segregation and went further to note: “We like nice neighborhoods too. We have a certain
pride, but we don’t have anything to build on it.”128 Discrimination was rampant, but the
victims were blamed for their own misfortune.
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Anti-discrimination bills were still opposed by realtors, even though 20% of housing
in Buffalo still allowed discrimination (in two-family structures occupied by owner).129
African American families had the money, but could not rent in white areas. By 1963,
40% of African Americans were still living in substandard housing.130 Realtors
vigorously resisted any strengthening of the Metcalf-Baker Law, which would counter
housing discrimination. The old argument resurfaced, as Thomas Barone, President of the
Greater Buffalo Board of Realtors stated in 1963: “This would hasten the exodus of
middle-income families from the cities, further eroding the tax base and leading to the
destruction of those very institutions which have made our cities great.”131 Here is an
example of self-fulfilling prophecy; incite racial tension and people will become
frightened and flee. That same year, the National Association of Real Estate Boards
stated that: “Realtors may properly oppose any attempt by force of law to withdraw from
property owners the right freely to determine with whom they will deal with in respect to
their property…”132 The realtors seemed more interested in preserving homogenous
neighborhoods to maximize negative racial perceptions and drive up prices to discourage
diversity.
Countering these views was the Committee Against Discrimination in Housing, who
in 1963 commented on segregation in housing projects. Board chairman Algernon D.
Black predicted: “ You’re going to have racial trouble, increasing sickness, riots and
fighting in the streets, racial tension; and you’re going to pay the price…”133 This was a
harbinger of things to come in Buffalo. Another view came from Rev. James A. Healy,
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chairman of the Buffalo Board of Community Relations, who three years earlier
compared the East Side of Buffalo to the Jewish ghettos in Europe.134 By the standard
definition of a ghetto, he was correct. Blacks were being separated from the rest of
society, and not by choice.

Isolation of Hamlin Park

The next blow to Buffalo’s African-American community fell on the Masten District,
when Frederick Law Olmsted’s Humboldt Parkway was obliterated to make room for an
expressway. By the late 1950s, the area near Humboldt Parkway had become a viable,
middle to upper class neighborhood. Hamlin Park (labeled HP in Figure 2), in particular,
resembled a quiet suburban neighborhood that boasted a collection of doctors, lawyers,
ministers, politicians and teachers among its residents. The beautiful, tree-lined parkway
supplemented the tight-knit, sociable neighborhood, but proved to be irresistible for city
planners who desired to alleviate heavy traffic using empty parkland. Some local
activists, such as Dr. Lydia T. Wright, who became the first African-American on the
Buffalo Board of Education, and architect/activist Robert T. Coles tried to mobilize
neighbors, but the area lacked a cohesive African-American group to fight local officials.
Their overtures to state officials went unheeded as well. The Kensington Expressway left
a hole in the neighborhood, both literally and figuratively. Businesses and family life
were disrupted for a period of ten years and properties disappeared from the city tax
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rolls.135 This new highway made travel to downtown faster, but also created a conduit for
commuters from the suburbs who reduced their travel time. These advantages are slanted
toward automobile owners, however. Most residents in the Humboldt Parkway area (40%
to 60%) did not own a car and were now even more isolated.136 Travelers can now
completely bypass the East Side on their journey to downtown on the below-grade
Kensington Expressway.

DeFacto School Segregation

The isolating influence of the Kensington Expressway and the rampant housing
segregation created another racial dilemma: segregated schools. The racially divided
neighborhoods led to de facto segregation of the neighborhood schools. A push for school
desegregation began in the late 1960s, aided in part by the coalition activist group BUILD
(Build, Unity, Independence, Liberty and Dignity). BUILD’s Black Paper Number One
reported the deplorable inequities in Buffalo’s public schools. High faculty turnover and
absentee rates, lack of African-American administrators and teachers, lower spending per
pupil as compared to other areas of New York State, and discouraging African-American
students from entering skilled trade crafts were some of the complaints outlined in the
report.137 There was no doubt that segregation led to African-American students being
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shortchanged. The Center for Urban Education (of New York City) introduced a report,
which found that African-American schools fell below the national and the Buffalo
average in reading.138 White schools were far ahead and the perception was that the white
schools were better quality. Another report from the Buffalo Board of Education called A
Study of Cross Busing revealed that by 1970, 72% of the schools were heavily
segregated.139 African-American students were trapped in low-performing schools in
slum areas and the only alternative seemed to be the integration of public schools to level
the resources and raise achievement.

Integration of Buffalo Schools

This proposed integration was the focus of the 1969 mayoral campaign. Buffalo
Common Council and former Board of Education member Alfreda Slominski made
forced busing a focal point of her racially charged mayoral campaign. She predicted that
whites would flee the city if forced to send their children to schools in African-American
neighborhoods.140 Here is another self-fulfilling prophecy from an opponent of
integration. Slominski’s campaign was marred by the actions of some of her supporters as
well. The Good Government Club used ethnic slurs and tore down incumbent mayor
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Frank Sedita’s campaign signs before Slominski cut ties with the group.141 These groups
were not alone in their zeal as Mrs. Slominski herself was accused by the activist group
CAUSE of encouraging harassment of members of the Buffalo Board of Education,
voting against the Model Cities program, and encouraging an illegal boycott of the public
schools.142 Although Slominski was adamantly against mandatory busing, her opposition
diminished after her mayoral defeat and later victory as Erie County Comptroller. In fact,
no serious, organized opposition to forced school integration through bussing was ever
mounted in Buffalo, due in part to the lesson learned from the bad experience in Boston’s
school desegregation process and from the genuine effort to involve the community in the
decisions.
Buffalo’s successful transition to integrated schools under the control of
Superintendent Eugene Reville, began with the first day of busing in 1976. No incidents
were reported, although a teacher’s strike delayed the start until September 26.
Community leaders, politicians, school officials, and clergy banded together in a rare
show of unity to prevent the disaster that took place in Boston earlier. Another factor,
pointed out by Stephen J.L.Taylor, Associate Professor in the Department of Government
at American University, was that most of the opposition was voiced long before Judge
John Curtin’s 1976 decision that struck down the Arthur v. Nyquist case, which attempted
to block school desegregation in Buffalo.143 The school plan would proceed as planned
and the results would be cause for optimism. Test scores in reading and math improved,
but as Judy Trent-Scales found, suspension, special education placement, and dropout
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rates of African-American students stayed disproportionately high.144 While whites were
being attracted by special magnet schools and the promise of a unique curriculum,
African-American parents were still dealing with the same problems. Was the low
percentage of African-American teachers and administrators, along with the lack of
cultural sensitivity in white teachers, negatively affecting their children? In following
years, federal aid that funded the magnet program began to diminish and the schools
began to resegregate. Buffalo’s city budget reports reveal that the 2009 allotment for the
schools totaled $70,321,758, compared to $171,594,000 in 1985.145 Test scores in reading
and mathematics have declined, while African-American exposure to whites has declined
as more whites have left the city for the suburbs.
Erica Frankenberg and Chungmei Lee support the theory that exposure to different
races and socioeconomic levels has a positive effect on academic achievement and
suggest that a countywide desegregation model may be the answer.146 This may never
happen in Erie County however, as the New York State Constitution inhibits the
annexation of surrounding municipalities, which would be the fastest way to merge
school districts. Another factor is the widespread perception of suburban residents that
Buffalo is a problem area and that any merging of the school districts would drag down
suburban test scores.
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Redlining

Packaged with the geographical and racial isolation of African Americans is
economic isolation. The aforementioned difficulty in obtaining mortgages, whether in
high-risk or suburban areas, was aided by a process called redlining. This was a method
by which banks refused home mortgages in what they deemed to be “high-risk” areas by
marking them in red on a map. A 1975 study showed that over nineteen months, Buffalo
received only 25.9% of the mortgages and only 18.2% of the total money allotted.147 The
suburban areas received the rest, even though twelve of the thirteen banks studied had
headquarters in the city limits. The study also found that the predominately black Ellicott
and Masten Districts received only 0.9% and 0.3% respectively.148 Bankers were affected
by the same perceptions that residents and officials fell victim to. African Americans
were viewed as risks simply because they lived in an undesirable area. These areas would
never become desirable however, without stable homeownership. One real estate broker’s
client was approved for a mortgage based on financial criteria, then denied after the
assistant mortgage officer found the area to be inside the redlined zone.149 This problem
was a common one and helped to prevent stabilization of the neighborhoods. That factor
figures prominently in the unwillingness of present-day lenders to issue mortgages to
prospective East Side homeowners. Robert Mark Silverman, Associate Professor at the
University at Buffalo School of Urban and Regional Planning, conducted a 2008 study,
which found that the East Side is still not receiving mortgages due to low socioeconomic
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status of the area, age of the houses, and short tenure of many residents.150 Perception
became reality as East Side residents were cut off from the rest of the population.

Blockbusting

To make matters worse, when African Americans did occasionally purchase homes in
white areas, a process called blockbusting was used as a means to maximize realtor profit
while promoting fear that led to increased white flight. Realtors would convince white
homeowners that the neighborhood property values would drop after when an AfricanAmerican family moved in. Then the realtor would get the white owner to sell cheap,
while selling to a black buyer at an inflated price. The Buffalo Common Council
condemned this practice in 1964, stating that promoting or inciting “…neighborhood
unrest, community tension, or fear of racial, religious, nationality or ethnic changes in
any street, block, neighborhood or other area…” would be punishable by a fine.151 This
law was not backed by any type of enforcement however and realtors (both AfricanAmerican and white) continued to practice blockbusting and help increase segregation.
By the 21st century, the vast majority of available properties were located on Buffalo’s
East Side, as they had been abandoned; a buyer could purchase an entire block of
residences in some cases.
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Figure 4. Available Residential properties in Buffalo as represented by balloons (from
BuffaloRising.com, 2010).

Employment Trouble

The economic isolation and inability to acquire wealth through homeownership
cannot be viewed without the context of lack of employment opportunity for blacks in
Buffalo. The white residents of Buffalo benefited from an abundance of industrial
employment, mostly in steel making, auto production, shipping, and grain storage.
Buffalo was a large city in 1950 and one of the world’s busiest ports. African Americans
however, were usually the last to share in this prosperity. They faced the dilemma of
being the “last-hired, first-fired,” along with having to disprove the aforementioned
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perception of blacks being unintelligent and unable to work without white supervision.
Throughout the twentieth century, Buffalo’s economy received a boost through the jobs
provided by the Republic and Bethlehem Steel Companies, but African-American
workers were often discriminated against. They were denied the higher paying jobs, such
as foremen, and were saddled with the less desirable jobs. In 1980, two minority
appellants sued Bethlehem Steel for discrimination, lost, and then had the order reversed
on appeal. Bethlehem was keeping higher paying jobs from minorities who were also
underrepresented in the overall area’s steel industry. 152 This was the case for many area
employers, including white businesses that operated on the East Side. Even when jobs
became available in the suburbs, such as with the construction of the SUNY Campus in
Amherst during the late 1960’s, blacks were not immediately hired. A 1968 study from
the State Commission for Human Rights revealed that only 0.8% of the skilled workforce
in the Buffalo construction industry was African American and there were no apprentices
being trained for foreman positions.153 Obtaining a job was incredibly difficult when
faced with discrimination and lacking efficient public transportation, yet accepting
welfare increased the perceptions that led to discrimination.
This discrimination reared its head in various other forms as well. As the black
population spread throughout the East Side, white flight increased and white businesses
began to shut down. The East Side was left without an adequate supply of merchants.
Those who remained charged high prices to those who lacked the means of transportation
to travel elsewhere. BUILD’s records from 1968 show that it was actually more
expensive to live in the ghetto. Residents bought in small quantities and often on credit,
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there were no large stores, the merchandise was substandard, and merchants raised prices
on the days that welfare check arrived.154 Residents were paying more and receiving less,
just as they had previously with housing. The argument over grocery stores continues into
the present, as there are some supermarkets on the East Side, but still none in the Ellicott
District. The smaller, corner stores still prey on those who lack transportation by selling
expired goods or individual items not labeled as such.155 Residents often have to travel to
other parts of the city to find adequate merchandise and fair prices. This comes at a time
when supermarkets are looking for untapped markets; the East Side offers such a market.
The combination of isolating influences spilled over into violence during the summer
of 1967. The predominately black East Side neighborhood near William Street and
Jefferson Avenue (census tract #14 in Figure 3) was boiling over with anger. There was
lingering resentment by Polish residents who had competed for jobs and housing with
blacks earlier. Rents were still high for inferior housing. There were complaints of false
arrests, lack of investigations of corrupt police, and police taking part in looting.156 What
was termed a “race riot” (initiated by African Americans) broke out, with fires set,
looting of stores, and people breaking windows. When asked why there was such anger,
residents responded that whites were profiting from blacks, but not providing jobs.157
Something had to be done to quell the anger, so Mayor Sedita decided to meet with some
area residents and listen to their concerns. Lack of jobs, unopened playgrounds, and
inequity in education were among the problems discussed.158 This episode further
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damaged the perceptions that white had of African Americans. It was easier to blame the
violence on “hoodlums,” instead of blaming the society that created the conditions that
led to the disturbance.159 The root problems were dismissed by the conservative white
population, who were genuinely shocked by outbursts of violence.

Conclusions on Race Relations

Although many of the negative perceptions have been successfully challenged
through careful study, they still persist. Even the realtors began to admit that integrated
neighborhoods could gain value when white neighbors were welcoming. In fact it was
incidences of racist vandalism in opposition to blacks moving in that lowered property
values.160 During the 1980s, lenders used a new type of redlining: no mortgages of less
than $15,000, which inhibited home ownership in many neighborhoods.161 Mixed race
and income neighborhoods lead to integrated schools and a more equitable education.
This in turn creates a more skilled workforce that appeals to companies who may wish to
relocate in the area. This has proven to be a tough sell however, as the exodus of whites
from Buffalo continued into the 21st century. The suburbs have always resisted lowincome housing, leading Buffalo to become what one official termed a “warehouse for
the poor.”162 Many in the suburbs are content to keep the status quo; they can work and
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play in the city and then return to their communities. Discrimination was still present and
contributing to continued segregation.
While more African Americans in Buffalo own homes today, the 2000 census shows
that problems remain. Through the 1980s to the present, homebuyers did not purchase
many homes in the city. As of 2000, only 43.5% of total housing units were owner
occupied, while 57.7% of the structures were built before 1939. In Erie County as a
whole, 65.3% of homes were owner-occupied and families with children were at 15.2%
poverty. Less than 30% of Buffalo’s population has a high school diploma, while 33.9%
of families with children live in poverty. African Americans made up 38.6% of Buffalo’s
population, but only 13.6% of Erie County’s population.163 Buffalo has become a poor
city in a segregated county made up of dozens of fiercely territorial factions. The
reluctance of Western New York whites to share a neighborhood with African Americans
has damaged the economic health of the region and limited opportunities to create an
attractive workforce.
Despite the continued existence of discrimination and segregation, Buffalo possesses
many redeeming qualities that are a result of its residents. The various African American
neighborhoods still show signs of life and character, in spite of previous setbacks. Hamlin
Park (labeled HP Figure 2), nearly destroyed by the intrusive Kensington Expressway,
boasts numerous block clubs that strive to keep the area clean and orderly. Several
charter schools now call the Ellicott District home and the A.D. Price housing complex
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(formerly Willert Park) has new town homes and more amenities.164 The Broadway
Market is still in operation after extensive renovations and continues to serve the
Broadway-Fillmore district.165 An old orphanage in the Ellicott District (see Figure 2) is
being converted to housing for low to moderate-income residents.166 An urban farm
project continues to flourish in the Fillmore District, close to the Broadway Market.167 If
city leaders can resist the urge to focus on “silver bullet” projects and devote more
resources to further develop neighborhoods, infrastructure, and schools, the city will be a
more desirable place to raise a family. If lenders can offer more options to prospective
homeowners, than those families will have a chance to take root and prosper.
In addition to problems created by poor race relations, America’s obsession with the
automobile has also played a role in the decline of cities. Buffalo is an example of this
trend, which has persisted into the 21st century. In the rush to alleviate traffic congestion
during the 20th century, many cities used federal funds to construct highways that
displaced neighborhoods and blocked access to prime waterfront land. These highways
required funds that could have been used to create efficient public transportation instead
of intrusive, dominating ribbons of concrete.
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CHAPTER 3
THE PREDOMINANCE OF THE AUTOMOBILE AND ITS ROLE IN THE DECLINE
OF BUFFALO, NEW YORK
In the late-1800’s, legendary landscape architect Frederick Law Olmsted proclaimed
the city of Buffalo to be “the best planned city, as to its streets, public places, and
grounds, in the United States if not in the world.”168 His system of parks and parkways,
combined with the distinctive radial street plan of Joseph Ellicott, indeed made the Queen
City the envy of late 19th century America.169 Olmsted’s Delaware Park parkways were
described as “impressive and coherent”, while magnificent Humboldt Parkway became
the first landscaped parkway to connect two public recreation grounds.170 In the midst of
burgeoning industry, rapidly increasing population and the automobile traffic congestion
that followed, the Olmsted system provided a much-needed respite for Buffalonians. The
parks and the parkways that connected them became places for city residents to
congregate, which provided neighborhood unity and improved the quality of life in
Buffalo.
During the twentieth century, Olmsted’s vision of a natural oasis in an urban setting
came into conflict with the realities of politics and economics. The expansion of industry
in Buffalo sparked population growth, and their transportation method of choice was the
automobile. City and state leaders, eager to accommodate and accelerate both the
development of industry and the influx of people, decided to sacrifice aesthetics for
efficiency. They decided to construct a state highway and a series of expressways to
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alleviate traffic congestion and provide businesses with thoroughfares that would assist
them in transporting goods and materials. These highways and expressways were
eventually linked, ironically replacing Olmsted’s parkway system, using readily available
federal funds.171 Buffalo was hardly alone in this pattern of generating ribbons of
concrete to satisfy Americans’ attachment to the perceived freedom of automotive travel.
Other northeastern industrial cities such as Cleveland and Pittsburgh engaged in
excessive highway construction at the expense of nature.
This orgy of highway building and the subsequent failure to construct effective public
transportation in the Buffalo area leads to an essential question. Were state and local
leaders at fault for possessing a lack of vision regarding the aforementioned
transportation decisions, or does the responsibility belong to the car-owning citizens and
their demand for more roadways? Some historians, such as Buffalo business owner Mark
Goldman, lay the blame at the feet of Buffalo’s city planners and officials, with their
“heavy-handed” approach to projects and “tribelike” attitude toward outside opinion.172
Countering this view is Brian Ladd, Adjunct Research Associate at the State University
of New York at Albany, who argues that automobile dependence is the culprit. He
presents the American (and later European) love of automotive freedom as a sort of
counterbalance to socialism.173 Americans did not want to be told what to do by
government officials and did not choose to be herded onto public transportation. Leaders
were merely providing what the public was demanding. Neil Kraus (see Chapter 1) adds
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to the debate by noting the lack of any consequential community resistance to highway
and expressway construction.174 With federal money pouring in and labor in demand, the
general public accepted these projects as a form of progress. This chapter will examine
the decision to devote public resources to highway building over public transportation in
order to assess the role of the auto, citizen groups, and policy makers in Buffalo’s general
decline. There is ample evidence to conclude that this is a more complex problem and
that the real fault lies in a combination of strong federal and state bureaucracy, inept local
leadership, unorganized citizen activist groups, and a populace devoted to the
convenience of the automobile.

Traffic Problems

Buffalo’s ascent as an industrial center began with the harnessing of Niagara Falls
hydropower after 1896.175 A diverse group of industries operated in the city, including
chemical plants, steel plants, grain mills and automobile manufacturers. Shipping and
railroads were the methods of transport for materials and goods. These industries boomed
during World War I and World War II, as they were needed to provide weapons and
supplies to the Allies. Buffalo’s population increased 19.6% (423,715 to 506,775) from
1910 to 1920, while the next decade produced a 13.1% increase (506,775 to 573,076).176

174

Kraus, 125.
Margaret M. Sullivan. "Buffalo." World Book Advanced. 2009. Database on-line. Available from
World Book Online, <http://worldbookonline.com/advanced/article?id=ar081380>. Accessed 21 February
2009.
176
Campbell Gibson. "Population Of The 100 Largest Cities And Other Urban Places In The United
States: 1790 To 1990".June 1998. U.S. Bureau of the Census. Database on-line. Available from
175

66
People were flocking to Buffalo to take advantage of the employment opportunities
available. Along with the increase in population came traffic congestion. City leaders
struggled with possible solutions to alleviate the huge volume of traffic on city streets and
feed the central business district more efficiently. Adding urgency to the dilemma were
some officials, such as Erie County Engineer George C. Diehl, who predicted that
Buffalo’s population would soon reach two million.177 Highways became a top priority as
traffic had to be diverted to lessen valuable commute time. The only impediment to the
building of highways was the question of who would provide the funding for such
massive projects.

Federal Funding

The funding question was answered after World War II with the creation of the PostWar Reconstruction Fund, which drew on a federal surplus of $310 million from a
booming U.S. economy.178 New York State Governor Thomas Dewey promoted a
highway that would run from New York City downstate to Niagara Falls. The New York
State Department of Public Works issued a report in 1946 that echoed Buffalo officials’
optimistic population estimates, projecting Buffalo’s population to grow to 630,000 by
1960 and more importantly that vehicle registration would reach 300,000.179 Traffic was
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becoming a serious problem that state officials claimed would get worse. The report
marked the beginning of the supremacy of the automobile in the state as the Department
of Public Works consolidated its power with engineers making the decisionsall geared
toward the car owner as a worker/commuter.180
State officials promoted the New York State Thruway with a huge marketing blitz.
With an original starting cost estimated at merely $202 million, the Thruway would soon
carry traffic from New York City to Buffalo in only seven hours. It would also move raw
materials and finished goods to aid existing businesses and attract new ones. Governor
Dewey hailed the Thruway as a part of New York’s progress, a new “Erie Canal.”181 In
addition, officials claimed that real estate values would increase along the highway
route.182 The only question that remained was where to place the Buffalo portion of the
new super highway.
The Buffalo City Planning Association attempted to exert its influence on the
Thruway placement decision, advocating a route that would slice through the center of
the city, bisect Delaware Park, and then move northwest toward Niagara Falls. City
planners wanted a route that would move traffic to and from the central business district,
while preserving access to the waterfront.183 An earlier study touted the value of a
thriving waterfront: “Buffalo has the opportunity to create one of the most attractive and
useful waterfronts to be found in any city. It would be inexcusable to muff it.”184 Even
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though industry and the automobile dominated decision-making, city planners still
recognized that Lake Erie aesthetics played a large role in Buffalo’s appeal.

Displacement and Suburban Exodus

The ultimate decision, however, rested with New York State Supervisor of Public
Works, Charlie Sells. Sells chose the Buffalo waterfront as the Niagara Section of the
Thruway, parallel to the Niagara River, Black Rock Canal and Lake Erie. Although the
waterfront view became obstructed, the alternative route would have meant the removal
of approximately 3,400 homes, which was unrealistic. 185 The waterfront route was less
intrusive, as it followed the route of the old Erie Canal and its towpath along with
railroad right-of-way property. Nevertheless, a small number of homes were moved to
new locations. The West Side neighborhood also lost several restaurants, gardens and fish
markets along the water. Ferryboats to Canada from the foot of Ferry Street ceased
operations.
Farther north, the residents of Buffalo’s Riverside neighborhood (labeled R in Figure
2) saw their waterfront access restricted.186 Riverside Park was reduced, fishing and
hunting clubs were demolished, swimming pools were removed, and the Riverside Park
casino was torn down.187 After 1958, Riverside lost what gave it character the Niagara
River. The need for efficient transportation outweighed the integrity of the neighborhood.
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The Niagara Section of the New York State Thruway was completed by 1960 and
Buffalo’s neighborhoods were forever altered.
Figure 5. Buffalo’s Riverside neighborhood in the 21 st
century (from Buffalo Architecture and History)

The rationale behind the
Thruway was more efficient
transportation, as shown by
Charlie Sells’ 1946 warning of
“untenable traffic
congestion.”188 Officials
presented the highways as
critical to the economic health

of the state. There were other factors behind the Thruway construction however. One
factor was the flood of federal money that flowed into New York, $33 million in 1946,
that had to be used quickly or the state would face a reduction in funds.189 What state
leaders would not admit was that the Thruway was in part a massive make-work
government project that relied on a temporary federal surplus. The public soon
discovered that the original cost of $202 million was inaccurate and that the eventual cost
would reach $1 billion.190 Bonds had to be issued and tolls charged to cover the cost,
counter to the “pay-as-you-go” approach touted by Dewey. Another factor pushing
construction was the influence of the steel and automobile lobbies. More cars led to more
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roads and vice versa. When work slowed toward 1950, automobile dealers complained of
a possible loss of sales.191 The automobile was now the driving force behind policy
decisions.
The effects of New York State Thruway construction were numerous. The Highway
Trust Fund of 1956 was one of these. From that point on, all revenue generated by tolls
was set aside to be use exclusively for the building of more highways.192 The Thruway
Authority became an enormous entity, free to make decisions that benefited the car owner
with little regard for anyone else. The new highways led to more suburban sprawl as the
flow of people from Buffalo to the suburbs increased. Suburbanites were able to live
farther away from their jobs in the city. New York State exacerbated the problem by
increasing aid to town highway departments.193 Local leaders can be faulted for ignoring
the fact that Buffalo’s population growth had slowed for five consecutive decades by
1940.194 As population began to decline after the 1950’s and more people left for the
suburbs, leaders still pushed for more highways. They assumed that suburbanites would
continue to patronize the central business district, not realizing that towns would build
their own businesses. Ironically, the commute for the average American has increased
since the highway boom, even though they were marketed as timesaving
breakthroughs.195 More highways equaled more traffic and less than twenty-five years
later the Niagara Section of the Thruway was crumbling, requiring costly repairs.196 The
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Highway Fund is almost depleted today, requiring states to eventually fund their own
repairs. In addition, property values along the Thruway route dropped from 1950 to 1960,
contrary to what state officials promised.197 One positive effect that materialized was the
lower rate of fatalities due to car accidentsa twenty percent decrease from 1954 to
1958.198

The Kensington Expressway

Although the Niagara Section of the Thruway provided a north-south highway along
the waterfront of Buffalo, there was no conduit to carry traffic on an east-west route
through the city. City planners first proposed an arterial route along Hinman Avenue in
the northwest section of the city, but the Common Council unanimously rejected it. They
wanted an arterial that would siphon traffic from Delaware Avenue, Elmwood and
Military Road into the Thruway and carry it downtown.199 The site that was chosen
demonstrated the importance of the automobile and the lack of regard for Olmsted’s
parks by planners. They picked a route that would minimize destruction of residential
properties, but devastate Olmsted’s system. The new expressway would have two
sections, the Scajaquada and the Kensington. The Scajaquada bisected Delaware Park
and disfigured the park’s lake. The Kensington obliterated Olmsted’s majestic Humboldt
Parkway (see Figures 6-10) and bisected the Humboldt Park and Fruit Belt
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neighborhoods. Planners saw Humboldt Parkway as merely a traffic conduit, so
expanding it made sense and caused less disruption than alternate sites. Parkland was
expendable, even if a renowned landscape artist designed it. The neighborhood was
expendable as well, as it was quickly becoming African-American with the Jewish
residents moving out.
Trees began to fall in 1958, as workers cleared Humboldt Parkway. There was some
displacement, as 570 buildings, including many businesses, had to be removed to
accommodate the new expressway.200 The mostly middle class families were forced to
scramble to find new housing, while many fled the neighborhood to avoid living next to
an expressway. Buffalo was now viewed as a transfer point between Pennsylvania,
Massachusetts and the rest of the Thruway system. There were 306,000 cars in the city by
1961.201 The automobile was transforming the city in rapid fashion, but a debate
emerged.
Some saw the expressway as a sign of progress, similar to the Thruway. In 1964,
Buffalo Business magazine reported that “people must move about” and that “access to
the industrial area” would improve the economy.202 This view was typical of the business
class in Buffalo who argued that parks and neighborhoods do not boost economies.
Efficiency came into play again as the Chamber of Commerce complained that drivers
and truckers were losing $35 million annually due to lack of expressways.203 Earlier,
Buffalo Business had touted the Kensington as a good value for Buffalo, due to the state
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absorbing $45 million of the cost with the city paying only $6 million.204 Again we see
the lure of free money that had to be used immediately or lost. Support came from some
of the city’s architects as well. Milton Milstein concurred with business leaders when he
stated that: “Our planning should indulge the driver habit as ingeniously and attractively
as our planning skills will permit.” He also praised freeways as a means for the driver to
bypass undesirable areas.205 Neil Kraus points out that the Kensington eliminated the
need to traverse Buffalo’s black East Side.206 The area is isolated from the passing traffic,
while expressway drivers and politicians can pretend that the African-American area does
not exist, as they drive through the area on the below-grade Kensington. Humboldt Park
and the Fruit Belt were hardly undesirable, but they were filling with African Americans
and stood in the way of a quicker commute to the suburbs.
There was little outcry against the Kensington, and Buffalo lacked an “established
community organization” to counter the destruction of the neighborhood, according to
Buffalo architect and African-American community activist Robert T. Coles. 207 Small
factions competed rather than come together for the common cause. Influential AfricanAmerican politicians and clergy did not want to concede power to other groups. This was
a reoccurring problem through to the present day. The Model Cities Agency, part of a
federal urban aid program, was one of the groups who criticized after the fact. They
complained that the Kensington isolated residents, 40 to 60 percent of whom did not own
a car.208 Some of those residents reported that the expressway construction prohibited
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movement from one side of Humboldt Parkway to the other for ten years. This was a
factor in the failure of numerous neighborhood businesses and was also a major
disruption to neighborhood life.209 An impassable, enormous mud pit now separated
friends and neighbors. In addition, the city lost $1.8 million in taxes from properties that
were removed for the Kensington in the initial section.210 People from the suburbs were
benefiting from the expressway without sharing in the cost of acquiring the right-of-way.
All of these concerns, however, were superseded by the need for quicker traffic flow and
more construction jobs.
The aesthetic and social value of Olmsted’s Humboldt Parkway cannot be
overlooked. It was a social gathering place where people from the neighborhood bonded
and formed a sense of community. Coles, who built his home with its back facing the
Kensington, criticized the trend of more expressways and parking: “Will we ever realize
that the city and the automobile are incompatible, that the solution we see in more urban
expressways and downtown parking is no solution at all.”211 He was in the minority
however, as the majority of Buffalonians owned cars and influenced the decisions in
public policy. Government leaders and urban planners did not view the neighborhoods
and their charm as economic assets.
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Figure 6. Humboldt Parkway-1915 (from HotBuffalo.com)

Figure 7. Preparation for Demolition (from DanReitz.com, 2010)
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Figure 8. Kensington Expressway Construction in 1963. (from DanReitz.com,
2010)

Figure 9. The Kensington Expressway Divides Neighborhoods. (from Buffalo
Rising, 2010)
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Figure 10. Humboldt Parkway Becomes the Kensington Expressway (from DanReitz.com,
2010)
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Rapid Transit

Buffalo leaders did attempt to counter the automobile culture by proposing a public
transit system that would adequately serve the Western New York region, including those
who could not afford to own a car. In 1964, the Niagara Frontier Transportation
Authority (NFTA) reported that increasing sprawl had ruled out walking or bus trips to
the central business district. In fact, only seven percent of all regional trips utilized public
transit.212 The transit system was inadequate and the explosion of automobile ownership
did not bode well for the future of public transportation. In the same year, the Committee
on Urban Studies began advocating regional planning, rather than competing with
growing suburbs.213 This was a daunting proposition however, as local government
officials were and still are very protective of their jurisdictions.
Two years later a study of public transportation revealed that highways had actually
increased the cost of travel, as many households now needed two cars.214 The push for
rapid transit was building momentum. Another factor that favored transit was the
aforementioned study’s prediction of future parking problems downtown if traffic
continued to increase.215 City planners had pushed for more parking ramps downtown,
going so far as to remove the ornate Hotel Buffalo to clear space for parking in 1968.216
The city was locked in a desperate struggle to make downtown more desirable to
consumers. An advertisement in the September 1961 issue of Buffalo Business magazine
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exclaimed: “Even parking ramps can be attractive!” as if the ramps were architectural
gems.217 Buffalo’s plethora of parking spaces had been praised earlier as a draw for
suburban shoppers who could help to boost a still vibrant retail center downtown, not
realizing that the suburbs would soon be self-sufficient and stores would flee to the
suburbs.218 The continued building of parking ramps was not a viable option anymore.
Now officials and planners were ready to try rapid transit.
The road to rapid transit would not be simple, however. The African-American
community needed the service, but was suspicious of the NFTA and the State Urban
Development Corporation. In question was the consolidated power of the agencies that
answered to no one, not even the state legislature.219 Buffalo had previously gone along
with the destruction of Humboldt Parkway, without any citizen input. There was a
genuine concern that the highway interests would again prevail over the interests of the
public transportation users. This concern unfortunately may have slowed the process at a
time when time was a crucial factor in reaching public transportation goals.
Those goals were outlined in a series of transportation studies that were conducted in
the late-1960s. One study from 1969 advocated a transit line that would extend to
suburban Amherst (northeast of Buffalo), connecting with the soon-to-be-built University
of Buffalo North Campus.220 The Amherst area was growing and county officials
recognized the benefits of a corridor between the suburb and the city. An efficient transit
line would be the link that joined the two areas, rather than having them develop
217

Buffalo Business, September 1961.
Charles M. Hall. “There Will Always be a Downtown.” Buffalo Business. Buffalo, N.Y.,
February 1958.
219
Richard Harmon. Wake-Up in the Split-Level Casbah, November 1968, from the Robert T. Coles
Papers: in Buffalo State College Special Collections, E.H.Butler Library Research: accessed March 20,
2009.
220
Erie and Niagara Counties Regional Planning Board. Evaluation of Transportation Planning and
its Impact on Regional Development. Buffalo, N.Y., 1969.
218

80
separately. The “Buffalo-Amherst Corridor” became a popular concept, as the Buffalo
Courier Express reported in 1970 that the corridor could become a “future growth route
and residential center of the region.”221 Regional planning had become a real possibility
as the NFTA laid out more ambitious proposals, but problems soon appeared.
Buffalo’s African-American community leaders refused to be intimidated again by
government. Coles voiced his concern in 1971 to Lewis G. Harriman Jr. chairman of the
Area Committee for Transit (ACT). Coles argued that the citizens had no say in planning
and that a plan for overhead transit would involve another high social cost for the
neighborhoods affected.222 Bunny Ross, a prominent Buffalo community activist, started
a grassroots coalition comprised of sixty community organizations called No Overhead
Transit (NOT) and collected 55,000 signatures to block the construction of overhead
rails.223 The residents of Buffalo’s black neighborhoods merely wanted to be consulted
before their areas were significantly altered. Harriman shot back with an urgent plea to
Coles to negotiate, or else lose the state matching funds for construction. This would also
release $171 million in funds from the federal government. Harriman words were
concise: “The time for action is NOW!”224 Harriman’s statement was prophetic, as the
coming years brought staggering inflation and higher project costs.
Despite the arguments between the community and ACT, the state was prepared to
commit funding, as was the federal government. Buffalo was unique in that it was not
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required to provide any city funding for the project, as was the case in other cities. The
cost for phase 1 of the construction, which consisted of Buffalo to Amherst and would be
completed in 1976, was $271,096,743; phase 2 (Buffalo to the northern suburb of
Tonawandato be competed in 1980) was $65,840,000.225 With these two rail phases
implemented and bus lines feeding them, Buffalo would have an adequate regional transit
system, students could access the city, commuters could travel to downtown jobs, and
people from low-income neighborhoods could access jobs in the suburbs. The route
would have used abandoned railroads at grade, so the right-of-way cost was minimal.226
The entire Metro Rail project was estimated by the NFTA at $474 million in
1974all covered by state and federal funds.227 It seemed as though the rapid transit line
would come to fruition.

Delays and Inflationary Pressure

By 1975 however, the project hit a roadblock. The Greater Buffalo Development
Foundation (GBDF), an organization of business elites, released a study that labeled the
proposed covered transit mall downtown as too expensive at $26 million.228 The mall was
changed from below to above ground, which ignored the fact that Buffalo has harsh
winters and cut off vehicular traffic to Main Street. Later, the NFTA and the GBDF made
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additional changes that increased costs and caused more delays. After three years of
argument, during which time business leaders did nothing, the GBDF asserted its own
power and eliminated any chance of Buffalo developing regional rapid transit.229 Local
leadership received cooperation from citizens and outside government, but still failed to
produce results.
The delays proved to be fatal to the regional concept. The late-1970s brought severe
inflation, which sent costs skyrocketing. 230 The original plan to connect to Amherst and
the Tonawandas was revised. The new plan was minimalDowntown Buffalo to the
University of Buffalo South Campus on the city limits. The 6.5-mile route provided a
capital cost savings, but the 11-mile plan (to Amherst) would have resulted in a smaller
operating deficit.231 That cost now shifted to the city. The tunneling began in 1979 with
NFTA Chairman Chester R. Hardt predicting “the revitalization of the Western New
York economy.”232 In many cities, property values increased with proximity to rapid
transit. This was not the case in Buffalo however, as the rapid transit line did not extend
far enough to provide the significant benefits that come with true regionalism.233
Buffalo’s attempt at constructing an adequate rapid transit system failed in many
respects. A study released in 2007 backed the argument that without a regional economy
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and a truly regional transit system, the effect on property values would be minimal.234
This is due to the fact that Buffalo’s Metro Rail transit line does not extend to where
employment opportunities are increasingthe suburbs. In fact, a nationwide survey
recently showed that 36 percent of entry-level jobs were outside the reach of public
transportation.235 A study from 1975 warned of the minimal impact on property values,
and added that the encouragement of car use would cause sprawl (and government cost)
to increase.236 Ironically, the authors of the study (the GBDF) helped cause the delay that
limited the final project. Other cities such as Toronto experienced a doubling of property
values in property adjacent to transit stations.237 Those transit systems are much larger
and provide access to an entire region, not just the central city. In addition, African
Americans are denied access to the suburbs, isolating them just as the Kensington
Expressway did in Buffalo.238 The fact that Buffalo subsidizes parking downtown with a
number of ramps further undercuts the need for public transportation.239 People will not
use transit if parking is inexpensive, unlike cities like Boston or Toronto where parking is
more costly. In addition, the failure to extend the transit system to Amherst allows the
University of Buffalo’s suburban campus to pull economic benefits away from the city.
Amherst has developed while Buffalo continues to decline.
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Other Cities Correct Their Mistakes

These types of mistakes and failures are not exclusive to Buffalo however. Other cities,
especially in the Northeast, have committed similar mistakes. The differences come in the
response to those mistakes. Cleveland is one “rust belt” industrial city that experienced a
marked drop in population during the latter half of the twentieth century. Their waterfront
on Lake Erie is cut off from downtown by a major highway called the Shoreway. Their
elite business leaders exert a great deal of influence on public policy, while the local
media promotes any new development.240 This control by the elite excludes citizen input,
much like Buffalo. Decisions are made only with the consent of the major lawyers,
bankers and developers. The economic emphasis has been placed mainly on “silver
bullet” projects, again comparable to Buffalo. In recent years, the waterfront has seen
additions such as the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame, a new baseball stadium and a new
basketball arena. These improvements, while impressive on the surface, have not
stemmed the tide of declining population and crumbling neighborhoods in Cleveland.
New strategies would have to be implemented.
One of those strategies is to stop filling the waterfront with artificial aesthetics and
uncover its natural beauty and ability to attract people. Cleveland’s Shoreway highway
was slated to be transformed (starting in 2013) into a low-speed, at-grade boulevard,
restoring access to the Lake Erie shoreline.241 This move is an attempt to improve the
quality of life, shake off the industrial, “rust-belt” image and help retain young
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professionals who prefer living in an urban setting. In accordance with the strategy of less
investment in downtown “silver bullets” is a commitment to more investment in the
neighborhoods, including new housing.242 Retaining the population by improving the city
as a whole, rather than creating a glitzy downtown, is the new focus of Cleveland’s
planners.
Another city, albeit not a Northeastern one, that succeeded in removing an obstruction
to the waterfront was Portland, Oregon. The Harbor Drive highway was completed in
1950 and combined with industrial property to cut off waterfront access.243 Citizens
banded together to rectify this mistake and demanded the return of their waterfront. In
1974 Harbor Drive was closed and later converted to parkland. An adjoining avenue was
widened to handle the displaced traffic and negative impact was minimized. Government
officials took the proactive steps of forewarning drivers of the closure and synchronizing
traffic signals to aid traffic flow downtown.244 Potential problems were eliminated
through proper planning. Portland now combines historic sites with scenic open space to
create an asset to the city.245 By working in cooperation with all interests, Portland was
able to open up its shorelinea decision that provided aesthetic and economic benefits.
Several annual festivals are held on the waterfront, boosting tourism and enriching city
life in Portland.
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Conclusions on the Predominance of the Automobile

Buffalo has the vision and the opportunity to correct the mistakes of the past. Other
cities have set precedents for highway removal, improved rapid transit, cooperation
between organized citizen and government, and less state bureaucracy. The Buffalo
Olmsted Parks Conservancy provides the vision in its 2008 plan, which calls for a
comprehensive restoration plan of Buffalo parks. Included in the plan are the conversion
of the Scajaquada Expressway to a parkway and the restoration of Agassiz Circle
(between the Scajaquada and Kensington Expressways) as a formal entrance to Delaware
Park.246 The project is costly, but is comparable to the cost of maintaining the two
expressways. The federal and state departments of transportation fully fund this
maintenance, so funds are available to convert the Scajaquada. In 2005, the New York
State Department of Transportation released a study that examined the feasibility of
converting the Scajaquada into a two or four-lane boulevard.247 The study concluded that
a four-lane reduced- speed (35mph) parkway would meet the goals of restoring a parklike setting while still carrying traffic efficiently. Public opinion has started to creep into
public policy in Buffalo.
The issues of the Niagara Section of the Thruway obstructing the waterfront and the
Metro Rail rapid transit system extension have resurfaced as well. In 2009, the Buffalo
Common Council unanimously approved a resolution supporting both the extension of
the Metro Rail and the removal of the Niagara Section of the Thruway through the use of
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federal stimulus funds.248 The removal of the Thruway is merely wishful thinking at this
point, as no study has been conducted even though previous proposals have called for
restoring the waterfront. Stimulus funds are only granted to projects that are “shovelready” and approved by the federal government, therefore a simple proposal does not
qualify. The Metro Rail extension proposal cannot be considered by the federal
government without a plan to cover operating expenses. This is not an unreasonable
request, as most rapid transit systems are not self-sufficient. A new tax might have to be
imposed in order to guarantee revenue, possibly at a countywide level. With the large
number of suburban drivers in Erie County, a Metro Rail tax might not receive much
support.
These obstacles are by no means insurmountable, if residents and leaders of the
Buffalo and Western New York region can move away from their attachment to the
automobile. The region has seen leaders with vision, such as the late New York Senator
Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who argued for a regional approach to transit. He asserted that
government deliberately fostered sprawl and automobile dependence.249 The highway
lobby, which includes real estate developers, highway construction companies, trucking
companies and automobile manufacturers, exerts considerable influence over government
decisions. This influence has resulted in a continuing disparity in federal funding between
highways and public transportation. One instance of this was the Milwaukee East-West
Corridor Study in the early 1990’s. The proposed light-rail system was rejected by
Governor Tommy Thompson and by the Federal Highway Administration in favor of
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highway improvements that cost ten times more ($ 1 billion).250 Buffalo politicians and
citizen groups must look to other cities who overruled the highway lobby and follow their
lead. The transit lobby took a blow however, when the George W. Bush administration
cut federal funding for transit projects by 50 percent in 2004.251 A new Democratic
administration under Barack Obama may help the transit advocates to regain their
standing.
Buffalo’s decline began as part of a natural pattern of shifting industry. Steel and
other industries left for areas that were situated better geographically or offered lower
overhead in terms of less taxes and labor costs. The city needed local leaders with vision
that could help Buffalo develop a new economic base and stabilize the population.
Instead, Buffalo’s political and business leaders longed for the past and advocated grand
“silver bullet” projects, such as the poorly situated convention center, that did nothing to
improve the quality of life in the city. These elites formed redundant power groups and
battled each other for control over the money that the state and federal governments
dangled over them. They facilitated suburban sprawl by catering to car owners, failing to
realize that the suburbs would eventually become self-sufficient. When it was apparent
that more highways were not the answer, they failed to produce a viable transit option,
delaying until the costs were prohibitive. The state and federal governments were equally
complicit as they provided ample funding for improvements, but were overly influenced
by the highway lobby. The disparity in funding between highways and public transit
continues into the 21st century. Finally, the citizens of Buffalo share in the blame for the
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decline. Just as the political and economic leaders fought for power, citizen groups also
succumbed to infighting. The various factions had public support for the rapid transit
line, for example, but could not come together to exert enough influence on those in
power.
Today the power of heavy-handed, unresponsive local government and the influence
of opportunistic economic leaders are still present. Projects that the majority supports are
delayed by internal strife while other cities are forming coalitions and improving
themselves. Regional rapid transit remains a dream that is fading, while highway repairs
continue to be funded. Buffalo will continue to decline if the city continues to cling to the
failed policies of the past. Citizens must demand that government implement policies that
improve neighborhoods and the quality of life in the city, rather than catering to one
interest groupautomobile owners.
The next problem to affect Buffalo’s decline concerned the relationship between
government, organized labor, and big business. Chapter four outlines the decline of
manufacturing jobs in Western New York, once a huge part of the region’s economy. As
manufacturing jobs disappeared, the region lost population and the City of Buffalo began
its economic and population decline.
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CHAPTER 4
THE ROLE OF MANAGEMENT, LABOR, AND GOVERNMENT IN THE DECLINE
OF MANUFACTURING IN BUFFALO

During the period after World War II, Buffalo was a manufacturing giant and at the
peak of its population. The nearly 600,000 people benefited from Buffalo’s prime
position as the nation’s eighth-largest manufacturer and fifteenth largest city. 252 Buffalo
had many advantages for luring industry that the city leaders never failed to flaunt. As far
back as 1860, a city pamphlet touted Buffalo’s geographical position between eastern and
western markets, a sound infrastructure, and cheaper access to labor, power, and raw
materials.253 With the Western and Southern regions of the United States not fully
developed, Buffalo took full advantage of its location on the eastern shore of Lake Erie.
In addition, natural resources played a role in Buffalo’s advantage as the same 1860
publication claimed “…at no other city can the ore and the coal meet so
advantageously.”254
Employment in post-WWII Buffalo was plentiful, as 1950s Buffalo boasted
numerous large companies, including some multinational corporations. Bell Aircraft,
American Brass, Houdaille Industries, National Gypsum, Dunlop Tire, Carborundum,
Ford, General Motors, Trico, Westinghouse, Western Electric, and Buffalo Forge were
but a few of the choices for the Buffalo labor force. In addition to these, Buffalo was a
252
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major steel making center, with a Bethlehem Steel plant in Lackawanna and a Republic
Steel plant in South Buffalo. Manufacturing provided nearly 45% of the total
employment in Buffalo by 1950, with service jobs providing only 10.7%, and
government a mere 9.1%.255 Most of these workers were represented by labor unions,
making Buffalo’s labor force higher paid on average when compared to the rest of the
nation. For example, in 1960, Buffalo per capita income was 7.8% above the national
average.256
Bethlehem Steel led the pack in terms of these well-paying jobs. In 1951, the
company announced plans to expand capacity at the Lackawanna plant capacity from 3.6
million tons annually to 4.68 million tons.257 The demand for steel in the 1950s could not
match that of World War II, but the U.S. was expanding and the devastated countries of
Europe and Asia needed to rebuild their infrastructures. By 1965, Bethlehem’s
Lackawanna payroll alone ballooned to 21,500 workers, but what city leaders and
workers did not recognize (or did not want to believe) was that Buffalo’s population and
manufacturing base was beginning to decline. The blame for this decline is often placed
at the feet of the United Steelworkers of America (USWA) or the United Automobile
Workers (UAW), two major labor unions that successfully bargained for wages, benefits
and work rules that surpassed those of Buffalo’s non-union workers as well as the
national average. By 1960, UAW works made 16% more in wages and benefits than the
national average.258
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Former management at many of the aforementioned manufacturing companies
bemoaned the high wages and generous benefits won by workers through collective
bargaining. They claimed that the inflexibility of the unions (leaders and members) in
refusing wage concessions and relaxing of work rules contributed to the many plant
closures, takeovers, and bankruptcies. The late John Strohmeyer, journalist and Pulitzer
Prize recipient, argued that union victories led to unnecessarily high wages and that “past
practice” clauses created unnecessary positions in plants.259 Thomas E Leary and
Elizabeth Sholes, partners in an independent public history firm and authors of several
articles on industrial history, counter with the claim that mismanagement, combined with
poor distribution of capital and an increasing corporate appetite for “paper profits”
(profits made through transactions rather that through selling a product or service) over
actual production, led to the decline of manufacturing jobs in Buffalo and in the nation as
a whole.260 Judith Stein, Professor of History at the City College of New York, highlights
the cooperation between the USWA and Bethlehem, noting that as early as 1970, the
union assisted the company in pushing for a lower property tax bill and a delay in
installation of pollution-control equipment.261 Both parties, however, charge that local
and federal governments fostered a climate in which American companies could not
compete with foreign manufacturers. Christopher G.L.Hall, President of American
University in Kosovo, adds the argument that the federal government had no industrial
policy and left companies to fight each other in the free market, while other countries
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captured U.S. markets.262 In addition, the U.S. government fostered a climate of free
trade and open borders that made the decline of manufacturing inevitable. An
examination of these charges reveals that all have merit, but since labor, management and
government are interdependent, they cannot be picked apart and pinpointed for the
purpose of laying blame exclusively. Management, labor, and government all failed to act
to save American manufacturing jobs and lacked visionary leadership; they relied on selfpreservation as an impetus for action (or in many instances, inaction).

Major Companies Vacate Buffalo

While the 1950s and 1960s were good economic times for Buffalo, there were signs
that the city, and the region in general, was on the decline. Population growth in the city
had slowed significantly since 1930, and started to decline after 1950.263 The suburbs as
well as the Southern and Western U.S. regions began to attract residents who moved to
take advantage of increasing employment opportunities and a warmer climate. The St.
Lawrence Seaway opening in 1959 ended Buffalo’s commercial base and increased the
dependence on manufacturing. Ships began to bypass Buffalo and travel through the
Welland Canal, which became a more direct route to the Atlantic Ocean. As an example,
grain exported from Buffalo declined from fifty-nine million bushels in 1956-1957 to
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802,000 in 1968-1969.264 The grain shipment industry in Buffalo began its inevitable
decline. Buffalo had opposed the Seaway since it was proposed in the 1920s, while
federal officials tried to reassure local business leaders.265
David C. Perry, Professor of Urban Planning and Policy at the University of Illinois at
Chicago, points out that local ownership of large companies had been on the decline as
well since the 1920s as newspapers, department stores, oil transport, food processing, and
granaries were bought out by outside interests.266 Buffalo was losing control over its
economy and becoming susceptible to the whims of corporations. The largest companies,
steel and automobile manufacturers, were owned by multinationals. This can be an asset,
as a large company is able to invest in a subsidiary due to more availability of capital.
The downside is that large corporations frequently sell off profitable branches or close
branches that are not as profitable as others to streamline and maximize profits. In the 21st
century, only a few manufacturing companies (Rich Products, Labatt, Sorrento Cheese,
and New Era Cap Company) are headquartered in Buffalo, along with some banks
(Manufactures and Traders Trust and First Niagara) and insurance companies (Merchants
Insurance Group and Lawley Insurance). As manufacturing in the Northeast began
plummeting, the downside became reality. Each postwar recession drove Buffalo’s level
of manufacturing jobs down and the subsequent recoveries did not restore the previous
levels.267 Global competition, lower wages, market shifts, and depletion of natural
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resources all combined to pull jobs elsewhere. In addition, companies were using
technology to eliminate positions and shifting some production to different locations.

Houdaille and National Gypsum

Houdaille Industries is an example of a Buffalo-based company that manufactured
automobile bumpers, hydraulic shocks, and machine tools. It later became a huge
conglomerate, acquiring construction materials companies, toolmakers, along with
contracting and engineering services. As journalist and author Max Holland points out,
Houdaille avoided antitrust laws by using this type of diversification, rather than vertical
or horizontal integration.268 With vertical integration, a company will purchase
companies in the supply chain to control prices, while with horizontal integration, a
company will purchase or “buy out” other companies that make the same products in the
same stage of production. Diversification provided Houdaille with protection against
recession; if one sector performed poorly, another would provide the cash flow to keep
the weaker link running.
Houdaille performed very well through the 1970s, posting huge profits, including
$24.8 million in 1976.269 They had low debt and a healthy cash flow, but left Buffalo in
1977, for Fort Lauderdale. Houdaille went up for sale initially because the Jacobs family

268

Max Holland, When the Machine Stopped: A Cautionary Tale from Industrial America. (Boston:
Harvard Business School Press, 1989): 57.
269
“Houdaille Profits at Record Levels.” Courier Express, 25 January 1977

96
of Buffalo attempted to purchase the company through stock purchases.270 The Houdaille
chairman enlisted the help of investment bankers Goldman, Sachs, and Company to block
the takeover attempt, but Goldman Sachs was more concerned with the three million
dollar fee it would collect if Houdaille were sold. When the firm of Kohlberg, Kravis, and
Roberts (KKR) used Golman Sachs as an intermediary, a leveraged buyout of Houldaille
proceeded. KKR used Houdaille’s lack of debt to finance the purchase (interest on debt
is tax deductible, therefore it is possible to negate a company’s tax burden by accruing
debt), the stock price soared because of the rumored takeover, and Houdaille’s chief
executive could not take the risk of the stock price crashing.271
With the exit of National Gypsum in the same year, Buffalo was left with no Fortune
500 companies headquartered in the city, and only five large, publicly owned firms.272
National Gypsum had begun to expand overseas and acquired huge debt to do so. Their
new company president closed their Buffalo plant, moved to Dallas, Texas and made
record profits in the 1980s.273 Older plants were expendable and building new plants with
financing was tax deductible. Buffalo had disappeared from the national manufacturing
spotlight and has not returned. Neither of these companies moved solely because of
oppressive labor costs or restrictive labor rules; their owners made enormous profits from
expansion using debt interest to lower their taxes. Other problems that did not involve
labor, such as lower taxes, were also present. This was a national trend, not just confined
to Buffalo.
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Author Max Holland blames Houdaille not for investing, but for investing
ineffectively, micromanaging, and ignoring input from experienced employees.274 This
pattern of mismanagement was unfortunately a common one that negatively affected
Buffalo’s manufacturing jobs. Holland describes Houdaille as “a top-heavy bureaucracy,
obsessed with procedure and prestige rather than function and need.”275 When companies
are managed in this manner, they focus on the short term and leave themselves vulnerable
to recession and/or inflation, then shift the blame to high employee costs. In Houdaille’s
case, they hired executives who were lawyers or accountants, rather than production
people who had the knowledge and the will to innovate.276 They were more concerned
with procuring a return for stockholders and less with creating products and keeping jobs.
Relations between labor and management became strained as a result. The once-great
Houdaille Industries eventually became the target of the aforementioned leveraged
buyout, was sold and renamed.

Bethlehem Steel

The most substantial casualty of the manufacturing decline was the Bethlehem Steel
plant in the city of Lackawanna, New York, which borders Buffalo to the south.
Bethlehem acquired the Lackawanna facility through its $60 million purchase of
Lackawanna Steel in 1922 and proceeded to modernize the twenty-year-old plant with an
eye on the growing automobile industry. The coming of World War II meant that
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Bethlehem had to shift to producing huge amounts of steel for defense. The Lackawanna
plant operated to capacity, becoming the largest steel making operation in the nation.
Following the war, the plant continued to produce at a healthy pace, employing 21,500 by
1965. The auto industry fed the demand for steel, employing 22,000 by 1964, including
companies such as General Motors, Ford, Buffalo Tool and Die, American Radiator,
American Brass, Dunlop Tire, and Trico.277 Employment was high and wages combined
with benefits were generous for many in the manufacturing plants, but trouble was
looming. The variables that led to these conditions had begun to change.
One of these variables was the relationship between management and labor.
Bethlehem Steel in particular was known for its animosity toward organized labor. The
company faced legal action by contractors in the 1920s due to Bethlehem’s refusal to deal
with companies who were unionized.278 This set the stage for future relations between
management and labor. In the 1940s, Bethlehem management rejected union interference
in matters of production, further damaging relations and sending the two sides in opposite
directions. From that point on, the union was pushed into using legal means to protect
what had been gained through bargaining.279 Relations continued to break down through
the 1960s, denying the company of an important resource: human capital. Workers were
not valued for their ideas on the shop floor because the company viewed them as
replaceable parts. John P. Hoerr, a veteran reporter of American labor, cites a Japanese
study that concluded that U.S. businesses trusted systems, not workers who merely ran
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machines, similar to Houdaille’s aforementioned obsession with procedure.280 Bethlehem
was a top-down company as well, with no cooperation on the shop floor. A 1963 study of
business and industry in the region found that Buffalo’s labor force was productive, even
with the higher wages, but also had a higher level of labor unrest.281 President Richard
Nixon tried to repair management-labor relations by pushing the steel industry to accept
higher wages in exchange for union-management committees to improve productivity.
This effort failed, however, as managers refused to negotiate working conditions,
focusing on labor reductions only.282 Again, management dismissed the input of floorlevel workers. By the time management and labor developed cooperative teams, the
damage was irreparable.

Management Troubles at Bethlehem Steel

Poor management practices also contributed to Bethlehem’s decline. Strohmeyer
documents numerous blunders, all fueled by the arrogance that permeated a hugely
profitable corporation. In contrast to large metal fabricators, some independent
companies hired engineering consultants and draftsmen only when needed and joined
forces with other small companies to secure bids on projects.283 This could have cut costs
for Bethlehem and other large companies, but short-term planning and desire for
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quarterly profits prevented change. Subcontractors did work for Japanese companies also,
which lowered their overhead.284 In addition, many corporations like Bethlehem in
mature industries were allied through directors who served on boards together. This
helped them to control the steel and automobile industries for decades, but slowed the
adaptation to a changing economy. The same banks and stockholders who supplied the
cash to these giants required a return on their investment, thus mandating consistent
profits and short-term vision.285 The industries were structured to exploit the favorable
conditions, and the subsequent difficulties resulted in lost profits and jobs.
Bethlehem and the steel industry in general also faced the problem of rising labor
costs. Several factors led to the high cost of labor, however. One factor was the 1956
steel strike, which was lengthened by a poor economy. Management did not want to give
in to labor, considering the political pressure to limit price hikes and inflation.286 The
strike ended one day following the start of the Suez Canal crisis, perhaps causing the
Eisenhower administration to push for a resolution affecting an industry critical to
national defense. The strike led to slightly raised wages, increased benefits, and a 7.4%
hike in steel prices.287 The administration had more pressing concerns, but the wage-price
spiral continued upward.
Later in 1959, another strike stopped steel production for 116 days, opening the door
for imported steel. This resolution did not result in a significant wage increase (the
steelworkers instead received a cost-of-living adjustment indexed to inflation) and the
price of steel did not rise until 1962, but the two strikes resulted in a continuous wage-
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price spiral, the depletion of steel stockpiles, and the realization by customers that quality
steel could be purchased from foreign countries at a cheaper price. Management was
taking a proper stand in order to counter the growing threat of cheaper steel from
overseas, but their ongoing contribution to the poor state of labor-management relations
left them in a position in which they could not easily achieve future concessions from
labor. In addition, Paul A. Tiffany notes that steel companies did not push back at the
bargaining table before 1959 because both unions and the companies had a monopoly on
steel production and therefore shared the spoils.288 Short-term vision and consistent
profits kept change from taking place, and the cost-of-living adjustment became a ticking
time bomb. Employee costs tripled from 1972 to 1982, to $26.29 per hour (including
benefits).289 This could have been prevented through better relations with labor and
attention to the long term.
Another mistake on the part of Bethlehem management included failure to bargain
honestly and openly. Much of the blame for the failure of Bethlehem, and manufacturing
in general, is placed on the powerful labor unions, but management could have avoided
the dreaded “past-practice” rule, in which established jobs could not be consolidated or
eliminated, by admitting during the 1959 strike that they had started inefficient
practices.290 The industry could not convince any floor-level management to step forward
and admit that that they had done so, resulting in a victory for the union. Jobs were now
strictly defined and fiercely defended by the union; any work done by someone that was
not in their job description could result in a grievance being filed. A further examination
into the Bethlehem safety record revealed that in 1969, there were 58,956 visits to the
288
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emergency room by steelworkers.291 This is a good indication of why the United
Steelworkers of America refused to back down on “past-practice;” they did not trust the
company to value the safety of its workers.
Poor allocation of capital became another avoidable blunder for the huge corporation.
Bethlehem’s investment in the Lackawanna plant was substantial, but yielded low
return.292 The plant was over twenty years old when Bethlehem acquired it in 1922, and
the parent company never fully modernized the facility, preferring to follow a piecemeal
approach. The installation of the new basic oxygen furnaces (BOFs) occurred ten years
behind the Japanese competition and utilization of American steel plants was only around
60% by the late-1950s. Meanwhile, imports were increasing from 784,000 tons in 1954 to
4,396,000 tons in 1959.293 American companies were losing ground while Bethlehem was
bragging about the new technology. John E. Jacobs, Vice President of Bethlehem
commenting on the new BOFs in 1964 stated that: “They are the newest and, we are sure,
the best in the world.”294 Neither was true, and the Lackawanna plant now had a new
threat looming in the Midwest with the construction of Bethlehem’s Burns Harbor,
Indiana plant, which was completed in 1965.
The construction of a new plant was the result of an earlier failure to merge with an
existing plant in the 1930s and again in the 1950s (Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company)
due to legal action by stockholders and later an antitrust suit from the federal
government.295 Capacity increased and only high demand could keep the facilities
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running. Fortunately for the steel workers, the Vietnam War provided that demand
throughout the 1960s and kept Lackawanna active. The problem with Burns Harbor, as
far as Lackawanna was concerned, was that new plants have a high capital cost that
require running at full capacity to ensure a worthwhile return on the investment. A
Brookings Institution study done in 1978 found that upgrading existing facilities was
more cost-effective in the long run.296 Short-term vision based on quarterly reports
surfaced yet again. Bethlehem tried to calm fears of a Lackawanna shutdown, claiming
that the new plant in Indiana was “no threat.”297 Claiming that the market was growing
showed either dishonesty or incompetence, given the growing threat of cheap imports and
rising labor costs. The new plant actually increased Lackawanna’s production, as they
supplied Burns Harbor with steel slabs until the new plant was completed.298 What no
one wanted to admit was that Burns Harbor was taking the Midwest market from
Lackawanna and draining the capital that could have retooled the older plant properly. To
compound the short-term approach, Bethlehem continued to invest in Lackawanna (in
piecemeal fashion) even as it prepared to announce plans to close the plant in 1982.299
The closure of Lackawanna was inevitable after the construction of the massive, new
facility in Indiana, but the company refused to plan that far in advance.
The 1970s and early 1980s saw Bethlehem reap the rewards of that short-term
thinking. The company refused to modernize through research and development, new
ideas (which labor could have contributed to), or reorganizing the structure of the
company. The answer, as always, was to expand rather than increase productivity and
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engage in diversification. The demand from the continuing conflict in Vietnam helped
business, but in 1977 Bethlehem cut steel capacity from 6 million to 4.8 million tons at
Lackawanna, laying off 9,000 workers in the process. 300 The issue here was the age,
location, and productivity of the plant based on dubious capital expenditures. Labor
relations remained a problem, but the Burns Harbor plant was not much better, although
it did not suffer from the “past practice” rule because it was a newer facility. A General
Motors strike preceded the layoffs, and Trico (Buffalo-based maker of windshield
wipers) was forced to lay off workers as well.301 The press in Buffalo was beginning to
catch on when in late 1970, the Courier Express newspaper predicted that the Burns
Harbor plant would eventually lead to the closure of Lackawanna.302 The following year,
Bethlehem refused to offer automakers lower steel prices, unlike other companies.303
Imports increased as auto companies looked to cut costs and Bethlehem’s inflexibility
and lack of cooperation with a buyer it depended on helped hasten its decline.
Another mistake of Bethlehem’s management (and the industry in general) was the
failure to turn towards increased importation of iron ore. The U.S. supply is not as rich in
taconite as mines in Australia and Brazil, and it required upgrading at the mine site by
higher-paid U.S. mineworkers.304 This increased the cost for U.S. steel companies and
made them less competitive than countries like Brazil who had government subsidies,
lower wages and cheaper raw materials. While the U.S. mining companies complained
about the volume of iron ore imports by the mid-1980s, the automobile manufacturers
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had no qualms with the importation of foreign steel for their cars. The steel industry
could have decreased costs by using the same tactics.
The bad decisions continued for Bethlehem throughout the 1970s. The USWA
charged Bethlehem with failing to modernize by applying new technology during a time
of favorable trade agreements.305 Bethlehem was indeed pumping capital into
Lackawanna (a new bar mill in 1972), but again it was done in piecemeal fashion while
the company fought labor over work rules and productivity. The overspending and
mismanagement was also evident in the high salaries and perks for office staff: some
clerks were earning $30,000 in the mid-1970s while management received seven weeks
vacation a year.306 White-collar salaries rose with union salaries and they were not laid
off with blue-collar workers, even during shutdowns until 1982. Waste and inefficiency
characterized the corporate mindset of Bethlehem management. Meanwhile, U.S. Steel
was beginning to diversify, using other healthy acquisitions (such as Marathon Oil) for
cash flow, and making deeper cuts than Bethlehem.307 Bethlehem refused to accept that it
could do more than move into mining operations; diversification could have helped
during the downtimes of steel’s cyclical market. In contrast, U.S. Steel did not have to
declare bankruptcy, because it changed and adapted to survive. Furthermore, U.S. Steel
diffused the no-win situation of worker cuts leading to costly pension payments by
pumping cash into the fund and claiming it as a tax deduction.308 Long-term vision kept
U.S. Steel viable, though drastically reduced, while Bethlehem continued to decline.
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Labor Mistakes

While management decisions helped to sink Bethlehem, the USWA leaders and its
members also failed to slow the decline. Union corruption and ballot fraud during the
1960s is well documented and the desire for labor leaders to hold power was a disservice
to the industry and the workers. This was the case for the UAW as well; corruption
damaged the national image of the major unions through the 21st century. The USWA
refused to challenge management and production issues that could have saved jobs in the
long run. They allowed workers to file grievances for the pettiest of infractions by
management, which tacked on huge costs to an already generous compensation package.
When local union leaders who recognized that cooperation would help secure jobs
suggested concessions, the members voted those leaders out.309 Like management, the
leaders and members of the unions tended to think of their short-term interests, rather
than long-term security. They achieved numerous hard-earned victories, but lost their
livelihood and security. In addition, the unions failed to use their political clout
effectively to stop the Trade Reform Act of 1974 and the Trade Agreements of 1979,
which provided a fast track for free trade and more imports, while giving the president
more control over tariffs.310 The farmers argued that foreign markets remained restricted
to U.S. agricultural products and labor unions decried increase imports, but the effort was
not sufficient to sway Congress.
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Government Failings and Globalization

Local and federal government share the responsibility for the loss of manufacturing
jobs in Buffalo as well. The federal government’s failure to institute an industrial policy
and local government’s gouging through property taxes are more examples of short-term
vision that resulted in manufacturing jobs leaving for other regions or nations. Hall
argues that the lack of an industrial policy (the U.S. did not subsidize steel and had no
industrial bank) left steel companies to fight each other and then fall victim to the free
market (only the U.S. had a steel industry that ran on free market principles), which was
the downside of the U.S. economic system.311 Other nations had the advantage of
government support (or were run by the government), which included the support of the
U.S. government as well as their own government. The fight against communism was the
main concern of the postwar U.S. government. From 1957 to 1960, the Dwight
Eisenhower administration joined with international agencies to provide foreign steel
companies with $585.8 million and also gave technical advice to the Japanese.312 The
irony here is that Eisenhower avoided domestic economic control, but was an
interventionist abroad. The USSR wanted to supply the Japanese with coal and iron ore,
but the Eisenhower stepped in, while ignoring the signs of declining industry at home.313
This irony applies to the large manufacturers as well. They wanted limited government
interference when times were good, then demanded intervention to curb foreign imports.
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The Japanese strategy was one of exports, so they increased their steel capacity far
over domestic projections and used bulk carriers to ease transport costs.314 Japan was
gaining a larger share of the U.S. market, especially the Midwest, which was opened to
foreign steel by the St. Lawrence Seaway completion in 1959. The U.S. steel companies
wanted to recapture more of the domestic market, but there was virtually no cooperation
between government and business in the period from 1958 to 1962, when imports gained
a foothold.315 The domestic steel companies were facing a no-win situation; they could
not lower export prices due to fair trade laws and complained that foreign steel was
simultaneously being dumped (sold at an artificially low price aided by subsidies) on the
domestic market. They claimed they could not compete with other nations under those
conditions.316 The destruction of Europe and Japan was a double-edged sword; the U.S.
was left to satisfy demand unchallenged, but the demand led to expansion over research
and development. By the 1960s, Japan and other nations were using state-of-the-art plants
and the U.S. was adding pieces to aging facilities, such as Lackawanna. The Japanese
government promoted research with subsidies, built ports for steel companies, and loaned
money for acquisition of raw materials.317
Compounding the dilemma was the negative perception of steel as a powerful
industry that grew during a period of distrust of big business in America.318 Not many
people had sympathy for titans like Bethlehem or U.S. Steel. The 1972 movie Godfather
II (set in 1959) gives a glimpse of this when the gangster character Hyman Roth utters to
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his colleague: "Michael, we're bigger than U. S. Steel."319 Big Steel was synonymous
with power and wealth as far as Americans were concerned.
The Jimmy Carter administration ushered in more problems for manufacturers as
globalization spread industry and lowered the demand for skilled workers.320 Developing
countries began to take over industry that had provided high-paying work for Americans.
Steel cans were replaced with aluminum, and lighter cars were produced for greater fuel
efficiency after the energy crisis. As with his successors, President Carter was more
concerned with the specter of communism than the decline of manufacturing in the
Northeast and Midwest. Buffalo in particular lost over 16,000 manufacturing jobs from
1972 to 1982.321 Carter’s Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Paul Volcker, attempted to
stop inflation by reducing the money supply, but inflation rose, unemployment rose, and
sales of homes and cars plummeted.322 Manufacturing workers refused to compromise
lest they lose their purchasing power. Steel companies saw sales drop as well and the
high interest rate slowed capital expenditures. The Bethlehem plant in Lackawanna
reduced capacity from 4.8 million tons to 2.8 million in 1977, leaving 8,500 employed
workers.323 The Buffalo area was hemorrhaging jobs and welfare rolls were rapidly
expanding. Cost of living adjustments made pay rise with inflation (although wages were
a smaller percentage of costs in 1980 than 1965), so cost rose, and capital was difficult to
obtain.324 Meanwhile, other countries such as Japan, Brazil, Mexico, Taiwan, and South
Korea received low interest loans, subsidies, fixed wages, and trade restrictions to create
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and protect jobs.325 It was difficult to compete with low-wage nations; the only way
would have been to develop higher quality steel and/or niche products. The window of
opportunity for saving manufacturing jobs was quickly closing.
Fear of inflation and communism turned President Carter against protectionism, but
he did institute a trigger price mechanism, which based the lowest accepted cost of
foreign steel on Japan’s price.326 Any lower price was considered dumping, but U.S.
importers simply started companies offshore to buy imported steel and then resell it.327
The free market was working as designed; people were finding ways to make money.
Carter pushed the Economic Development Administration in 1978 to loan steel
companies money for modernization, but the funding was inadequate for an industry of
that size.328 Like with the industry itself, the efforts to intervene were too little, too late.
Carter, slowed by the weak dollar’s positive effect on the trade deficit, failed to form a
policy that may have prevented the destruction of manufacturing in the U.S.
The 1980s brought a laissez-faire approach from the Ronald Reagan administration
and companies began to fill management with college graduates (as opposed to
production people) who looked to lower pay and raise production through harsh tactics.
European companies restructured in the 1980s as well, but their efforts were met with
violent opposition. Stein asserts that the difference is that European governments had a
history of intervening in disputes, whereas the U.S. government’s inaction resulted in
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poor labor-management relations.329 The “business-friendly” attitude of the Reagan
administration was an attempt to reduce the power and influence of unions.
Reagan used unemployment to keep inflation down and placed business over labor.
Business saw this as a period to finally break free of union control and “long-standing
labor contracts, which restrict flexibility in negotiations and increased production
costs.”330 The firing of the striking air traffic controllers in 1981 set the tone for the
administration’s actions. Reagan later installed an anti-union chair to the National Labor
Relations Board to reverse pro-labor policies.331 The government assisted companies in
cost cutting by explaining how to use foreign labor. Meanwhile, right-to-work laws,
federal subsidies, cheap land, and warmer weather hastened the exodus of businesses to
the South and West.332 Here we see another example of irony; Reagan gave trade
protection, tax incentives (while cutting those for steel) and research money to Silicon
Valley, while leaving the rest of manufacturing to the “free market.”333 Clearly there
were favorites as far as industries and regions were concerned. Energy, real estate, high
technology, defense, and finance became the industries of the new economy. Buffalo saw
gains in these sectors, but less than the national average and not enough to offset the huge
loss of high-wage manufacturing jobs.334
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Local government did not have answers to the exodus either, and for years helped
contribute to it. Property taxes for Bethlehem Steel were exorbitant, comprising 73% of
Lackawanna’s tax base and rising $17 million in one year.335 Local government was
balancing its books on the back of Bethlehem. Harrison Radiator in nearby Lockport was
experiencing similar problems with assessments as well.336 The situation was so
exploitive and damaging that at one point in the 1970s, the USWA cooperated with the
company to demand (and successfully achieve) a lower tax bill for the Lackawanna
plant.337 On a positive note Representative John LaFalce of Buffalo proposed a federal
industrial bank in 1984, but was rejected by the Reagan administration.338 Steel
companies and other manufacturers were caught in the shift to a service economy.
In 1982, on the day after the Christmas break, Bethlehem announced it would be
closing the Lackawanna plant, taking 3,900 jobs (plus 3,400 who were laid off) with it.339
Unemployment the following year rose to 12.2% in the Buffalo area.340 This was typical
in the Northeast during this period. By 1984, the Lackawanna plant and Republic Steel’s
South Buffalo plant were closed. Republic had picked Cleveland for the site of a new
plant in 1978, but spent $46 million on updates in Buffalo, only to close soon after.341 In
1984 alone, Buffalo lost 2,100 jobs at Republic and 1,100 at the Chevrolet plant in the
Buffalo suburb of Tonawanda.342 The decade was one of declining employment and
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continued population loss. Bethlehem’s restructuring was partially blamed on high labor
and environmental control costs associated with the aging Lackawanna site, but their
largest losses occurred after it and other productive plants were closed.343 Paying for
early retirement and abandoning capital proved to be too much for the company, which
went bankrupt in 2001 and was bought out in 2003. Other companies soon followed,
leaving Buffalo with a fraction of the manufacturing jobs it once bragged about.

The Trico Corporation

The Trico Corporation, Buffalo-based manufacturer of windshield wiper blades and
one of the area’s top employers, also eliminated its Buffalo locations while placing the
blame on high labor costs, reduced auto sales, and competition from abroad. Trico
operated three plants in the Buffalo area with a work force of about 5,000.344 By the
1970s, Trico had built an enviable stock portfolio for a local company, with $52 million
invested in GM, Ford, Exxon, and AT&T. Similar to the steel and auto companies, Trico
complained of labor costs, fighting the union (United Auto Workers) in the quest for
lower overhead. By 1977, there were signs of trouble, as rumors surfaced about Trico
planning to relocate their operations, but management denied these rumors. This
happened shortly after the UAW won the right to represent Trico’s workers after 35 years
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under the Trico Worker’s Union.345 The key here is that management hinted that finances
were stable and that the company would remain in Buffalo as long as economically
viable. Goldman argues that Trico did not modernize or try to cut costs because they were
making paper profits from their stock portfolio.346 They coasted until the declining auto
industry caused them to reassess their approach. Then in 1985, after weathering the
cyclical economy of the early 1980s, Trico announced that it was closing two of the
Buffalo plants and moving nearly 1,100 jobs to Brownsville, Texas and Matamoras,
Mexico. This occurred despite the fact that the UAW hired outside consultants to find
methods to make the plant more efficient.347 Trico wanted drastic reductions, not small
concessions.
After the relocation, Trico’s overhead dropped and its profits increased, but the $1.20
per hour wages paid to workers in Mexico resulted in shantytowns on the Mexican border
and harsh criticism from the UAW.348 The idea behind building the plant (and others)
was for the company to stay solvent, while providing an economic boost for Mexican
workers, thus lowering the rate of illegal immigration into the United States. Time has
shown that the latter was not true. The illegal passage to the U.S. has continued, while
Trico showed that it could lose money regardless of the tax or labor situation. The
company posed modest profits and some huge losses until being sold in 1994. In 2002,
Trico announced that it would close the remaining Buffalo facility after having moved
the headquarters to Michigan four years earlier. Labor made every attempt to help the
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company and retain jobs, but the tide of globalization, fostered by government and
business, was too powerful to withstand.

Conclusions on the Role of Management and Labor

As of 2011, Buffalo remained a “dependent” city, lacking capital, relying on outside
interests, and still in the process of destructuring. Other Northeastern cities have moved
further in the transition to new industry, such as Pittsburgh with its base of corporate
control and finance.349 The 2007 U.S. Census reveals that in Erie County, health care and
social assistance jobs are the most numerous, employing 73, 571. Retail comes in second
at 53,571 and manufacturing has fallen to third at 48,058.350 Although manufacturing
jobs number slightly less than retail, the total payroll is more than double. Manufacturing
still provides high-wage jobs, albeit significantly fewer than in previous decades. The
Ford Stamping plant, the GM Tonawanda plant, and Dunlop are among some of the highwage employers. The populations of the city and county continue to drop, while the level
of education has risen as Buffalo attempts to move closer to a new economy. The
percentage of those in Erie County with a bachelor’s degree (28.4 %) is higher than the
nation average (27.4).351 In addition, the percentage of those who are age 65 or older
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dropped to 12.2% in the city of Buffalo.352 It seems that a new influx of immigrants has
helped a previously aging population to add more youth, which bodes well for a labor
force that is also becoming more educated.
The decline of manufacturing in the U.S., and in Buffalo, is the result of a myriad of
forces, some of which are part of natural economic transitions. While Buffalo could not
keep its geographical advantage, due to shifting (and shrinking) domestic markets, other
factors could have prevented the severity of the job losses. Better relations between
management and labor, for example, would have led to lower overhead and increased
productivity. In the late 1980s, the Steel Tripartite Committee of management, labor, and
government joined to discuss depreciation allowances (oil companies received these for
years), more time for environmental compliance, new technology promotion, and the
trigger price process. After 100 years of steel making, cooperation was taking place.353
The Japanese manufacturers used this cooperative method all the while, investing in new
technology (aided by government), cross-training workers and valuing their ideas,
aggressively pursuing foreign markets, and restricting foreign access to their own
markets. Some U.S. steel companies, such as Nucor, decentralized their operations and
placed the responsibility (and power) within their respective facilities.354 In this way, the
employees have a stake in the company’s success and are not ruled by a paternalistic
power structure. Meanwhile, Japan has fallen prey to the same globalization process that
enriched them, as demand for inexpensive products has caused imports to rise in Japan
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since the 1990s. Free trade led Japanese companies to begin to move manufacturing jobs
to South Asian countries with lower wages, only to ship the goods back to Japan later.
Companies and workers in Western New York agree that labor-management
committees raise productivity. Studies have shown that unionized companies in the area
that reform their relationship with labor have higher productivity than non-union
companies.355 The non-union plants in other regions that do have higher productivity are
usually newer facilities, so the efficient technology is the mitigating factor. In the U.S.,
research and development funding is lower in unionized (and older) industry, putting it at
a disadvantage.356 Properly distributed capital, combined with good labor relations and
government support (including tax deductions for tuition reimbursement in high-skilled
areas), can spell success for a unionized company, while still providing jobs that pay a
living wage.
Since the huge job losses of the 1970s and 1980s, companies in Western New York
have joined with labor to challenge government through demands for tax incentives and
loans for businesses. The relationship is better than ever, but even this has not been
enough to stem the tide of globalization and the current recession. The U.S. Department
of Labor projects that the U.S. will lose over one million more manufacturing jobs
through 2018.357 The share of the production pie has continued to shrink rapidly as the
U.S. transitions to a service economy, like many other industrialized nations. Now, more
than ever, government must step up to provide more opportunity for training and
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education for the work force, so they will be eligible for higher paying service jobs.
Unions must use their influence to push for these opportunities, instead of focusing solely
on wage and benefit increases in existing jobs. Despite the sharp decline in union
membership for manufacturing workers in the U.S. from 1983 (only 11.4% are now
members), overall numbers rose in 2007 and 2008.358 Workers recognize the need for
protection in the expanding climate of free trade.
Part of the problem in Western New York, and in the nation in general, is that
companies are using profit to purchase debt and to acquire other profitable companies in
order to concentrate wealth. Buffalo has suffered more than other areas, not simply
because of high wages, but also because of a lack of locally owned companies and
available capital. Outside interests do not operate with concern for keeping jobs in the
area; they exist to make as much profit as possible and have no vested interest. Therefore,
labor is merely an input that must be obtained as cheaply as possible. The growth of
service jobs is natural, in that it provides services for those who hold the wealth. This
area has grown slower (in terms of service jobs) than the national average because it has
less wealth. The growth of government jobs, although lamented by those in business, is
natural also given the climate. The U.S. boasts more millionaires than any other nation by
far, with one estimate for 2007 reporting over 3,000,000 households with financial assets
of over one million dollars, while the richest 1% controlled 24% of income. 359 When
wealth becomes concentrated, the middle class shrinks, losing its purchasing power and
its share of tax payments to the government. To return that power and stimulate the
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economy (consumption is key), taxes are levied on the rich, which in turn pays for living
wage government jobs.
While the service sector has grown, many of these jobs pay much less than union
manufacturing jobs. Higher paying service jobs, such as accountants, computer
programmers, computer scientists, and mechanical drafters are available to those who
possess the educational qualifications, but are also prone to being farmed out to low wage
countries such as India. In addition, U.S. defense contractors, who employ engineers at a
higher wage level than other industries, have exacerbated the demand for engineers,
leaving a shortage for other industries and stifling innovation.360 A possible solution to
this would be for industries to invest in training and development for new engineers,
rather than expecting them to arrive completely prepared. These contractors have also
been outsourcing manufacturing jobs for parts supplies, further reducing America’s
manufacturing capacity and making it impossible for the nation to convert to wartime
production in the event of a major war.
The decline of manufacturing in Buffalo is a process that could have been slowed (it
has been in recent years), but it was inevitable given the worldwide move toward free
trade and open borders. Labor was indeed inflexible and its leaders at times corrupt, but
even total capitulation could not have staved off the trend of farming out labor to
underdeveloped countries. Likewise, even the most astute management could not have
competed indefinitely with foreign competition that did not face the pressure of a
domestic free market and had the cooperation and support of government. Finally, even
local government who might have slashed property taxes and offered incentives could not
have offset the willful attempt of the federal government to abandon the manufacturing
360
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sector in favor of other non-trading “paper” industries such as finance, insurance, and real
estate. In addition, no amount of government incentives or tax exemptions for
entrepreneurs who engage in “start-ups” will create high-tech (and low-skilled) jobs if
those companies are free to move their operations overseas without a tariff on the product
of that labor when they launch into mass production. An aversion to a trade war is ironic
from a federal government that enthusiastically intervenes in foreign affairs without
regard to cost. Also, the diminished manufacturing capacity in this country and the lack
of an industrial bank (former Buffalo Rep. John LaFalce’s idea) make it difficult to
transition to a productive manufacturing business. In a nation of over 300 million people,
it is simply not reasonable to expect that the entire work force will consist of highly
skilled jobs. There has to be living wage, low-skill employment, or the ranks of the
jobless will swell to depression-like numbers and the social assistance sector will become
overburdened.
Despite the setbacks of the past, there is still hope for the future of Buffalo and
Western New York in the 21st century. Chapter five will outline several proposed
strategies, which may help stem the economic and population decline in Buffalo. These
proposals include new zoning laws to replace outdated ordinances that were enacted
when Buffalo was a city dependent on heavy industry. Another proposal is capitalizing
on Buffalo’s rich history and world-renowned architecture by converting historic
structures into new commercial and residential space. Immigration is another strategy to
bring a new wave of entrepreneurs into the city and to help stabilize the population,
similar to the immigration of the early 1900s, which swelled Buffalo’s population.
Buffalo’s low housing prices can act as a magnet for new immigrants. In addition, using
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the “shrinking cities” approach to eliminate excess housing may help to increase property
values and reduce the amount of city services needed. These vacant parcels of land can
then be used for community gardens and urban farms. Together with an improved
waterfront that provides convenient access to the Niagara River and Lake Erie, these
proposals may move Buffalo from a position of decline to one of revitalization.
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CHAPTER 5
BLUEPRINTS, PROPOSALS, AND STRATEGIES: PROSPECTS FOR
REVITALIZING BUFFALO, NEW YORK IN THE 21st CENTURY

“The neighborhood shows a strange inability to update itself, enliven itself, repair
itself, or to be sought after, out of choice, by a new generation.”361 Urban activist and
writer Jane Jacobs used this quote to highlight her belief that although homogenous
neighborhoods change little in physical terms, perceptions of the neighborhood change
greatly. Labels such as “run-down” and “blighted” tend to be used to describe a onceprosperous area that has been tossed aside by the middle class in the rush to resettle in
newer, suburban settings. Buffalo is all too familiar with the pattern of demolishing blight
and the subsequent attempts to revitalize the area by replacing the unwanted buildings
with more modern structures. Does the simple act of replacing old with new lead to a
better neighborhood, or is vibrant city life something more than the physical?
What many in the city and those who migrated fail to realize is that Buffalo has
always had its share of blight, and even during times of economic prosperity there have
been derelict physical structures along with grimy industrial sites. In addition, problems
with excess traffic and pollution contributed to a decline in the quality of life in the city.
Buffalo, and other large cities, are in a constant state of flux, performing demolitions,
building new structures, rehabilitating old structures, and adjusting to traffic levels. The
difference between Buffalo’s earlier history and the present is that city leaders have
always worked with a growth template, expecting that the population would increase and
accommodating for it. Prevailing thought among leaders and planners has always been
361
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that a city that is not growing in population is dying; it will continue to shrink in
population and prosperity until it is no longer considered a city in terms of population.
During the prosperous times, local leaders failed to accept that slowing population
growth would eventually become population decline, and today they see decline as
reversible. The growth approach hinders attempts to stabilize population loss and to
improve the quality of life for existing residents.
In order to help Buffalo to maximize its vibrancy, economic future, and quality of
life, leaders and residents must accept that Buffalo will not return to its position as a
manufacturing giant with over a half-million people. Leaders will have to adjust to a new
reality and capitalize on the physical and human qualities that make Buffalo unique. The
challenge will be to find which strategies will effectively promote these assets, rather
than attempting to lure or create a “silver bullet” with the idea that one large project can
do what the entire population of a city cannot. The history of Buffalo is littered with these
large-scale quick fixes.
The first of these well-intentioned, but ineffective projects was the destruction of the
viable Ellicott District neighborhood and its housing project replacement (see Chapters 2
and 3) in the 1950s in an attempt at urban renewal. The damage is still apparent today, as
the public housing projects that replaced the homes are isolated from the nearby
downtown area. A second was the construction of the 190 section of the New York State
Thruway (see Chapter 4), which isolated valuable waterfront property and eliminated
neighborhoods. Even with the construction of new waterfront condominiums, the area
remains cut off from downtown by the Thruway. A third project was the
Kensington/Scajaquada Expressway (see Chapters 3 and 4), which bisected an East Side
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neighborhood along with part of Olmsted’s Delaware Park. The stable, middle-class
neighborhood was decimated in order to expedite travel to downtown and the nearby
suburbs. City leaders did not realize that the suburbs would develop their own retail and
industry. Decisions like these detract from Buffalo’s character while rendering the
opinions of its residents as unnecessary. This chapter will examine alternatives to urban
renewal decisions of the past in an attempt to find strategies that will help stabilize the
population improve the quality of life in Buffalo and make the economy more vibrant.
Any study of how to revitalize a city would be incomplete without the input of the
late writer and activist Jane Jacobs, whose ideas on urban life and renewal have been
widely read by students of planning, yet largely ignored by modern planners of the
postwar era. She advocated community involvement in the form of neighborhood block
clubs, which when supported by government, could become agents of change.362 As part
of a larger district, they can work together with other districts to counter the central
power of the mayor’s office. Gerald E. Frug, Professor of Law at Harvard University,
offers a less optimistic opinion that city residents have been acclimated to bureaucracy
and the views of planning “experts,” while losing their hold on democracy and grass
roots power and falling victim to apathy and distrust.363 Jacobs also echoes the desires of
ordinary residents in her support of mixed-use parks, which provide space for different
forms of recreation in order to be used frequently.364 This is counter to the view of expert
planners and preservationists in Buffalo, who are more inclined to adhere to Frederick
Law Olmsted’s original vision of pastoral landscapes. Jacobs opines on waterfronts as
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well, asserting that cruises and other forms of public access are necessary to draw crowds
on weekends and nights, not just working hours. This is in opposition to the power base
in Buffalo and their vision of building retail on the waterfront first, anchored by a major
tenant.365 The Erie Canal Harbor Development Corporation (ECHDC), which controls
the latest Buffalo waterfront project, is made up of mostly business leaders and
politicians (including Buffalo, NY Mayor Byron Brown and Erie County Executive Chris
Collins). The Corporation is more concerned with representing the power structure in the
city and county, rather than involving local community leaders. This is reminiscent of
past mistakes in Buffalo; ignore the input of the community leaders and push for a “silver
bullet” anchor, such as a large retail store. The attraction of the waterfront should be the
waterfront itself, along with the historic Erie Canal terminus. These unique assets can
attract people who will then attract business. The tendency to downplay the draw of
existing assets while pushing for new attractions to be constructed is a common one
among Buffalo’s major players.
Another point of contention, especially in Buffalo, among those who study urban life
and planning is the recent trend toward embracing and planning for a smaller city
footprint. Labeled “shrinking cities” or areas of “smart decline,” several urban areas that
have consistently lost population in the postwar era have implemented or are considering
altering their planning to accept the fact that population loss is not reversible, at least not
to the levels of the peak years after World War II. Youngstown, Ohio and Rochester,
New York are two cities that have embraced the concept of a shrinking city and have
begun to implement plans to combine demolition of vacant, unusable properties with an
effort to consolidate lots into larger parcels that will be reserved for future development
365
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or for “greening.” Lots will be kept landscaped to avoid becoming eyesores, but officials
will not encourage building of new homes in a city that has an abundance of available
inventory. Several lots may be used for community gardens, which have been
successfully initiated in Buffalo in the past with the aid of non-profit organizations such
as Grassroots Gardens of Buffalo. Edward Glaser, Harvard Professor of Economics,
concurs with the concept of shrinking; maintaining that cities like Buffalo cannot
compete at the level of cities in the Sunbelt.366 They believe that existing; viable
neighborhoods (and their residents) should receive assistance from city government to
remain sustainable and vibrant. Buffalo Mayor Byron Brown disagrees and asserts: “I
don't buy into the idea that Buffalo needs to shrink."367 As his predecessors believed,
prosperity and increasing population are dependent on a “silver bullet” project that will
draw people and economic development.
Scholars also debate the subject of immigration and its ability to revitalize urban
areas. History shows that immigration is a source of innovation, energy, and labor that
can keep the cycle of regeneration flowing in cities. Buffalo is a prime example of the
contributions of immigrants, with its rich history of Italian skilled tradesmen, Polish
domination of the meatpacking industry, Irish contributions to the labor force along with
Catholic schools and churches, and German banking and insurance operations.368 These
newcomers enabled Buffalo’s population to swell and strived to better themselves, while
helping the city to reach its own potential as a whole. Jane Jacobs points out the
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importance of new immigrants with fresh perspectives and ideas by stating that
“Immigrants add new small things and they have a chance to grow.”369 This is quite the
opposite of local leaders, who favor large projects spurred and aided by government that
are supposed to create a critical mass to revitalize Buffalo. Agreeing with Jacobs is John
O. Norquist, former mayor of Milwaukee, who advocates less-restricted immigration as a
means of providing a diverse economy that possesses much more potential than a
homogeneous city can.370 Robert A. Beauregard, Professor of Urban Planning at
Columbia University adds that Boston’s first growth in forty years was the result of
increased immigration and that New York City saw more new arrivals in the 1980s than
during the turn of the century. Meanwhile, Buffalo’s population dropped more in the
1990s than in the 1980s. 371 Immigration had helped other cities to stabilize their
population. It was the slowing of immigration, noted by Dowell Myers, USC Planning
Professor, which contributed to the decline of Northeastern cities during the 1950s and
1960s.372 Cities benefit from the influx of new blood, which provides a new generation of
workers and taxpayers.
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Zoning Laws

The disadvantages of a homogenous environment also stem from archaic zoning laws
in older cities. Professor of Urban Planning and Policy at Rutgers Frank Popper and
political science professor at the College of Staten Island Deborah Popper mention that
past zoning ordinances were designed in anticipation of growth, when city leaders though
that populations would continue on a never-ending upswing.373 Buffalo was no exception
to this trend; a 2006 comprehensive plan for the city predicted that the population would
eventually expand after the decline ended.374 Leaders refuse to accept that the city will
not grow to its former glory and the planning process has reflected this. The report states
that zoning ordinances have not been significantly overhauled since 1951.375 This
restriction prohibits the mixed-use (retail, residential, light industry) neighborhoods
advocated by 21st century planners. In addition, it inhibits the type of mixed-use
development envisioned for the downtown area of Buffalo. The origin of this zoning was
with the Hoover administration, which modeled zoning to separate industry from
housing, producing isolation and lack of residential areas downtown.376 The suburbs and
their new shopping areas negated the need to travel into the city strictly for shopping. In
the 21st century, Buffalo city government is replacing its outdated zoning ordinance and
attempting to establish “walkable” communities that are not planned around the use of
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automobiles.377 Public transportation can aid this transformation, if it is properly
maintained. The process will also become more streamlined, eliminating some of the
barriers to development. The challenge will be for citizen groups and the Common
Council to maintain a voice in how land is developed, to avoid project that upset the
balance of the area.

Saving Buffalo’s Architecture and History

In addition to outdated zoning laws, failure to preserve diverse architectural gems has
helped to hasten decline and hinder gentrification of viable neighborhoods, such as the
Hydraulics District in South Buffalo (southeast of the downtown area: see Figure 2),
which was dominated by the Larkin Soap Company. One of the more famous structures,
the Larkin Administration Building designed by Frank Lloyd Wright, was allowed to
deteriorate until it was finally demolished in 1950. The Western Trading Corporation
purchased the building for a mere $5000 with plans to build a truck terminal on the site,
but later changed the location.378 A world-class piece of architecture fell due to inept
local leaders who were more concerned with quantity over quality. Today,
preservationists have fought successfully to have many of Buffalo’s landmarks added to
the National Register of Historic Places, and many of the structures have been
rehabilitated for use as residential property or office space. The building used by Graphic
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Controls in the Larkin district was rehabilitated for office space and light industry in
2001. Various developers have acquired other buildings in the same district, seeking to
capitalize on a critical mass. With a mix of high-end residential, light industrial and
offices (along with existing homes), the district may eventually attract retail and become
a revitalized, mixed-use neighborhood. This model meshes with Jane Jacobs’ vision of
mixed-use areas that avoid stagnation because they are in use constantly.379
A leader in this redevelopment is Howard Zemsky, Managing Partner of Taurus
Capital Partners LLC, a privately held investment group. He spearheaded the
rehabilitation of the mammoth Graphic Controls building (renaming it the Larkin
Building, to acknowledge the history of the Hydraulics District) and has acquired twentyfive other structures in the district, with the intention of creating a mixed-use area of
restaurant, parks, apartments, and businesses that will restore the Hydraulics District to
its former glory.380 Zemsky’s efforts have begun a critical mass of development and
activity in the district, as public and private groups seek to join in the opportunity.
Another private developer has purchased the 1.2 million-square-foot former Larkin
Manufacturing complex at 701 Seneca Street. Electric company National Grid, First
Niagara Bank, the City of Buffalo, and New York State have all contributed to
rehabilitate more structures and improve the streets, sidewalks, landscaping, and lighting
in the district.381 The Hydraulics District is beginning to turn the corner through proper
urban planning and cooperation by public and private entities.
Another completed project is the Genesee Gateway Building, which comprises an
entire city block in the downtown area and is now open for leasing with office, retail, and
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residential space. This coincides with Jane Jacobs’ vision, as she noted that older
buildings have lower capital costs than new builds.382 National Grid and the Wendt
Foundation teamed with developers to get the Genesee Gateway project running. This is
an example of cooperation among various groups minus the heavy hand of urban
renewal. When local government assists in securing federal and state tax credits for
rehabilitating quality structures, rather than attempting to clear the area and replace it
with new builds, the area retains its history and character. In 2002, then Buffalo Mayor
Anthony Masiello attended a Pittsburgh preservation exchange where he learned that
preservation and reuse of existing structures stimulates the real estate market.383 Then in
2009, Howard Zemsky testified in Congress on behalf of a federal tax incentive program
called the Renewal Community Initiative, which allotted federal funds for rehabilitation
of historic structures and gave tax credits for hiring workers from low-income areas. This
program led to $170 million in development in the City of Buffalo, but was not renewed
for 2010, due to a poor U.S. economy.384 These projects have succeeded in saving
historically significant structures and providing employment for residents in the
immediate area. An added benefit of these successful rehab projects has been the higher
concentration of architectural firms headquartered in Buffalo. Rehabilitation of
landmarks is an industry in itself and can generate employment and capital for the city.
The irony here is that the expansion of industry and the need for space led to the
demolition of many historic structures and today the restoration of the remaining gems
provides new economic vitality and opportunity for the city.
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Immigration in the 21st Century

Another factor in economic vitality involves the attraction of new residents to the city
through a method that proved successful in the past: immigration. Buffalo has not been a
major attraction for immigrants in recent years, which has been the case for most of the
Northeast, excluding Boston and New York City. Buffalo’s percentage of foreign-born
residents stood at 4.4% in 2000, but census estimates from 2006-2008 show the
percentage moving over 5%.385 An influx of immigrants could help to stabilize and even
slightly expand the population, if the number of immigrants continues to rise. The
Welcoming Center for New Pennsylvanians in Philadelphia produced a study which
points out that immigration will be the leading cause of population growth (66%) in the
U.S. during the 21st century.386 Those cities that welcome immigrants and have programs
to help with acclimation to life in an American city have benefited from the influx. More
prosperous cities such as New York, Boston, Chicago, San Francisco, and San Jose
would have lost population in the 1990s were it not for the new arrivals.387
Buffalo has attracted a number of refugees from the Balkans, Indochina, Latin
America and Africa in the past decade, which can bring negative perception, but has
yielded positive results. Some critics feel that these immigrants can put a strain on
education and social services, but studies show that the public investment provides
returns rather quickly. In Buffalo several refugees have become business owners, despite
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having no credit history. In New York State, 28.7% of all startups are due to immigrants,
who are more likely than natives to start a business.388 The challenge will be providing
help to immigrants through a streamlining of the cumbersome bureaucracy, which can
prove insurmountable for some. While there is a need for protection of the public welfare
through licenses and permits, the current system takes months for a prospective business
owner, who has to pay rent while waiting for permission to start. While there are
organizations such as the Westminster Economic Development Initiative that will assist
immigrants in navigating the rules, the process itself needs to be simplified to help the
entrepreneurs and the economy in general.389 A business owner contributes more to the
economy than a welfare recipient who is forced to waste his or her skills. More proactive
cities, such as Boston, provide comprehensive assistance with public funding. The
Mayor’s Office of New Bostonians helps new arrivals to navigate city services, provides
access to English as a Second Language (ESL) services, and registers individuals once
they become citizens.390 In Pittsburgh, the Global Pittsburgh website provides
information for immigrants and encourages businesses to hire them.391 These cities are
taking the lead in moving immigrants into the mainstream, rather than waiting for the
second generation to contribute.
The path to increased immigration will not be an easy one, however. A 2005 Gallop
poll showed that 44% of Americans thought that immigrants were an economic drain,
with opinion split along party lines (Republicans were mostly opposed to increased
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immigration).392 Myths about the “poor” foreigners who refuse to assimilate have caused
an increase in the number of respondents who favor a decrease in immigration. Combine
this with the controversy over illegal aliens on the U.S. southern border, intense media
exposure, and Congressional debate, and the negative perception persists. This occurs
despite the fact that immigrants have high rates of self-employment, pay more taxes and
accept less welfare on average than natives, and produce billions of dollars in payrolls. 393
Isolated, negative incidents (usually crime) are the focus of media attention, rather than
the long-range statistics that give a clearer picture.
Attracting immigrants by creating a department similar to the Office of New
Bostonians would help the city in numerous ways. Immigrants from larger cities such as
New York are aware of Buffalo’s organizations like Journey’s End Refugee Services, the
International Institute of Buffalo, Catholic Charities, and VIVE, Inc., which help
immigrants adjust to American life; they advise fellow countrymen to travel to Buffalo
because of these opportunities.394 These organizations provide shelter, food, clothing,
along with pro bono legal work and support. By expanding these services, Buffalo will
be able to take advantage of an influx of youth to reinvigorate its aging population. These
groups rely on donations and are not-for-profit ventures. The City of Buffalo has no
official government office to assist new immigrants, as Boston does. Government
participation with one of the aforementioned organizations would be an improvement,
especially if it involved assisting immigrant students and parents with education. This is a
missed opportunity to bring in new residents and assist them in making ties to the city
through homeownership, entrepreneurship, educational involvement, and association with
392
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others from their home countries. Presently, the City of Buffalo government serves only
as a deterrent to the aspirations of new immigrants through burdensome business
regulation and lack of assistance for immigrant students and their parents. As the children
and grandchildren of the previous immigrants exit Buffalo for the suburbs, they will be
replaced by new immigrants looking for the same opportunities their predecessors had.

The Shrinking Cities Approach

Aside from stabilizing the population, another point of contention is the push to
examine the new concept of “shrinking cities,” or “smart decline.” Cities such as
Youngstown, Ohio and Rochester, New York are designing a smaller footprint for their
cities by clearing and “greening” vacant properties, rather than opting to build more
housing. These areas will then be shut off from city services such as sanitation pickup,
snow plowing, and police patrol, which will save money for city government. Buffalo’s
heavy population loss since 1950 left the city with a 15.7% vacancy rate for housing units
that can cost the public up to $12,000 over a five year period. There have been 4,500
demolitions since 1995, with plans for 3,000 more.395 The problem is that there is no plan
in place to address what happens after demolition, aside from saving lots for new home
construction.
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Economic experts like Edward Glaeser question the rush to build new homes in
cleared areas when there is an oversupply of structures.396 This will only serve to drive
property values down and pull residents from established neighborhoods, such as the
historically African-American and middle class neighborhood of Hamlin Park (labeled
HP in Figure 2). A 2010 Buffalo News study found that Buffalo’s new residential builds
over the past two decades, which were also subsidized for first-time homebuyers, were
bought by people who merely moved from one Buffalo neighborhood to another. Most
came from the Hamlin Park area. Only eight percent of the buyers came from outside of
the city; many of those were former residents of Buffalo.397 City government is paying
for residents to fill one area at the expense of another area, doing what federal urban
renewal did in the 1950s. Funds should be used to strengthen these established
neighborhoods by making loans available for rehabilitating older homes. Jacobs calls this
“gradual” money, which improves neighborhoods more than massive federal projects that
obliterate areas.398 Neighborhood character results from homeowners taking pride in their
property, even if it requires assistance from local government. Unfortunately, the Byron
Brown administration has suspended programs for emergency roof repairs, code violation
repairs, and down payment and rehabilitation assistance due to a lack of funds.399 While
existing neighborhoods crumble, the local government and developers seek to build new
homes and create instant neighborhoods on a blank slate. This approach has been proven
to be a failure, as history has shown.
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Advocates for smart decline, such as Frank Popper, point out that the U.S. is still
stuck in the mindset of Manifest Destiny, which dictates that the population must always
seek to spread out and populate the whole of the continent.400 Many who view smart
decline as defeatist, including Mayor Brown of Buffalo, have resisted the idea that a city
can improve itself by shrinking. Cities that have accepted shrinking have focused on the
remaining areas, where they partner with universities, help with business startups, and
attempt to lure investment.401 Some neighborhoods in Buffalo cannot be saved, due to the
fact that there are only a few structures left. Buffalo may eventually embrace the concept
of shrinking, as neighborhoods continue to depopulate, lowering demand further and
becoming magnets for crime.402 Leaders must begin the process of creating an inventory
of vacant properties to decide which areas are beyond rehabilitation.

Flint, Michigan

The city of Flint, Michigan has dealt with its vacant properties by forming a land
bank for the county, which consolidates lots into larger parcels. They have initiated
programs such as adopt-a-lot, pocket parks, rehabilitated rentals, and sales of adjacent
lots to homeowners for one dollar. This is funded through the state tax foreclosure fee,
land sale funds and revenue from brownfields tax increment finance revenue from
400

Deborah and Frank Popper, 4.
Laura Schatz. “Innovation in the Face of Population Decline: “Smart Shrinkage” in Youngstown,
Ohio.” Paper prepared for ACSP/AESOP Roundtable and SCiRN PhD Academy Chicago, Illinois, July
2008. Available from: http://mailer.fsu.edu/~iaudirac/garnet-iaudirac/WEB2/Youngstown_LSchatz.pdf.
Internet; accessed 21 July 2010, 9.
402
Justin P. Hollander. “Moving Toward a Shrinking Cities Metric: Analyzing Land Use changes
Associated With Depopulation in Flint, Michigan.” Citiscape: A Journal of Policy Development and
Research 12, no.1 (2010), 6.
401

138
bonds.403 Having control over the vacant lots, rather than letting them sit unused has
made residents feel safer as well. The operation is self-sustaining and can be replicated in
Buffalo. New York State allows counties to create land banks, but no formal
arrangements have been made at this time. One problem is that Community Development
Block Grants (CDBG) are not available for land banking and greening of lots, despite
local efforts to introduce federal legislation to allow it.404 The availability of those funds
would open up many opportunities for Buffalo to follow the lead of other cities.

Youngstown, Ohio

Youngstown’s plan, called Youngstown 2010, has four main goals to help the city
shrink and improve the quality of life in the viable areas. The plan calls for acceptance of
population decline and shrinking, defining the city’s role in the regional economy,
improving the image and quality of life, and includes a call to action for the entire
population.405 Unlike urban renewal, residents are valued for their input and opinions; no
one will be forced to move from an area if they refuse. In addition, the plan will be
reassessed every ten years. As of 2010, 43% of Youngstown’s land was vacant and the
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city had lost over half its population since its high point.406 While Youngtown has a
smaller population than Buffalo, the comparisons are very similar.
Youngstown took the initiative and formed the Youngstown Neighborhood
Development Corporation (YNDC), a partnership formed by the city government and the
Raymond John Wean Foundation, which targeted three areas to revitalize through help
with loan down payments for homebuyers. In return, the homeowners must commit to
live in the home for three years and participate in neighborhood revitalization.407 This
helps to form a cohesive neighborhood in which residents have the feeling of ownership
of the area, not just their homes. The YNDC is very active, listing homes for sale in the
target areas, turning vacant lots into parks, gardens and natural habitats, providing
“deconstruction training” to recycle materials from demolitions, and marketing the
neighborhoods as commercial ventures. They place signs, host welcome parties for new
homeowners, and encourage existing neighbors to hold open houses to demonstrate how
their home rehabilitation has progressed.408 Youngstown has very deliberately planned
their shrinking, but their plan is not a quick fix and will require years to produce quality
results.

Buffalo Debates the Shrinking Concept

Buffalo has resisted the concept of shrinking, claiming that there is not enough
funding available to maintain empty lots, rather than turning them over to developers as
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quickly as possible. Some neighborhood activists, such as the West Side Collaborative
point to the rehabilitation of that neighborhood through maintenance and some new
builds, but these were not comparable to the decimated areas of the East Side, some of
which have more empty lots than homes.409 Mayor Brown of Buffalo is also not sold on
the concept, insisting that the city’s population will again begin to grow. While this may
be true, given unknowns such as immigration, no one expects the population to return to
anywhere near the previous high. In addition, the Albany-based Environmental
Advocates of New York reports that up to forty percent of land in Buffalo is made up of
brownfields (unused, possibly contaminated land).410 Many developers currently possess
land that is not being developed; allowing them to acquire more wastes opportunities for
small entrepreneurs to make the land productive as urban farms or for existing
homeowners to expand their acreage. There is simply more supply than demand and new
builds will continue to pull down property values.
The Local Initiatives Support Corporation (LISC) of Buffalo has called for a series of
steps to reclaim vacant properties in order to shrink Buffalo’s physical environment. The
first step would be to stabilize viable neighborhoods by linking homeowners to
rehabilitation resources.411 This strategy has been proven to produce positive results and
return on investment, but Buffalo’s current budget situation prohibits additional help for
homeowners at present. The LISC also recommends bringing in architects and designers
for existing developments to participate in a competition to “right size” Buffalo.412 Other
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cities, such as Philadelphia, have used this approach to gain new perspectives on city
planning. In addition, the LISC suggests a citywide vacant properties enforcement unit,
which could handle any legal issues and save money in the long run.413 While Buffalo
resists these efforts, other cities such as Philadelphia are proving that greening vacant lots
can increase nearby real estate sales prices by as much as 30%.414 Updating zoning laws,
streamlining and consolidating redevelopment programs, and creating a land bank
(possibly countywide) to shut down services to selected areas can help to achieve savings
and increase tax revenue by making existing properties more valuable.
While the city of Rochester, New York, which is smaller than Buffalo in land area
and population, turns to abandoning (including demolitions and elimination of city
services) entire neighborhood areas to transform them into “green” or park-like areas,
Buffalo insists that it will not permanently shut down sections of the city. Although
thousands of vacant structures have been demolished, the city government has no
comprehensive plan to reuse the empty lots that are scattered all over the city.415 City
government has again stood by passively as private, not-for-profit organizations have
utilized the lots for urban farming and community gardens. Like with immigration, the
city government has been an impediment to these individuals who seek to reuse the
properties, instead of acting as a coordinator. The archaic city planning code discourages
agriculture and city officials claim that empty parcels are to be reserved for future
residential development.416 This is another example of city government displaying the
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lack of a comprehensive plan, instead relying on scattered development that only benefits
developers themselves and gives city government leaders an opportunity to attend a
ribbon-cutting ceremony. Building additional housing in a city with a declining
population makes less sense than redeveloping existing structures (such as the
aforementioned Hydraulics District), which offer the added benefit of historical charm
and character.

Examples From Other Areas

While Youngstown, Rochester, and Flint have set examples, they have also shown
which pitfalls to avoid. To succeed in right sizing, cities must avoid the mistakes of urban
renewal by making their effort a collaborative one. Proper community involvement with
planning and execution is a must. Youngstown started workshops in 2002 to bring
together community leaders and groups, business owners, labor unions, and individuals.
They submitted their ideas and concerns to a professional urban planning group, which
then used advertisements to inform the people of Youngstown of their plans.417 This is in
contrast to the previous heavy-handed methods of urban renewal (discussed in chapters 2
and 3), which obliterated neighborhoods without citizen input. Despite the careful
planning, Youngstown has had some difficulties, such as long-time residents who refuse
to relocate, but will not use eminent domain to force them out.418 Patience is key for the
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plan to succeed and not alienate residents. Flint has experienced problems with poorly
kept vacant lots in predominately poor, African-American neighborhoods.419 The small
percentage of owner-occupied structures in poor areas prevents the city from selling
adjacent lots. In addition, Philadelphia encountered problems with concerned residents
after failing to properly engage them in the reclamation process for areas to be cleared
and removed from city services.420
Philadelphia did show innovation in the process of greening lots, however. The city
uses workforce-training organizations to provide individuals who are homeless or exconvicts to tend to the vacant lots. They receive funds from the U.S. Department of
Urban Development (HUD) and the U.S. Forest Service and report an increase in
adjacent property values of 17%, while lots that remained abandoned caused a 20%
decrease.421 Buffalo can use ideas similar to these to increase the amount of parkland in
the city; some West Side groups have already done so. The Fargo Estate Neighborhood
Community Garden on Buffalo's West Side is one example of a community garden,
which was established with the help of the aforementioned Grassroots Gardens of
Buffalo. Even city government admits that Buffalo has less parkland than other cities of
comparable size.422 This approach works best on neighborhoods that have small pockets
of vacant properties, rather than most of the area.
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The “Greening” of Buffalo

Those areas that have large numbers of vacancies are perfect candidates for land
banking. While it would be counterproductive to hand this land to developers for home
construction, the land can still serve a useful purpose: urban agriculture. Buffalo is home
to several urban agriculture ventures, including the Wilson Street Urban Farm. Owner
Mark Stevens started the farm on a small parcel of vacant lots on the East Side, despite
initial objections from city government. The city wanted to keep the land available for
development and avoid contamination problems, so Stevens was forced to sign an
agreement to let the city take the property if they have a buyer and was also required to
use raised beds for his crops. The delay and the extra costs made the farm unprofitable in
the initial year, but a full growing season and an expected doubling of crops should help
Stevens turn a profit in 2010.423 Stevens moved from a rural area of Western New York
to farm in the inner city and contribute to a sense of community through the introduction
of impoverished residents to nature and the benefits of fresh produce. Dagmar Haase,
researcher at the Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research in Leipzig, Germany,
also notes that this “perforation” of properties can benefit the city by providing
biodiversity that highly developed areas cannot.424 There is a considerable need for fresh
produce on Buffalo’s East Side (see Figure 2), as the area is home to only one
supermarket. Perhaps the homestead program could be linked to a volunteer organization
to help homeowners start their own gardens after purchasing adjacent lots for one dollar.
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Another urban agriculture venture in Buffalo is the Massachusetts Avenue Project
(MAP), supported by public and private funds, which describes itself as “an urban
agriculture youth development program, that includes an urban farm and greenhouse, a
Farm to School Program, a youth dinner coop, a Mobile Market and Youth enterprise
program.”425 The organization employs teens that are trained in farming and business
skills, and includes an aquaponics system to raise tilapia fish for local buyers. MAP also
runs a mobile market, which services several areas of the city along with community
workshops.426 Like the Wilson Street Urban Farm, MAP provides the community with
education, skills, and sustenance. This is important, considering that most food products
are shipped between 1,500 and 2,000 miles on average to U.S. cities, with seven to
fourteen days in transit.427 Projects such as these are vital, as more farmland in Erie
County is lost to sprawl and small neighborhood stores lack fresh produce. In addition,
the presence of workers and volunteers laboring at these farms can act as a deterrent to
crime in the area.428 The teens that work on urban farms will use their job skills later as
adults, so linking schools to the projects is a natural fit.
Another urban farm venture is Queen City Farms on Buffalo’s East Side. The farm
operates on three acres of vacant land and sustains itself through donations and by selling
a portion of its harvest. The remaining crops will be sold at affordable prices to the
neighborhood, providing fresh produce to those who cannot travel to a supermarket. In
2010, a greenhouse was added, with volunteer help from Americorps and donations from
425
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the home improvement retailer Home Depot.429 In addition, local schools and colleges
use the farm as an opportunity for community services hours. The farm uses the vacant
land to provide goods for the immediate area and services for the entire city. In the past,
this land would have been saved for developers to profit from.
Another non-for-profit organization helping to make Buffalo more aesthetically
pleasing is Grassroots Gardens. Grassroots began in 1992 and is involved in over 70
community gardens throughout the city of Buffalo.430 They use parcels of vacant land and
assist residents in creating and maintaining community gardens. Grassroots partners with
several schools, block clubs, and businesses to help sustain itself, while being sponsored
by several Buffalo Common Council members and local foundations. Grassroots also
promotes conservation through the use of rain barrels and rain gardens. This organization
is another example of public/private partnership that improves the quality of life for city
residents.

Upgrading Existing Parks

While mentioning the subjects of greening vacant lots and urban farming, Buffalo’s
existing parks must be addressed as well. The system of parks and parkways designed by
Frederick Law Olmsted are part of the city’s charm, something that adds to the quality of
life in the area. The city has recently reacquired the maintenance of the system from Erie
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County and plans to adhere to the Buffalo Olmsted Parks Conservancy’s plan. The Plan
for the 21st Century is ambitious, but will likely prove too costly for city government to
fund in full, especially the proposed modifications to the Kensington/Scajaquada
Expressway, which the Conservancy would like to see narrowed to one lane and covered
in the below-grade sections.431 The expressway has caused disruption to Delaware Park
and to the surrounding neighborhood, but massive federal funds for highway removal or
downgrading are unlikely to be allocated any time soon. In addition, the Conservancy’s
desire to restore the parks to Olmsted’s original design of huge expanses of pastoral
landscape bordered by dense trees is contrary to Jane Jacobs’ view that parks should be
inviting, with recreational activities at the borders.432 The Conservancy would move these
areas out of sight, which could discourage residents from using them frequently.
Delaware Park is a good example of a frequently used, visible park that makes its
recreational attractions accessible. The parks in the Olmsted system are large enough to
accommodate structured and unstructured activity. Continued, everyday maintenance is
critical to keeping the parks attractive, while occasional improvements will satisfy the
Conservancy and its supporters.

Improving the Waterfront

Another natural attraction that needs to be addressed is Buffalo’s waterfront.
Improvements have been made to waterfront property, but a comprehensive plan has yet
431
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to be implemented. The 1970s saw the creation of the Erie Basin Marina, in the 1980s
Waterfront Village condominiums were built, and in 2008 a 13-story tower and
additional mid-rise condominiums were completed. While more downtown/waterfront
residents will provide more opportunity for retail, office, and entertainment venues, city
government should focus more on simplifying the permit process for retailers who wish
to locate in these areas, so as to provide more diversity and avoid isolating residents. A
vibrant, viable neighborhood possesses what Jacobs calls “…pools of mutual support…”
Residents will then mix with workers, creating opportunity for activity on nights and
weekends, instead of strictly weekdays. Buffalo has a history of single-use areas, mostly
due to zoning laws, which eventually become isolated and die out. Shopping districts,
theater districts, and office districts are only in use during certain times of the day,
preventing the vitality of a mixed-use environment.
The Chippewa district is an example of an area that had the potential to become
diverse after Mark Goldman started the Calumet Arts Cafe, a restaurant that featured
various types of live music, but now has begun to morph into what Goldman terms a
“bar-driven strip.”433 Problems with disturbances caused by a critical mass of drinking
establishments have caused the area to develop a reputation similar to the one it had
twenty years earlier, when it was a red-light district. In 2010, four people were killed
outside a bar five blocks south from the Chippewa district, negatively affecting the image
of Buffalo’s bar scene. A better mix of venues can negate these types of problems, but
the demand for youth-oriented bars and the need to sell huge amounts of liquor to turn a
profit makes that unlikely. Increased police presence and earlier closing times have been
proposed, but no decisive action has been taken.
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Another cause for concern is the current waterfront plan, dubbed “Canal Side,” which
has spawned argument over the importance of securing an “anchor tenant.” Seeking a
mammoth office or retail development, chairman of the Erie Canal Harbor Development
Corporation (ECHDC) Jordan Levy echoes the failed projects of the past. 434 Seeking a
“silver bullet” to instantly revive the area, Levy’s vision is contrary to Jacobs, who
asserts that primary uses do not create diversity alone.435 Economic professor at Buffalo
State College Bruce Fisher concurs, stating that retail itself will not create density. 436
Building a large retail store or office building does not have the same effect of several
small, mixed venues. Combine these with natural and genuine historical attractions and
the area becomes unique to Buffalo.
The ECHDC’s board of directors is comprised of a Buffalo lawyer, a former city
administrator, a New York State labor representative, two executives from the Rich
Products Corporation, a venture capitalist, the mayor of Buffalo, the Erie County
Executive, and an environmental activist. There are no experts in urban planning on the
board and until recently, the planning process had been closed to the public. The early
emphasis on securing a large retailer is a result of the lack of urban planning expertise
and the misguided belief that retailers lure people rather than people luring retailers, as
was proven by the development of the suburbs. Participation from the community,
including preservationists and urban planners who can offer a concept rather than ideas
for projects, was missing.
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The fact that the waterfront is on the shore of a Great Lake (Erie) and contains the
terminus of the legendary Erie Canal makes for such an attraction. Edward T. McMahon,
director of land use planning for The Conservation Fund, points out that people want
authentic attractions that are unique to the area.437 The restoration of the Erie Canal and
the cobblestone streets of the district provide unique attractions. Visitors can travel
anywhere in the country to see a colossal retail store, but not for the Erie Canal terminus.
In addition, the ECHDC has acted independently, repeating the past pattern of exclusion,
by not soliciting the input of the public. Buffalo restaurant owner and author Mark
Goldman states: "As long as there is no buy-in from the community, all these projects are
bound to fail.”438 Legal challenges to the attempts to lure an anchor tenant show how
Buffalo’s residents have learned from the mistakes of the past and now work to hold
leaders accountable to the public, while forcing them to heed public opinion.
The Erie Canal Harbor Development Corporation’s (ECHDC) Board of Directors
later changed its plans, focusing more on access to the waterfront than luring an anchor
tenant. In 2011,the Board extended the contract for the Central Wharf, renewed a contract
with Buffalo Place (a not-for-profit organization that partners business leaders and
legislators) to provide more than 300 events at the Inner Harbor, approved repairs for the
Buffalo Lighthouse, and announced the creation of a water taxi service. In addition to
these improvements, plans have been made for a public canal system, bridges, and a
street plan that is based on maps from the late-1800s. Also included in the proposed
construction are retail space, a hotel, and a public market. These changes were the result
of public pressure for a “lighter, quicker, cheaper,” option that could be built immediately
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and at minimal cost.439 What is critical here is access to the waterfront and to the historic
Erie Canal Terminus; these are what will attract people to that area. If people are
attracted, then retailers and hotels will follow. A mixed-use approach will help ensure
that people will visit the site at different times, providing more demand for these services.

Conclusions on New Strategies

Buffalo has shown signs of resurgence in the past two decades, despite continued (but
slowing) population loss. The city has once again become desirable for young
professionals who seek the vibrancy of urban life and enjoy living close to their place of
employment. Beauregard notes that these professionals, along with immigrants moved
into cities in the 1990s, but doubts that middle class families would choose the city.440 If
Buffalo can improve the quality of life through smart decline, then families will be drawn
to a city with a good mix of essential services (police, fire, education), unique attractions,
cohesive neighborhoods, an enhanced reputation, and public activities. The city must
focus on areas that can be improved, and amputate those areas it cannot support.
The continued influx of immigrants may help to stabilize the population, but care
must be taken to ensure that they receive the assistance to enable them to maximize their
potential and move into the middle class, while still desiring to remain in the city. Buffalo
should make every effort to expand its public involvement in immigrant services,
whether that means starting a separate department, or simply assisting the private
439

Mark Sommer. “Activists Turn Up the Heat on Harbor Development.” Buffalo News. 27
November 2010: B1.
440
Beauregard, 217.

152
organizations that currently exist. Immigration will be the key to innovation and growth
in the 21st century; Buffalo must harness this potential to remain viable as a large city.
In addition, Buffalo must also continue and support its experiments with urban
agriculture. The Massachusetts Avenue Project, Wilson Street Urban Farm, and Queen
City Farm have shown that private organizations can work together with universities,
individuals, and businesses to create ventures that positively affect neighborhoods. City
government must support these efforts, if not with funding than at least with simplified
bureaucracy. A city of over 260,000 people can support more than a handful of urban
farms; government can help the city become self-sustaining while promoting health and
entrepreneurship.
Those benefits also apply to the waterfront as well. The opportunity to enjoy a natural
wonder, along with one of the greatest man-made wonders, will draw people and add to
the quality of life in the city. If public input is valued, and those in positions of power can
show some deference to the public, the waterfront can reach its potential as a unique
Buffalo attraction. What this has in common with the other proposals to improve Buffalo
is that it has the greatest chance of succeeding if all parties are allowed to contribute to
the discussion. Residents, business leaders, public officials, and planners must collaborate
to produce blueprints that will not fail due to unforeseen problems. This type of
cooperation has helped to move other rust belt cities such as Youngstown, Rochester, and
Flint into the future; Buffalo must join them in the move toward quality over quantity.
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CHAPTER 7
OVERALL CONCLUSIONS

After analyzing the primary sources, several conclusions are apparent in regards to
the economic and population decline of Buffalo during the last six decades. First,
Buffalo’s political leaders have been grossly inadequate in their distribution of federal
funds. Their attempts at a “silver bullet” project that will cause a major spin-off of jobs,
development, or in-migration have proved futile. This approach is repeated in the recent
attempts to lure a major retailer to the waterfront, which had to be challenged in court by
community activists. In addition, scattershot development has been used in place of a
comprehensive plan for the city. Buffalo needs government leaders who will willingly
partner with private interests and encourage citizen input to promote improvements to
benefit the city as a whole. The “lighter, quicker, cheaper” approach to waterfront access
and the trend of urban agriculture are examples of this.
Second, the poor state of race relations in Western New York has done irreparable
damage to Buffalo. After years of discrimination, African Americans are now
increasingly isolated in the center city. Whites have fled in great numbers to suburban
areas, causing sprawl and increased infrastructure costs. Urban planning decisions (such
as the Kensington Expressway) were made without regard to the African American
neighborhoods and benefited developers and suburban commuters.
Third, the reliance on the automobile has led to a bias in the distribution of federal
funds. Low-income residents of Buffalo are shut out of employment opportunities in
suburban areas due to the inadequate system of public transportation. While the majority
of funds have been spent on highways and wider streets, public transportation has
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regressed to a point where it is less efficient than it was in the late-1800s. The Western
New York area cannot be a cohesive region without a comprehensive system of public
transportation.
Fourth, the demands of labor unions are not the sole reason for the decline of
manufacturing jobs in Western New York. While businesses did struggle with increasing
labor costs, a better relationship between the two parties, with the mediation of
government, could have prevented some of the jobs losses. Government must offer
incentives for businesses that stay in the area and place financial pressure (tariffs,
regulation) on those who move their operations overseas. The development in Buffalo’s
Hydraulics District is an example of cooperation between government and business that
has led to progress. However, labor unions must continue to be flexible in order to retain
jobs and help businesses stay competitive.
Lastly, in order to remain a viable, large city, Buffalo must be willing to learn from
similar cities that have had success in stabilizing economic and population loss. As
mentioned in chapter six, promoting immigration and helping immigrants to adjust to life
in Buffalo can help build communities to replace those that have migrated elsewhere.
Also, developing a comprehensive plan for vacant land should include the continued
support of organizations that assist residents in starting and maintaining community
gardens. Urban agriculture must be promoted and assisted by city government as a viable
alternative to new housing developments on large, vacant parcels. This will provide
sustenance for low-income areas rather than enriching developers. In addition, Buffalo
residents must continue to demand that the Erie Canal Harbor Development Corporation
provides a waterfront plan that grants access to the water and promotes the historic Erie
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Canal Terminus, rather than one that relies on failed approaches. Buffalo can be a viable,
but smaller city that is attractive to people of all races and socioeconomic statuses.

156
Bibliography-Primary Sources

American Iron and Steel Institute. The Steel Industry Today: A Report to the Cabinet
Committee on Economic Policy. New York, 1971.
The Association for the Encouragement of Manufacturers in the City of Buffalo. To
Manufacturers Who May be Seeking a Location for the Prosecution of Their
Business: A Brief Notice of Some of the Many Advantages Possessed by the City of
Buffalo, New York as a Manufacturing Town. Buffalo, 1860; accessed from the
Grosvenor Room of the Buffalo and Erie County Public Library.
Besag, Frank P. The Anatomy of a Riot. Buffalo: University Press at Buffalo, 1967.
Bethlehem Steel Corporation. Remarks by John E. Jacobs- Vice President of Bethlehem
Steel Corporation at Press Tour of Basic Oxygen Furnaces, Lackawanna Plant.
Buffalo, 1964.
Buffalo Business, May 1958.
Buffalo Business, September 1961.
Buffalo Business, May 1962.
Buffalo Board of Education: Advisory Planning Council on Desgregation. A Study of
Desgregation. Buffalo, 1972.
Buffalo Chamber of Commerce. The Great Lakes Grain Movement, Buffalo and the St.
Lawrence Seaway. Buffalo, 1929; accessed from the Grosvenor Room of the Buffalo
and Erie County Public Library.
Buffalo Board of Redevelopment. Neighborhood Conservation: Buffalo’s Pilot Project.
Buffalo, N.Y., 1960; accessed from the Grosvenor Room of the Buffalo and Erie
County Public Library.
Buffalo City Planning Association. The Thruways and Buffalo’s Future. Buffalo, N.Y.,
1946.
Buffalo City Planning Commission. The Modern City. Buffalo, N.Y., 1944.
Buffalo City Planning Commission. “Scajaquada Creek Parkway.” Buffalo, N.Y., 1953.
Buffalo Common Council. Proceedings of the Buffalo Common Council: January 7,
1964. Buffalo, N.Y., 1964; accessed from the Grosvenor Room of the Buffalo and
Erie County Public Library.

157

Buffalo Courier Express, February 1958March 1982.
Buffalo Members of the Niagara Frontier Transportation Study Committee. Staff Report
and Analysis of the Preliminary Evaluation of Alternative Public Transportation
Facilities Report. Buffalo, N.Y.: 1966.
Buffalo Municipal Housing Authority. A Primer of Housing Facts. Buffalo, N.Y., 1962;
accessed from the Grosvenor Room of the Buffalo and Erie County Public Library.
Buffalo Municipal Housing Authority. Annual Re-Examination of Tenants: State-Aided
Development. Buffalo, N.Y., 1965; accessed from the Grosvenor Room of the
Buffalo and Erie County Public Library.
Buffalo Municipal Housing Authority. Federal and State Developments and Summary.
Buffalo, N.Y., 1990.
Buffalo Municipal Housing Authority. Handbook and Report to the Commissioners.
Buffalo, N.Y., 1976; accessed from the Grosvenor Room of the Buffalo and Erie
County Public Library.
Buffalo Municipal Housing Authority. Redevelopment in Buffalo. Buffalo, N.Y., 1952;
accessed from the Grosvenor Room of the Buffalo and Erie County Public Library.
Buffalo Municipal Housing Authority. Ten Years of Progress (1934-1944). Buffalo,
N.Y., 1944; accessed from the Grosvenor Room of the Buffalo and Erie County
Public Library.
Buffalo News, October 1969December 2002.
Buffalo Olmsted Parks Conservancy. The Olmsted City. The Buffalo Olmsted Park
System: Plan for the 21st Century, edited by Robert G. Shibley and Lynda H.
Schneekloth. Buffalo, N.Y.: 2008.
Buffalo Rising. “Buffalo Green Code: Mayor Brown Announces Zoning Code
Overhaul,” BuffaloRising.com, Available from:
http://www.buffalorising.com/2010/04/buffalo-green-code-mayor-brown-announceszoning-code-overhaul.html. Internet; accessed 21 July 2010.
Buffalo Rising. “Showing Our Scars.” http://www.buffalorising.com/2010/09/mappingcity-owned-properties-tells-a-story-of-urban-decay.html
B.U.I.L.D. Incorporated. Papers and Records 1967-1976. From the Buffalo State College
Special Archives.

158
Center for Urban Education. A Plan for Accelerating Quality Integrated Education in the
Buffalo Public Schools, New York, N.Y.: 1966; available from
http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2sql/content_storage_01/0000019b/
80/33/44/ad.pdf
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. A Place to Call Home: The Crisis in Housing for
the Poor, Buffalo, N.Y., 1988; accessed from the Grosvenor Room of the Buffalo
and Erie County Public Library.
“Chamber Stand on Arterial Highways.” Buffalo Business, June 1954.
City of Buffalo. “City of Buffalo Owner-Occupied Housing Programs.” City of Buffalo
Website. Available from: http://www.citybuffalo.com/files/1_2_1/city_departments/SPlanning/pdfs/OwnerOccupiedPrograms.
pdf. Internet; accessed 21 July 2010.
City of Buffalo. Common Council. Special Committee on Community Development:
Public Hearings. Buffalo, N.Y. June, 1974. From the George Arthur Papers at City
of Buffalo. Comptroller’s Office. 153rd Annual Report of the Comptroller/City of
Buffalo, N.Y. Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1985. Buffalo, N.Y.: 1985.
City of Buffalo. Comptroller’s Office. 151st Annual Report of the Comptroller/City of
Buffalo, N.Y. Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1983. Buffalo, NY. : 1983.
City of Buffalo. Comptroller’s Office. 164th Annual Report of the Comptroller/City of
Buffalo, N.Y. Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 2009. Buffalo, N.Y.: 2009. Buffalo State
College Special Archives.
City of Buffalo Mayor’s Office. Buffalo Poverty Reduction Blueprint: A Roadmap for
Reducing Poverty in the City of Buffalo. Buffalo, 2009. Available from:
http://www.ci.buffalo.ny.us/files/1_2_1/Mayor/PressReleases/PovertyPlan.pdf.
Internet; accessed 21 July 2010.
City of Buffalo Office of Strategic Planning. Queen City in the 21st Century: Buffalo’s
Comprehensive Plan. Buffalo, 2006; accessed from the Grosvenor Room of the
Buffalo and Erie County Public Library.
“Cobey Settles Into New City Site.” Business First, March 26, 2007.
http://www.bizjournals.com/buffalo/stories/2007/03/26/daily13.html (accessed
January 14, 2011).
Coles, Robert T. “An Architect Looks at Buffalo.” Buffalo Business, October 1963.
Coles, Robert T. Letter to Lewis G. Harriman, Chairman of Area Committee for Transit,
28 December 1971, from the Robert T. Coles Papers: in Buffalo State College
Special Collections, E.H.Butler Library Research: accessed March 20, 2009.

159

Committee on Urban Research: State University of New York at Buffalo. Business and
Industry on the Niagara Frontier. Buffalo, 1963; accessed from the Grosvenor Room
of the Buffalo and Erie County Public Library.
Committee on Urban Studies. Urban Characteristics of the Niagara Frontier: An
Inventory. Buffalo, N.Y.: State University of New York at Buffalo, 1964.
The Congress of the United States Congressional Budget Office. The Effects Of Import
Quota on the Steel Industry, Washington 1984.
Dewey, Thomas E. “Today’s Erie Canal.” Christian Science Monitor, 30 August 1946, in
ProQuest Historical Newspapers [database on-line], Buffalo State College,
E.H.Butler Library Research: accessed March 1, 2009.
Erie and Niagara Counties Regional Planning Board. Evaluation of Transportation
Planning and its Impact on Regional Development. Buffalo, N.Y., 1969.
Erie County Citizens Organization. Redlining and Disinvestment in Buffalo. Buffalo,
N.Y., 1975.
Farkas, Karen. “Plan to Turn Cleveland’s West Shoreway into a Boulevard Gains
Momentum.” Cleveland Plain Dealer. December 5, 2008.
Federal Housing Administration, 1935 Underwriting Manual. Washington, D.C., 1935.
Model Cities Agency. Model City Program. Buffalo, N.Y., 1969.
George, Emmett. “Model Cities Time is Up-But Funds Keep Rolling In.” Chicago
Tribune, 30 January 1975, W4,in ProQuest Historical Newspapers [database online], Buffalo State College, E.H.Butler Library Research: accessed October 1,2006.
“Gottlieb Defends Thruway Project.” New York Times, 28 October 1946, in ProQuest
Historical Newspapers [database on-line], Buffalo State College, E.H.Butler Library
Research: accessed March 12,2009.
Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corporation R 635 F.2d 1007 (United States Court of Appeals,
Second Circuit. 1980).
Greater Buffalo Development Foundation. A Study of Community Benefits of Rapid
Transit Development in the Buffalo-Amherst Corridor. Buffalo, N.Y., 1975.
Greater Buffalo Development Foundation. Rapid Transit Station Areas Analysis for the
Buffalo-Amherst Corridor. Buffalo, N.Y., 1973.
Gridplan. “Humboldt Parkway and the Kensington Expressway: A History.” Available
from: http://danreitz.com/gridplan/?p=36. Internet; accessed 20 March 2011.

160

Hallett, Robert M. “$450 Million ‘Thruway’ to Speed N.Y. Traffic.” Christian Science
Monitor, 22 June 1950, in ProQuest Historical Newspapers [database on-line],
Buffalo State College, E.H.Butler Library Research: accessed March 1, 2009.
Harmon, Richard. Wake-Up in the Split-Level Casbah, November 1968, from the Robert
T. Coles Papers: in Buffalo State College Special Collections, E.H.Butler Library
Research: accessed March 20, 2009.
Harriman, Lewis G. Letter to Robert T. Coles, 20 October 1971, from the Robert T.
Coles Papers: in Buffalo State College Special Collections, E.H.Butler Library
Research: accessed March 20, 2009.
“Kensington Expressway Project a Bargain Deal for Buffalonians.” Buffalo Business,
June 1954.
Local Initiatives Support Corporation. Blueprint Buffalo: Regional Strategies and Local
Tools for Reclaiming Vacant Properties in the City and Suburbs of Buffalo. Buffalo,
2006. Available from:
http://www.vacantproperties.org/resources/BuffaloBrief_FINAL.pdf. Internet;
accessed 21 July 2010.
Manufacturers and Traders Trust Company. Planning the City. Buffalo, N.Y., 1925.
Milstein, Milton. “Another Look at Buffalo’s Architecture.” Buffalo Business, November
1963.
Model Cities Agency. Model City Program. Buffalo, N.Y., 1969.
“Murphy Hits Masten Plan.” Buffalo Criterion, 8 May 1959.
National Urban League. Race, Fear and Housing in a Typical American Community.
New York, N.Y., 1946; accessed from the Grosvenor Room of the Buffalo and Erie
County Public Library.
New York State Department of Public Works. Niagara Frontier Transportation Study.
Albany: State University of New York at Albany, 1966.
New York State Department of Public Works. “Report on New York State Thruways and
Arterial Routes: The Buffalo Urban Area.” Buffalo, N.Y.: 1946.
New York State Department of Transportation. NY Route 198 Scajaquada Corridor
Study: Grant Street to Parkside Avenue. Amherst, 2005.
New York State Thruway Authority. 8th Annual Report. Elsmere, N.Y., 1958.

161
Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority. Application of the NFTA for a Mass
Transportation Capital Improvement Grant Under the Urban Mass Transportation
Act of 1964. Buffalo, N.Y., 1974.
Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority. Metro for Buffalo: Transit Alternatives for the
Buffalo-Amherst Corridor. Buffalo, N.Y.: 1976.
Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority. A Transit Development Program for the
Niagara Frontier Region: Niagara Frontier Mass Transit Study. Buffalo, N.Y.,
1964.
Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority. A Transit Development Program for the
Niagara Frontier Region: Niagara Frontier Mass Transit Study. Buffalo, N.Y.,
1971.
Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority. A Transit Development Program for the
Niagara Frontier Region: NFTA Map. Buffalo, N.Y., 1974.
North American Urban Agriculture Committee of the Community Food Security
Coalition. Urban Agriculture and Community Food Security in the United States:
Farming from the City Center to the Urban Fringe. Available from:
http://www.foodsecurity.org/PrimerCFSCUAC.pdf. Internet; accessed 27 July 2010.
O’Connell, Francis J. “Buffalo’s Concrete Accomplishments.” Buffalo Business, October
1964.
Olmsted, Frederick L. Civilizing American Cites: Writing on City Landscapes, edited by
S.B. Sutton. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1971.
Pierce, Bert. “Speed-Up of Work on Thruway Urged.” New York Times, 14 September
1949, in ProQuest Historical Newspapers [database on-line], Buffalo State College,
E.H.Butler Library Research: accessed March 12,2009.
“The Pothole: Made in the U.S.A.” Courier Express, 15 March 1982, in Buffalo State
College Special Collections, E.H.Butler Library Research: accessed March 20, 2009.
“Property Owners Protest: Ellicott District Property Owners Not Pleased With Prices
Offered.” Buffalo Criterion, 13 September 1958.
Roth, Richard J. “Quiet Rites Mark Transit Tunneling Kickoff.” Courier Express, 3 April
1979, in Buffalo State College Special Collections, E.H.Butler Library Research:
accessed March 20, 2009.
“Senator Metcalf Explained Anti-Bias Bill Sunday.” Buffalo Criterion, 31 January 1959.

162
State University of New York at Buffalo. Committee on Urban Studies. Urban
Characteristics of the Niagara Frontier: An Inventory. Buffalo, N.Y., 1964.
“State Will Build Buffalo Thruway.” New York Times, 8 June 1946, in ProQuest
Historical Newspapers [database on-line], Buffalo State College, E.H.Butler Library
Research: accessed March 12,2009.
Third Annual Tri-City/County Conference. The Buffalo Area Economy. Buffalo, New
York, June 3-4, 1979. Accessed from the Monroe Fordham Regional History Center
at Buffalo State College.
Thomas, Lowell. The New York Thruway Story. Buffalo, N.Y., Henry Stewart
Incorporated, 1955.
Ticknor, Samuel H. M&T Bank and Research. The Economic History of Buffalo, 18251984. Buffalo, 1985. Accessed from the Monroe Fordham Regional History Center
at Buffalo State College.
United States Census Bureau. United States Census 2000: Profile of Selected Social
Characteristics; available from http://censtats.census.gov/data/NY/1603611000.pdf
and http://censtats.census.gov/data/NY/05036029.pdf; Internet; accessed 21 March
2010.
United States Census Bureau. Fourteenth Census of the United States: Composition of
the Characteristics of the Population for Wards of Cities of 50,00 or More; available
from http://www2.census.gov/prod2/decennial/documents/4108456no554ch5.pdf;
Internet; accessed 21 March 2010.
United States Census Bureau. 1940 Census Tracts; accessed from the Grosvenor Room
of the Buffalo and Erie County Public Library.
United States Census Bureau. 1966 Census Tracts: Population of Buffalo, Towns and
Villages; accessed from the Grosvenor Room of the Buffalo and Erie County Public
Library.
United States Census Bureau. Seventeenth Census of the United States: Characteristics of
the Population for New York; available from
http://www2.census.gov/prod2/decennial/documents/41557421v3p1ch4.pdf
United States Census Bureau, Sixteenth Census of the United States: Characteristics of
the Population for New York; available from
http://www2.census.gov/prod2/decennial/documents/33973538v2p5ch2.pdf
United States Census Bureau. The Seventeenth United States Census: 1950 U.S. City
Population Rankings; available from:

163
http://www.census.gov/population/documentation/twps0027/tab18.txt. Internet;
accessed 2 July 2010.
United States Census Bureau. 2006-2008 American Community Survey: 3-Year
Estimates; available from http://factfinder.census.gov. Internet; accessed 2 July
2010.
United States Census Bureau. United States Census 2007:Selected Statistics by Economic
Sector, 2007; available from http://www.census.gov/econ/census07/. Internet;
accessed 2 July 2010.
United States Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics. Overview of the 2008-18
Projections; Available from: http://www.bls.gov/oco/oco2003.htm. Internet;
accessed 2 July 2010.
University at Buffalo University at Buffalo Map Collection: available from
http://library.buffalo.edu/maps/buffalo-wnymaps/newmap.html. Internet; accessed
18 February 2011.
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. The Office of Community
Planning and Development, Evaluation Division. The Model Cites Program: A
Comparative Analysis of City Response Patterns and Their Relation to Future Urban
Policy. Washington, D.C.: 1973.
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. The Office of Community
Planning and Development. State-Designated Enterprise Zones-Ten Case Studies.
Washington, D.C.: 1987.
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. The Office of Policy Development
and Research and The Office of Community Planning and Development. Citizen
Participation in Community Development: A Catalog of Local Approaches.
Washington, D.C.: 1978.
Western New York Heritage Press. “South Division Street, Then and Now-1954.”
http://wnyheritagepress.org/photos_week_2005/inner_city/inner_city_1954.htm
(accessed 11 November 2010).
Youngstown Neighborhood Development Corporation. Programs. Youngstown, 2010.
Available from: http://www.yndc.org/programs. Internet; accessed 21 July 2010.

164
Bibliography-Secondary Sources

Ahlbrandt, Roger S., Richard J. Fruehan and Frank Giarratani. The Renaissance of
American Steel: Lessons for Managers in Competitive Industries. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1996
Alligood, Li Sun. “Creative Shrinkage: In Search of a Strategy to Manage Decline.”
BUP/MCP Thesis, University of Cincinnati, Design, Architecture, Art and Planning :
Community Planning, 2008. Available from: http://etd.ohiolink.edu/sendpdf.cgi/ALLIGOOD%20LI%20SUN.pdf?ucin1212081537. Internet; accessed 26
July 2010.
Almeida, Tangerine M., and Daniel Baldwin Hess, “Impact of Proximity to Light Rail
Rapid Transit on Station-area Property Values in Buffalo, New York,” Urban
Studies 44, no.5/6 (May 2007): 1041-1068.
Americorps. National Service. Greenhouse Goes Up at Queen City Farms. Available
from: http://www.wnyamericorps.org/greenhouse-goes-queen-city-farms. Internet;
accessed 20 March 2011.
Anders, George. Merchants of Debt: KKR and the Mortgaging of American Business,
Washington, Beard Books, 1992.
Baer, Susan E. “Gentrification and the Role of Community Organizations in AfricanAmerican Displacement.” Ph D. diss., University of Maryland, 1998.
Beauregard, Robert A. Voices of Decline: The Postwar Fate of U.S. Cities. New York:
Routledge, 2003.
Beimborn, Edward and Robert Puentes. In Taking the High Road: A Metropolitan
Agenda for Transportation Reform, Eds. Bruce Katz and Robert Puentes.
Washington: The Brookings Institute, 2005.
Bendick, Marc Jr. and David W. Rasmussen. “Enterprise Zones and Inner-City Economic
Revitalization,” in Reagan and the Cities, edited by George E. Peterson and Carol
W. Lewis. Washington: The Urban Institute Press, 1986.
Bensman, David and Roberta Lynch. Rusted Dreams: Hard Times in a Steel Community.
New York: McGraw-Hill, 1987.
Blumenberg, Evelyn and Margy Waller. In Taking the High Road: A Metropolitan
Agenda for Transportation Reform, Eds. Bruce Katz and Robert Puentes.
Washington: The Brookings Institute, 2005.

165
Buffalo Architecture and History. “The History of Buffalo, New York.” Accessed from:
http://buffaloah.com/h/histindex.html. Internet; accessed 29 July 2010.
Buffalo Architecture and History. “The Larkin Building, Buffalo, NY: History of the
Demolition.” Accessed from: http://www.buffaloah.com/h/larkin/admin/index.html.
Internet; accessed 29 July 2010.
Buffalo News, June 2003December 2010.
Buffalo Olmsted Parks Conservancy. The Olmsted City. The Buffalo Olmsted Park
System: Plan for the 21st Century, edited by Robert G. Shibley and Lynda H.
Schneekloth. Buffalo, N.Y.: 2008.
Capgemini and Merrill Lynch, World Wealth Report:2008; available from
http://www.us.capgemini.com/DownloadLibrary/files/Capgemini_FS_WWR08.pdf.
Internet; accessed 2 July 2010.
Christie, Les.“You Can’t Pay Them Enough to Leave.” CNNMoney.com.24 April 2008.
Available from:
http://money.cnn.com/2008/04/15/real_estate/Youngstown_plan_roadblock/index.ht
m. Internet; accessed 21 July 2010.
The Circle Association. African American History of Western New York State:19001935; available from http://www.math.buffalo.edu/~sww/0history/1900-1935.html;
Internet; accessed 21 March 2010.
Cobb, James Charles. The Selling of the South: The Southern Crusade for Industrial
Development 1936-1990. Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1993.
"Company Histories: National Gypsum." Funding Universe; available from
http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/National-Gypsum-CompanyCompany-History.html. Internet; accessed 24 February 2011.
Congress for the New Urbanism. Portland’s Harbor Drive. Available from
http://www.cnu.org/highways/portland. Internet; accessed 20 March 2011.
Cope, Meghan and Frank Latcham. “Narratives of Decline: Race, Poverty, and Youth in
the Context of Postindustrial Urban Angst.” The Professional Geographer 61, no.2
(2009): 150-163. EBSCOhost Research. Database on-line. Buffalo State College,
E.H.Butler Library Research; accessed March 6, 2010.
Crocker, Jarle. “Rochester Uses Citizen Stakeholders to Revitalize Inner-City
Neighborhoods,” in Cities and Growth: A Policy Handbook, ed. Roger L. Kemp,
182-187. London, McFarland and Company, 2008.

166
“Death of Humboldt Parkway.” HotBuffalo.Com. Available from:
http://www.hotbuffalo.com/index.php/2008/08/21/death-of-humboldt-parkway.
Internet; accessed 20 March 2011.
Dillaway, Diana. Power Failure: Politics, Patronage, and the Economic Future of
Buffalo, New York. Amherst: Prometheus Books, 2006.
Environmental Advocates of New York. Brownfields. Available from:
http://www.eany.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&catid=36%3Ais
sues&id=178%3Abrownfields-&Itemid=79. Internet; accessed 20 March 2010.
Fein, Michael R. Paving the Way: New York Road Building and the American State,
1880-1956. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2008.
Fink, James. “Call Out for Erie County Planning Board.” Business First, February 12,
2009. Available from:
http://www.bizjournals.com/buffalo/stories/2009/02/09/daily53.html. Internet;
accessed 26 July 2010.
Fisher, Bruce. “ What Will it Take?” Artvoice 6, no.44 (October 31, 2007). Available
from: http://artvoice.com/issues/v6n44/news/what_it_will_take. Internet; accessed
26 July 2010.
Fleron, Lou Jean, Howard Stanger and Eileen Patton. Employment Workplace Practices
and Labor-Management Relations in Western New York. (Buffalo, NY: Western
Region, ILR School, Cornell University, 2004): 49; accessed from the Grosvenor
Room of the Buffalo and Erie County Public Library.
Ford, Larry R. America’s New Downtowns: Revitalization or Reinvention? Baltimore:
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003.
Frankenberg, Erica and Chungmei Lee. Race In American Public Schools: Rapidly
Resegregating School Districts. Cambridge, MA: The Civil Rights Project of
Harvard University, 2002; 1-24; available from
http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/deseg/Race_in_American_Public_Sc
hools1.pdf. Internet; accessed 2May 2010.
Freeman, Richard. “Is Declining Unionization of the U.S. Good, Bad, or Irrelevant?,” in
Unions and Economic Competitiveness, eds. Lawrence Mishel and Paula B. Voos,
143-168. New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1992.
Freund, David M.P. Colored Property. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007.
Frieden, Bernard J. and Lynne B. Sagalyn. Downtown, Inc.: How America Rebuilds Its
Cities. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989.

167
Friedhoff, Alec , Howard Wial, and Harold Wolman. The Consequences of Metropolitan
Manufacturing Decline: Testing Conventional Wisdom. (Washington, D.C.: The
Brookings Institution, 2010):4; Accessed from:
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/reports/2010/1216_manufacturing_wial_
friedhoff/1216_manufacturing_wial_friedhoff.pdf. Internet; accessed 14 January
2011.
Frug, Gerald E. City Making: Building Communities Without Building Walls. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1999.
The Fruit Belt: A Story of Family, Resilience, and Hope. DVD. Produced and directed by
Sharon Benz, Jessica Incorvaia, Amanda Walser and Katie Bartolotta. 31 minutes.
2006; Buffalo, NY: Daemen College, 2006.
Gibson , Campbell. "Population Of The 100 Largest Cities And Other Urban Places In
The United States: 1790 To 1990", June 1998; available from Population Division,
U.S. Bureau of the Census.
<http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0027.html. Internet;
accessed 2 May 2006.
Glaeser, Edward L. “Can Buffalo Ever Come Back?” City Journal, October 2007.
Available from: http://www.city-journal.org/html/17_4_buffalo_ny.html. Internet;
accessed 24 July 2010.
Godfather II. DVD. Directed by Francis Ford Coppola. 1972; Los Angeles, CA:
Paramount, 2005.
Goldman, Mark. City on the Edge: Buffalo, N.Y. Amherst: Prometheus Books, 2007.
Goldman, Mark. City on the Lake: The Challenge of Change in Buffalo, N.Y. Amherst:
Prometheus Books, 1990.
Goldman, Mark. “First There Was Black Rock.” Buffalo Architecture and History.
Available from: http://www.buffaloah.com/h/br/brgold/index.html Internet; accessed
3 March 2009.
Goldman, Mark. High Hopes: The Rise and Decline of Buffalo, New York. Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1983.
Gotham, Kevin Fox “Racialization and the State: The Housing Act of 1934 and the
Creation of the Federal Housing Administration,” Socialogical Perspectives, 43, no.2
(2000): 291-317. EBSCOhost Research. Database on-line. Buffalo State College,
E.H.Butler Library Research; accessed March 6, 2010.
Graebner, William. Coming of Age in Buffalo: Youth and Authority in the Postwar Era.
Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990.

168

Grassroots Gardens of Buffalo. Available from: http://www.grassrootsgardens.org/.
Internet; accessed 20 March 2010.
Gratz, Roberta Brandes. “A Conversation with Jane Jacobs.” Tikkun Magazine, May/June
2001
Grogan, Paul S. and Tony Proscio. Comeback Cities: A Blueprint for Urban
Neighborhood Revival. Boulder: Westview Press, 2000.
Haase, Dagmar. “Urban Ecology of Shrinking Cities: An Unrecognized Opportunity?”
Nature and Culture 3, no. 1 (2008): 1-8.
Hall, Christopher G.L. Steel Phoenix: The Fall and Rise of the U.S. Steel Industry. New
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997.
Hawkins, Benjamin M. “The Impact of the Enterprise Zone on Urban Areas”, Growth
and Change, 15, no. 1 (1984): 35-40.
Hawkins, William L. Jr. “CDBG: A Practitioner Looks Back.” Journal of Housing and
Community Development. 56, no. 4 (1999): 34-35-6. EBSCOhost Research. Database
on-line. Buffalo State College, E.H.Butler Library Research; accessed October 1,
2006.
Hirsch, Barry T. and John T. Addison. The Economic Analysis of Unions: New
Approaches and Evidence. Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1986.
Hoerr, John P. And the Wolf Finally Came: The Decline of the American Steel Industry.
Pittsburgh, The University of Pittsburgh Press, 1988.
Holland, Max. When the Machine Stopped: A Cautionary Tale from Industrial America.
Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1989.
Hollander, Justin P. “Moving Toward a Shrinking Cities Metric: Analyzing Land Use
changes Associated With Depopulation in Flint, Michigan.” Citiscape: A Journal of
Policy Development and Research 12, no.1 (2010): 133-151.
Jackson, Kenneth T. “A Nation of Cities: The Federal Government and the Shape of the
American Metropolis.” The Annals of the American Academy 626, no. 1 (2009): 1120. EBSCOhostResearch [database on-line], Buffalo State College, E.H.Butler
Library Research: accessed 15 July 2010.
Jackson, Kenneth T. Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States. New
York: Oxford University Press, 1985.

169
Jacobs, Jane. Cities and the Wealth of Nations: Principles of Economic Life. New York:
Random House, 1984.
Jacobs, Jane. The Death and Life of American Cities. New York: The Modern Library,
1961.
Kalas, John W. “Reindustrialization in New York: The Role of the State University,” in
Reindustrializing New York State: Strategies, Implications, Challenges, eds. Morton
Schoolman and Alvin Magid, 281-312. Albany: State University of New York Press,
1986.
Karmin, Monroe W. “What’s the Status of Urban Uplift.” Wall Street Journal, 30
January 1969, in ProQuest Historical Newspapers [database on-line], Buffalo State
College, E.H.Butler Library Research: accessed October 1,2006.
Kasinitz, Philip, John H. Mollenkopf, Mary C. Waters and Jennifer Holdaway. Inheriting
the City: The Children of Immigrants Come of Age. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 2008.
Katz, Bruce Robert Puentes and Scott Bernstein. In Taking the High Road: A
Metropolitan Agenda for Transportation Reform, Eds. Bruce Katz and Robert
Puentes. Washington: The Brookings Institute, 2005.
Katznelson, Ira. When Affirmative Action Was White: An Untold History of Racial
Inequality in Twentieth-Century America. New York: Norton, 2005.
Keating, Dennis. “Cleveland: A Midwestern Rustbelt City Struggles to Sur(Re)vive.”
Urban Futures Seminar: Durham University and University of Tesside, United
Kingdom, 10 September 2007.
Kolson, Kenneth. Big Plans: the Allure and Folly of Urban Design. Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 2001.
Koritz, Douglas. “Restructuring or Destructuring?: Deindustrialization in Two Industrial
Heartland Cities.” Urban Affairs Review, no.26 (1991): 497-511.
EBSCOhostResearch [database on-line], Buffalo State College, E.H.Butler Library
Research: accessed July 10,2010.
Kowsky, Francis R. The Best Planned City: The Olmsted Legacy in Buffalo. Buffalo:
Buffalo State College Foundation, 1992.
Kraus, Neil. Race, Neighborhoods, and Community Power: Buffalo Politics, 1934-1997.
Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000.
Kromer, John. Neighborhood Recovery: Reinvestment Policy for the New Hometown.
New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2000.

170

Kujawa, Richard S. “The Urban Development Action Grant Program (UDAG),” in
Encyclopedia of Urban America: The Cities and Suburbs, edited by.N.L. Shumsky
(Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 1998).
Ladd, Brian. Autophobia: Love and Hate in the Automotive Age. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2008.
Lay, Shawn. Hooded Knights on the Niagara: The Ku Klux Klan in Buffalo, New York,
New York: New York University Press, 1995.
Leary, Thomas E. and Elizabeth Sholes. From Fire to Rust: Business, Technology and
Work at the Lackawanna Steel Plant, 1899-1983. Buffalo: Buffalo and Erie County
Historical Society, 1987.
Lemann, Nicholas. “The Myth of Community Development.” New York Times. 9 January
1994.
Massey, Douglass S. and Nancy A. Denton. American Apartheid: Segregation and the
Making of the Underclass. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993.
McGovern, Stephen J. “Ideology, Consciousness, and Inner-City Development: The Case
of Stephen Goldsmith’s Indianapolis.” Journal of Urban Affairs 25, no.1 (2003): 125. EBSCOhost Research. Database on-line. Buffalo State College, E.H.Butler
Library Research; accessed November 11, 2006.
Meyer, Brian. “Council hopes stimulus plan will extend Metro Rail.” Buffalo News, 4
February 2009, Available from buffalonews.com. Available from:
http://www.buffalonews.com/cityregion/buffaloerie/story/569006.html. Internet;
accessed 1 April 2009.
McKinley, Dave. “Urban Farming Catching On In Buffalo and Across America.”
WGRZ.com. March 2010. Available from:
http://www.wgrz.com/news/local/story.aspx?storyid=75660&catid=37. Internet;
accessed 23 July 2010.
McMahon, Edward T. “Lowell, Other Cities Preserve Their Heritage,” in Cities and
Growth: A Policy Handbook, ed. Roger L. Kemp, 147-150. London, McFarland and
Company, 2008.
Model City, Buffalo, N.Y. Produced by Doug Ruffin Enterprises, 2005. 2 DVD’s.
Mohl, Raymond A. “The Second Ghetto and the ‘Infiltration Theory’ in Urban Real
Estate,” in Urban Planning and the African-American Community, eds. June M.
Thomas and Marsha Ritzdorf, 58-75. London, Sage Publications, 1997.

171
Myers, Dowell. Immigrants and Boomers: Forging a New Social Contract for the Future
of America. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2007.
"New Hires in UAW No Longer Tops. MSNBC." MSNBC. Available from:
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/37789668/ns/business-autos/. Internet; accessed 23
February 2011.
New York State Thruway Authority. “Construction Costs.” Available from:
http://www.nysthruway.gov/about/factbook/index.html Internet; accessed 1 March
2009.
Norquist, John O. The Wealth of Cities: Revitalizing the Centers of American Life.
Reading: Perseus Books, 1998.
Parris, Terry. “Shrinking Right: How Youngstown is miles ahead of Detroit.” Hi
Velocity. 3 June, 2010. Available from:
http://www.hivelocitymedia.com/features/Youngstown6_3_10.aspx. Internet;
accessed 21 July 2010.
Pearlman, Ellen. “Memphis Focuses on Housing to Save Its Downtown,” in Cities and
Growth: A Policy Handbook, ed. Roger L. Kemp, 151-155. London, McFarland and
Company, 2008.
Perry, David. “The Politics of Dependency in Deindustrializing America: The Case of
Buffalo, New York,” in The Capitalist City, eds. Michael Peter Smith and Joe R.
Feagan, 113-137. New York: Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1987.
Peters, Alan H. and Peter S. Fisher. State Enterprise Zone Programs: Have They
Worked? Kalamazoo: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 2002.
Pleeter, Saul. “The Effects of Public Housing on Neighboring Property Values and Rents
in Buffalo, N.Y.” Ph D. diss., University of Buffalo, 1971.
Popper, Deborah and Frank Popper. “Smart Decline in Post-Carbon Cities: The Buffalo
Commons Meets Buffalo, New York.” The Post Carbon Institute. Available from:
http://www.postcarbon.org/Reader/PCReader-Popper-Decline.pdf. Internet; accessed
21 July 2010.
Price, Alfred D. “Urban Renewal: The Case of Buffalo, NY.” Review of Black Political
Economy 19, no. 3 (1991): 125-160. EBSCOhost Research. Database on-line.
Buffalo State College, E.H.Butler Library Research; accessed March 6, 2010.
Rabin, Yale “The Persistence of Racial Isolation: The Role of Government Action and
Inaction,” in Urban Planning and the African American Community: In the Shadow,
eds. June M. Thomas and Marsha Ritzdorf, 93-108. London: Sage Publications,
1997.

172

Rae, Douglass W. City: Urbanism and Its End. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003.
Rusk, David. Cities Without Suburbs. Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2003.
Rybczynski, Witold and Peter D. Linneman. “How to Save Our Shrinking Cities.” Public
Interest, no. 135 (Spring,1999): 30-44. Available from:
http://www.nationalaffairs.com/doclib/20080709_19991353howtosaveourshrinkingc
itieswitoldrybczynski.pdf. Internet; accessed 21 July 2010.
Schatz, Laura. “Innovation in the Face of Population Decline: “Smart Shrinkage” in
Youngstown, Ohio.” Paper prepared for ACSP/AESOP Roundtable and SCiRN PhD
Academy Chicago, Illinois, July 2008. Available from:
http://mailer.fsu.edu/~iaudirac/garnet-iaudirac/WEB2/Youngstown_LSchatz.pdf.
Internet; accessed 21 July 2010.
Schilling, Joseph and Jonathan Logan. “Greening the Rust Belt: A Green Infrastructure
Model for Right-Sizing America’s Shrinking Cities.” Journal of the American
Planning Association 74, no.4 (2008): 451-466.
Shoch, James. “Organized Labor Versus Globalization: NAFTA, Fast Track, and PTNR
with China,” in Rekindling the Movement: Labor’s Quest for Relevance in the
Twenty-First Century, eds. Lowell Turner, Harry C. Katz, and Richard W. Hurd,
275-313. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2001.
Seattle Department of Transportation. Seattle Urban Mobility Plan: Case Studies in
Urban Freeway Removal. Seattle, 2007.
Silverman, Robert M. “Mortgage Lending Disparities in Metropolitan Buffalo:
Implications for Community Reinvestment Policy.” The Journal of Regional
Analysis and Policy 38, no.1 (2008): 36-44. EBSCOhost Research. Database on-line.
Buffalo State College, E.H.Butler Library Research; accessed March 6, 2010.
Stein, Judith. Running Steel, Running America: Race, Economic Policy, and the Decline
of Liberalism. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1998.
Strohmeyer, John. Crisis in Bethlehem: Big Steel’s Struggle to Survive. Pittsburgh: The
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1986.
Sullivan , Margaret M.“Buffalo,” in World Book Advanced.
http://worldbookonline.com/advanced/article?id=ar081380&st=buffalo: accessed
March 1, 2010.
Taylor, Steven J.L. Desegregation in Boston and Buffalo: The Influence of Local
Leaders. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998.

173
Teaford, Jon. C. The Rough Road to Renaissance: Urban Revitalization in America,
1940-1985. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990.
Tiffany, Paul A. The Decline of American Steel: How Management, Labor, and
Government Went Wrong. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988.
Thomas, June Manning. “Model Cities Revisited: Issues of Race and Empowerment,” in
Urban Planning and the African-American Community, eds. June M. Thomas and
Marsha Ritzdorf, 143-200. London, Sage Publications, 1997.
Trent-Scales, Judy “School Desegregation in Buffalo: The Hold of History,” The
Harvard Blackletter Journal, 7 (1990): 116-118. EBSCOhost Research. Database
on-line. Buffalo State College, E.H.Butler Library Research; accessed April 1, 2010.
Tyson, James L. “Has ‘Mistake on the Lake’ Been Fixed?” Christian Science Monitor, 28
April 1995, in ProQuest Historical Newspapers [database on-line], Buffalo State
College, E.H.Butler Library Research: accessed 3 March 2009.
Vaughters, Al.”Is Vacant Lot Opportunity for Growth?” WIBV. Com. 6 April 2009.
Available from:
http://www.wivb.com/dpp/news/is_vacant_lot_opportunity_for_growth_090406.
Internet; accessed 21 March 2010.
Von Hoffman, Alexander. House by House, Block by Block: The Rebirth of America’s
Urban Neighborhoods. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.
Welcoming Center for New Pennsylvanians. Urban Revitalization in Philadelphia:
Immigrant Entrepreneurship and Improving Opportunity in the Local Economy.
Philadelphia, 2004. Available from:
http://www.welcomingcenter.org/pdfs/ImmigrantEntrepreneurship.pdf. Internet;
accessed 21 July 2010.
Walters, Stephen J.K. “Unions and the Decline of U.S. Cities.” The Cato Journal 30, no.
1 (2010). http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj30n1/cj30n1-6.pdf
Warren, Kenneth. Bethlehem Steel: Builder and Arsenal of America. Pittsburgh: The
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008.
WGRZ. “Abandoned Housing Crisis In Buffalo.” Accessed from:
http://www.wgrz.com/news/local/story.aspx?storyid=76773&catid=13. Internet;
accessed 25 July 2010.
Wolcott, Victoria W. “Recreation and Race in the Postwar City: Buffalo's 1956 Crystal
Beach Riot.” The Journal of American History 93, no. 1 (2006): 63-90. EBSCOhost
Research. Database on-line. Buffalo State College, E.H.Butler Library Research;
accessed March 6, 2010.

174

